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Abstract 
 
The central aim of this dissertation is to make an unambiguous international trade policy 
recommendation for developing countries grounded on rigorous economic theory. As is 
generally known, trade models featuring increasing returns to scale and imperfect 
competition have challenged the mainstream case for free trade which is built upon 
unrealistic assumptions like constant return to scale and perfect competition. In this 
context, the core contribution of this dissertation is the restatement of the original free-
trade case made by the classical political economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo. 
This restatement is based on the accurate interpretation of Ricardo’s famous numerical 
example in chapter 7 of the Principles. The classical case for free trade formulated by 
Smith and Ricardo neither relies on unrealistic assumptions nor the laissez-faire 
doctrine. On the contrary, it stipulates that free trade should always be accompanied by 
public policies that expand the provision of public education, job training, health care 
and infrastructure. Moreover, a widespread policy change towards free trade should 
always be implemented gradually, in order to take care of those groups who might be 
affected in the short run by the increased level of international competition and 
technological progress. The main conclusion of the dissertation is that free trade – as 
conceived by classical political economy – is the most suitable international trade policy 
for developed as well developing countries for achieving sustainable economic growth 
and development.  
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Das zentrale Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, eine internationale Handelspolitik für 
Entwicklungsländer zu empfehlen, die auf einer rigorosen ökonomischen Theorie 
beruht. Wie allgemein bekannt ist, haben theoretische Handelsmodelle mit steigenden 
Skalenerträgen und unvollkommenem Wettbewerb die traditionellen Handelsmodelle 
mit konstanten Skalenerträgen und vollkommenem Wettbewerb in den letzten Jahren 
zunehmend verdrängt, und die darauf beruhende These über die generellen Vorteile des 
Freihandels in Zweifel gezogen. In diesem Zusammenhang besteht der wesentliche 
Beitrag dieser Dissertation in der Überarbeitung der klassischen Freihandelstheorie, wie 
sie von den klassischen politischen Ökonomen Adam Smith und David Ricardo 
ursprünglich formuliert worden ist. Diese Überarbeitung besteht im Wesentlichen in der 
korrekten Interpretation des berühmten numerischen Beispiels über die komparativen 
Kostenvorteile von Ricardo in Kapitel 7 seines Buchs Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation. Die klassische Freihandelstheorie von Smith und Ricardo basiert weder auf 
unrealistischen theoretischen Annahmen noch auf der Laissez-faire-Doktrin. Beide 
Ökonomen plädieren dafür, die Freihandelspolitik mit öffentlichen Investitionen in den 
Bereichen Bildung, Gesundheitsversorgung und Infrastruktur zu ergänzen. Darüber 
hinaus sollte der Freihandel immer nur schrittweise umgesetzt werden, um jene 
gesellschaftlichen Gruppen zu schützen, die kurzfristig durch die Intensivierung des 
internationalen Wettbewerbs und des technologischen Fortschritts negativ betroffen 
sein könnten. Als wichtigste Schlussfolgerung der Dissertation ist festzuhalten, dass der 
Freihandel – wie er von der klassischen politischen Ökonomie ursprünglich konzipiert 
worden ist – die am besten geeignetste internationale Handelspolitik zur Erzielung eines 
nachhaltigen wirtschaftlichen Wachstums ist. 
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Preface 
No one who cannot rejoice in the discovery of his own 
mistakes deserves to be called a scholar. 
Donald Foster 
When I started to write this doctoral thesis, I could not foresee that it would take me 
approximately five years to conclude it. Obviously, the objective of making a trade poli-
cy recommendation for developing countries based on rigorous economic theory 
proved to be a more wide-ranging and harder to accomplish task than anticipated. 
Although I had been interested in the polemical and contested issue of free trade 
since my undergraduate studies in Economics at the University of Havana, I hardly con-
sidered myself an expert on the subject at the beginning of this project. In the midst of 
the literature review process it was particularly challenging for me to truly understand 
the ubiquitous concept of comparative advantage. I was puzzled by the fact that while 
David Ricardo was often credited in the economic literature as the author of compara-
tive advantage, some well-known economists criticized him for his allegedly erroneous 
demonstration of this concept. 
Furthermore, the case for free trade seemed to rely on theoretic trade models built 
upon unrealistic assumptions like constant return to scale and perfect competition. The-
se traditional trade models had been challenged by newer trade models featuring 
increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition. 
In addition to the challenge in the academic sphere, the case for free trade seemed to 
be refuted in the real world as well. Free trade policies were important ingredients of the 
neoliberal economic reforms implemented throughout Latin America in the 1990s. They 
were part of a broader laissez faire approach to the economy recommended by the ne-
oliberal agenda, which had produced high social costs among vast sectors of the 
population in the countries where it had been implemented. How could a trade policy 
endorsed by the so-called Washington Consensus be in the best interest of developing 
countries after all? 
Not surprisingly, at the beginning of my research I was rather skeptical that a free 
trade policy could spur economic growth in developing countries. My gradual process of 
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conversion from a critic to a supporter of free trade started with the discovery of a pa-
per written by Ruffin (2002), which referred to Sraffa’s article of 1930. These two 
articles put forward a different interpretation of the four numbers in the numerical ex-
ample of chapter 7 of David Ricardo’s book Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. I 
immediately realized that it was necessary for me to forget what I had previously read 
about comparative advantage in the economic textbooks, in order to be able to study 
without prejudice the insights and implications of the numerical demonstration of com-
parative advantage in the Principles. 
While reading the Principles, I discovered that for truly understanding Ricardo’s propo-
sitions on foreign trade, it was indispensable for me to become familiar with Adam 
Smith’s book An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. This book does 
not only mark the beginning of the establishment of economics — or political economy, 
as Smith used to call it — as an independent academic discipline, but also contains the 
first formulation of a systematic and comprehensive case for free trade in the history of 
economic thought. 
The exhaustive study of these two seminal books and the related literature resulted in 
the restatement of the classical case for free trade. This restatement proved to be a quite 
formidable challenge, which explains, along with some personal circumstances, the unu-
sual amount of time that took me to write the dissertation. 
Now that the task is accomplished, I would like to thank all those who have assisted 
me in one way or the other during this process. First I have to thank the Latin American 
Institute (LAI) in Vienna for granting me a scholarship during four years. I’m particular-
ly indebted to Ana Rosa Camba Santos, who was responsible for coaching the 
participants of this scholarship program. She and my fellow scholarship holders were 
like a family to me. 
A special thank goes to my tutors, Prof. Joachim Becker and Prof. Andreas Novy, for 
their valuable comments and admirable patience. 
Lastly, I would like to thank my family and friends. Without their encouragement and 
relentless support during all those years, it would have been impossible for me to ac-
complish the task. I hope that life gives me the opportunity to express my sincere 
gratitude to all of them in many different ways. 
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Finally, I am also indebted to those scholars — both living and death — who have 
written about the subject of international trade. Irrespective of the fact that I may agree 
or disagree with them, I am grateful for their inputs — also for the ones that I have 
criticized and rejected in this dissertation —, since they have helped me to form my own 
opinions and thoughts about this interesting and relevant topic. 
Vilfredo Pareto once wrote: “Give me an error any time, full of seeds, bursting with its own cor-
rections. You can keep your sterile truth for yourself.” I could not agree more with Pareto’s 
dictum. In this sense, I would certainly prefer that this doctoral thesis be regarded as an 
original and inspiring sequence of fruitful errors rather than a dull collection of sterile 
truths. 
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Introduction 
The best way to become acquainted with a subject is to 
write a book about it. 
Benjamin Disraeli 
Since the very beginning of the gradual emergence of economics as an independent 
academic disciple more than two hundred thirty years ago, the overwhelming majority 
of its practitioners have believed in the virtues of free trade for achieving national eco-
nomic prosperity. Unfortunately, the economists have not been particularly successful in 
convincing non-economists that governments should not intervene in the voluntary 
exchange of commodities and services among countries. The typical layperson is rather 
skeptical if not frankly opposed to the idea of free trade with foreign countries. As a 
result, trade policy has become one of those issues where the recommendations of pro-
fessional economists clash particularly strong with public opinion. 
Because of this lack of support outside the economic profession, the free-trade case 
had failed to gain much traction in the real world of international politics for the most 
part of the twentieth century. In the last two decades, however, free trade has started to 
make steady progress in the real world as well. An insurmountable amount of free trade 
agreements and initiatives have been launched, negotiated and signed throughout the 
world. Many governments are currently engaged in several multilateral and bilateral free 
trade negotiations at the same time. Powerful regional trading blocs have emerged, and 
influential international organizations — like the World Trade Organization (WTO) — 
have been created with the explicit purpose of advancing the free-trade agenda among 
its member states. As a consequence of these recent developments, the amount of 
commodities exchanged internationally has increased to an unprecedented level. 
Paradoxically, at the very same moment when the free-trade principle is finally trans-
cending the narrow confines of the academic sphere and making significant 
advancements in the real world of international trade politics, the once overwhelming 
support for free trade among economists is starting to decline. A growing number of 
economists do not regard free trade as a suitable economic policy for achieving long-
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term economic growth and development anymore, in particular with respect to develop-
ing countries. 
As Krugman (1987) points out, the economists’ diminishing support for free trade is 
not the result of renewed political pressures for the implementation of protectionist 
trade policies, which had prevailed in the past without shaking the intellectual founda-
tions of the free trade case, but because of developments that have taken place in the 
theory of international trade itself since the 1980s. The traditional constant returns and 
perfect competition models of international trade — the so-called Ricardian model and 
Heckscher-Ohlin model — have been supplemented and to some extend supplanted by 
new trade models that emphasize increasing returns and imperfect competition. These 
new trade models call into doubt the theoretical accuracy of the free trade recommenda-
tions put forward by the traditional trade models, and open up the possibility that 
government intervention in trade via import restrictions, export subsidies, and so on, 
may under some circumstances be in the best national interest for developed as well as 
developing countries after all. 
Given the present doubts about the merits of the case for free trade, it seems rather 
difficult to formulate clear and unambiguous trade policy recommendations to govern-
ments. If these doubts cannot be overcome, the steady progress of the free-trade 
principle in the real world during the last decades might come to a halt or may even be 
reverted. In that case we may witness a comeback of protectionist trade policies, retalia-
tory tariffs and trade wars in the near future. 
In this context, the present doctoral thesis is set to address the following research 
question: Is free trade a suitable economic policy for achieving long-term economic 
growth and development, in particular from the perspective of developing countries? 
An unambiguous trade policy recommendation in favor or against free trade has to be 
founded on solid theoretic foundations for having the slightest chance of being accept-
ed by economists and laypersons with preconceived opinions about the subject. For 
such an ambitious purpose, the current mainstream international trade theory does not 
provide a viable basis. Thus, it was necessary to dedicate the bulk of this dissertation to 
critically review the main concepts and propositions of mainstream international trade 
theory. The result has been a significant restatement of the free trade case. 
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The dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter lays out the methodo-
logical perspective of the doctoral thesis. According to this methodological perspective, 
there is not a single and monolithic case for free trade in international trade theory but 
two competing and mutually exclusive cases: 1) the case for free trade of classical politi-
cal economy, and 2) the one put forward by the neoclassical school of economic 
thought, which is currently the mainstream explanatory framework regarding the virtues 
of free trade. 
Chapter Two is dedicated to a restatement of the classical case for free trade, follow-
ing closely what is actually written in Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations and David Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. At 
the center of this restatement is the accurate interpretation of Ricardo’s numerical ex-
ample in chapter 7 of the Principles. 
The third chapter contrasts the classical with the neoclassical case for free trade. It 
starts by pointing out the main points of disruption between the classical and the neo-
classical framework. It also contains a critique of the two traditional neoclassical trade 
models: the so-called Ricardian model and the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The chapter 
concludes with a brief critique of the welfare concept as the main benchmark put for-
ward by the neoclassical school of economic thought for judging the merits of 
economic policies. 
Chapter Four critically reviews some arguments for protection in the light of the re-
statement of the classical case for free trade. The arguments for protection were chosen 
based on their current level of popularity among scholars. The first two arguments — 
strategic trade policy and external economies — have become increasingly popular in 
the aftermath of the so-called New Trade Theory, which has reincorporated increasing 
returns to scale to mainstream international trade theory. This development appears to 
have also injected new life to the infant industry argument, perhaps the oldest and long-
est-lived specific argument for protection. In the present context of accelerated 
economic globalization some development economists have proclaimed the ever-greater 
relevancy of infant-industry protection for developing countries. 
Finally, the fifth chapter offers some general recommendations about the practical 
implementation of a free trade policy, taking into consideration the particular interests 
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of developing countries. It is followed by the conclusions and recommendations that 
can be extracted from this doctoral thesis. 
As can be inferred from this brief overview of the five chapters, the scope of this dis-
sertation is limited to the analysis of foreign trade theories. Aspects of international 
finance — like, for example, exchange rate policies and the pros and cons of adopting 
common currencies —, although relevant for a successful implementation of interna-
tional trade policies, have been intentionally left out in order to narrow the subject of 
research. This decision reflects the author’s belief that a thoughtful analysis of interna-
tional finance cannot be accomplish without basing it on a solid economic theory 
regarding the international exchange of commodities and services. The present doctoral 
thesis is foremost dedicated to make a contribution in providing such a solid theoretic 
foundation for analyzing international trade. 
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1 Methodological Approach 
If you would be a real seeker after truth, it is necessary 
that at least once in your life you doubt, as far as possible, 
all things. 
Rene Descartes 
1.1 On the Concept of Free Trade 
In this doctoral thesis, free trade is defined as the trade policy recommendation that 
national governments should abstain from intervening in the voluntary exchange of 
commodities and services across political borders between the residents of their respec-
tive countries. Under a free-trade regime, national governments do not impose artificial 
barriers — such as tariffs, quotas, subsidies or nontariff barriers — with the purpose of 
hampering the importation of specific commodities and services in order to secure their 
production within national borders. 
I have deliberately avoided describing this free-trade policy as laissez-faire because this 
term has also been used to label a general economic doctrine that seeks to minimize or 
eliminate government intervention in most or all aspects of society, and which I do not 
support. Free international trade can be described as a policy of non-discrimination with 
respect to foreign-made commodities and services, without the need to recur to the 
ambiguous term laissez-faire. 
The first claims in favor of free international trade were probably made in debates 
over foreign trade monopolies in the English parliament at the end of the sixteenth 
century. At that time there was a centuries-old practice of granting exclusive privileges 
to select merchants so that they could engage in trade with particular regions. In this 
context, calls for free trade ! or, more precisely, freedom to trade ! emerged from an an-
timonopoly movement that opposed such government restraints on domestic as well as 
foreign trade. The members of this antimonopoly movement demanded the right of the 
merchant to carry on trade without government permission or approval. Thus the first 
free traders were calling for the abolition of exclusionary guild regulations and govern-
ment grants of monopoly rights and privileges, and decidedly not for the elimination of 
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import tariffs or export subsidies, which is the current demand of modern free-trade 
advocators (Irwin, 1998, p. 46). 
This later claim for free trade is the result of a very different debate and context. With 
the emergence of modern nation-states in the sixteenth century, governments started to 
worry about the effects of international competition on the prosperity of national indus-
tries. These concerns led to the formulation of the first system of thought regarding 
international trade called mercantilism. According to the mercantilists of the early seven-
teenth century, the key objective of trade policy was to achieve and preserve a favorable 
balance of trade with foreign countries on a permanent basis. Trade with another coun-
try was judged profitable as long as the value of exports exceeded the value of imports, 
thereby resulting in a balance-of-trade surplus, which added wealth to the export-surplus 
country in form of precious metals. International trade was seen as a zero-sum game ! 
one country’s gains were necessarily the other country’s loss !, since it is not possible 
for all countries to achieve a favorable trade balance at the same time. Although dis-
missed by economists on theoretical and logical grounds, reminiscences of the balance-
of-trade doctrine have managed to survive in the minds of the average citizen and many 
contemporary politicians until the present. 
By the end of the seventeenth century mercantilists gradually upgraded the balance-
of-trade doctrine, focusing more on the commodity composition of international trade 
as the principal criterion for determining if foreign exchange was beneficial to the na-
tional economy. Followers of this upgraded version of mercantilism essentially argued 
that the government has to secure that economic activities generating high value-added 
— or involving extensive processing and manufacturing — are carried out predomi-
nantly by resident industries. Because manufacturing activities generated more value at 
that time, mercantilists recommended that the national economy should be oriented 
toward importing raw materials and exporting manufactured commodities. Consequent-
ly, governments should impose low import duties on inputs and raw materials, and 
impose high import duties on processed goods (Irwin, 1998, p. 38). 
At the first look, this upgraded version mercantilism seems very similar to the bal-
ance-of-trade doctrine. For the late-seventeenth-century mercantilists, though, the main 
advantage of manufacturing was not simply the economic gain from exchanging more 
valuable processed commodities for less valuable unprocessed goods, but that manufac-
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turing was allegedly more capable of generating well-paid jobs. Thus, the underlying 
purpose of the mercantilists’ focus on the commodity composition of trade was to 
promote economic development by encouraging the expansion of manufacturing and 
thereby creating more jobs opportunities for the local population. Commercial policy 
was seen as an important mechanism for directing economic incentives in such a way as 
to spur economic development. Thus, the notion that protection could secure a higher 
level of employment and output in manufacturing became the main argument that the 
free-trade doctrine had to overcome after the mid-seventeenth century (Irwin, 1998, p. 
40). 
Both of the reasons mercantilist writers set down for regulating trade — to promote a 
favorable balance of trade and to secure greater manufacturing production —, were 
derivative of a more general view of international trade where a disharmony between 
private and public interests necessarily led to a misallocation of economic resources. 
This misallocation had to be remedied by proper government intervention. In this con-
text, free-trade thought emerged not only to question the particular goals and concerns 
of mercantilists, but also to confront the general question regarding the proper role of 
the government in directing the country’s economic affairs and its international com-
merce in particular (Irwin, 1998, p. 44).1 
1.2 The Current Status of Free Trade in Modern Economics 
Since the publication of Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations back in 1776, the issue of free trade has enjoyed a unique status among 
economic thinkers.2 For more than two hundred years, the vast majority of economists 
have believed in the virtues of free international trade in advancing the goal of widely 
                                                
 
1 For a fuller discussion of mercantilist’ views, see Irwin (1998). 
2 John Maynard Keynes, one of the most influential economists of the 20th century, explicitly 
acknowledged this special status of free trade when he stated in his famous article “National 
Self-Sufficiency”: “I was brought up, like most Englishmen, to respect free trade not only as an economic 
doctrine which a rational and instructed person could not doubt but almost as a part of the moral law. I regarded 
departures from it as being at the same time an imbecility and an outrage. I thought England's unshakable free-
trade convictions, maintained for nearly a hundred years, to be both the explanation before man and the justifica-
tion before heaven of her economic supremacy” (Keynes, 1933). 
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shared economic prosperity.3 This professional concurrence in recommending free trade 
is particularly remarkable since economists have built a solid reputation of disagreeing 
on almost every other important economic-policy issue. But when it comes to interna-
tional trade policy, the typical disagreement among economists is supplanted by a 
widespread support of free trade, with only a few dissenting voices. 
This majoritarian support of free trade among economists takes its special meaning 
from the fact that it is a widely discussed policy issue where the economists’ view clash-
es particularly strong with public opinion. The average citizen usually favors 
protectionist policies, especially in the specific branch of industry where he or she is 
currently employed or has invested some capital. The extended support for protection-
ism among the population creates a special incentive for some economists to turn 
apostate. In order to neutralize this incentive, some scholars have elevated the adher-
ence to free trade to a touchstone of professionalism in economics, a sort of Economists’ Creed. 4 
Despite the economists’ strong commitment to free trade, the level of support for 
free-trade policies has remained quite low outside the professional ranks. Therefore, the 
economists’ claim for free trade had relatively little impact in the practical world of in-
ternational trade during most part of the 20th century. In the last two decades, however, 
the idea of free trade has gained a growing number of supporters from outside the aca-
demic circles as well. As a result, numerous free trade agreements and initiatives have 
been launched, negotiated and signed throughout the world. Many governments are 
currently engaged in multilateral as well as bilateral free trade negotiations at the same 
time. Powerful regional trading blocks are emerging, and international trade is rapidly 
expanding. After more than fifty years of delay, the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
was finally founded in 1995, and its membership has rapidly risen to 153 states5 until the 
                                                
 
3 One survey reports that 88 percent of economists questioned in the United States, Austria, 
France, Germany and Switzerland support or support with qualification the proposition that 
„tariffs and import quotas reduce general economic welfare“. The highest level of support was 
achieved in the United States with 95 percent. See Frey et al. (1984). 
4 See Krugman (1987). 
5 The number of Member States according to the WTO homepage (www.wto.org) consulted on 
July 10th 2010. 
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present. The WTO, together with other international organizations like the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have been promoting a wave of trade lib-
eralization in specific economic sectors throughout the world. 
Paradoxically, this recent wave of international trade liberalization has been accompa-
nied by growing doubts about the theoretical case in favor of free trade among those 
who hitherto had been its most enthusiastic supporters: the economists themselves. 
These growing doubts and diminishing support for free trade among economists are not 
the result of renewed political pressures in favor of protectionist policies, which have 
triumphed in the past without shaking the intellectual foundations of the free-trade the-
ory; they are the result of changes that have taken place within mainstream international 
trade theory.6 
Since the 1980s traditional international trade models featuring constant-returns-to-
scale and perfect-competition have been gradually supplemented and to some extend 
supplanted by new theoretic models that emphasizes increasing returns and imperfect 
competition. These new models of international trade have been amalgamated — pre-
sumably for marketing purposes — under the umbrella term New Trade Theory (NTT). In 
addition to the two assumptions already mentioned — increasing returns to scale and 
imperfect competition —, the NTT-models also have in common a relatively high level 
of mathematical (=formal) sophistication. The rapid academic success of the NTT-
models is due to the fact that they appear to remedy the two central weaknesses of the 
traditional models of international trade: the unrealistic nature of the assumptions re-
garding constant return to scale and perfect competition, and the proven inability of the 
traditional trade models to explain the current pattern of international exchange, which 
largely consists in intra-industry trade (Krugman, 1987). 
Although the NTT-models are usually accompanied by vague trade-policy recom-
mendations — if any at all —, they have managed to seriously shaken the prior 
consensus in favor of free trade among economists. Krugman, a co-founder and leading 
advocate of the NTT, summarizes the policy conclusions based on these trade models 
as followed: 
                                                
 
6 See, for example, Baldwin (1992). 
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“Free trade is not passé, but it is an idea that has irretrievably lost its innocence. Its 
status has shifted from optimum to reasonable rule of thumb. There is still a case 
for free trade as a good policy, and as a useful target in the practical world of poli-
tics, but it can never again be asserted as the policy that economic theory tells us is 
always right” (Krugman, 1987, p. 132). 
According to Krugman, modern economic theory does not provide a solid frame-
work in favor of free trade. The post-NTT case for free trade rests predominantly on 
political considerations — not on arguments directly derived from economic theory. 
Therefore, economists cannot justify their support of free trade exclusively on economic 
arguments anymore, but have to rely predominantly on political arguments like the pos-
sibility of retaliation and the unleashing of trade wars.7 Nevertheless, a majority of 
economists, including many new trade theorists, continue supporting free international 
trade, although often in a more cautious and less confident way. 
Why hasn’t the NTT led to stronger recommendations against free trade? Kuttner 
(1991) suggests that the reason behind this suspicious policy-reticence among new trade 
theorists is their collective fear of being labeled protectionists. Cowardice, though, can 
hardly be considered as a suitable scientific explanation. In terms of personal virtues and 
vices, there is no evidence for supposing that economists are different from any other 
group of people. It is rather save to assume that they have a normal distribution of 
courage and cowardice. Some economists may indeed be afraid of expressing their views 
truthfully, while others may be more audacious and outspoken. Excessive cowardice is 
therefore a very improbable explanation for the general reticence of contemporary 
economists in formulating bold international trade policies. 
Krugman (1992, p. 424) considers Kuttner’s explanation to be grossly unfair, yet —
surprisingly — not entirely unjustified. After all, free trade has a special status among 
economists, and even brash young trade theorists may be hesitant to challenge this tenet 
directly. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the policy diffidence of new trade theo-
rists is — at least to a certain extent — the result of their unwillingness to challenge the 
norms of their academic discipline. Nevertheless, Krugman considers that the real rea-
                                                
 
7 See, for example, Krugman (1993). 
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son behind the trade-policy reticence is the “(…) realistic appreciation of the difficulty of coming 
up with a solid advice — and of getting it accepted.” 
Krugman’s explanation immediately triggers an interesting question: Why is it appar-
ently so difficult for contemporary economists to come up with a solid advice regarding 
international trade policy? An in-depth inquiry into this puzzle seems to be even more 
justified by the fact that the policy reticence of mainstream economists is not limited to 
the field of international trade, but is also manifest in other branches of economic theo-
ry as well. It seems to be a widespread and recurrent syndrome affecting modern 
economic thought rather than a limited and transitory phenomenon. 
The noticeable policy-reticence of many mainstream economists has led to the cri-
tique that the economic science has very little to offer in terms of contributing to solve 
the obtrusive socioeconomic problems of our time; that it is not even concerned with 
these problems any more.8 In short, that economics has become an irrelevant science.9 
The critics insist that scientific research in general should be oriented towards solving 
significant problems, that is, the ones whose solution will most benefit the society. Eco-
nomic research is meant to be useful. By contrast, a majority of today’s economic 
researchers often give the impression of engaging in economics research following the 
slogan l’art pour l’art (art for art’s sake).10 Nowadays, vast intellectual and material re-
                                                
 
8 See Galbraight (1973, p. 2). Referring to the textbooks of the 1970s, Morgenstern (1972, p. 
1163) claim that few if any unresolved theoretical problems are mentioned. Unresolved prob-
lems simply do not seem to exist. Present-day economics contributes so little that is new or 
useful towards solving the practical troubles of the world. 
9 Among the many critics there are also some leading professional economists — not only out-
siders or intellectual mavericks. It is not the purpose of this section to present a summarized 
review of all the critical points raised, but to rather indentify and concentrate on the roots of the 
problem. The following sample just indicates the range and variety of the critique. It is said that: 
the empirical foundations of economics are inadequate (Leontief, 1971); there has been a scan-
dalous waste of intellectual resources in the overdevelopment of mathematical economics and 
econometrics (Hahn, 1970); many of the economists’ efforts are irrelevant (Worswick, 1972) and 
contribute little or nothing of value to the solution of major practical problems (Morgenstern, 
1972); and the profession generally maintains a perverse reward system (Blackman, 1971). For a 
contrary assessment, see Heller (1975). 
10 Phelps (1972), for example, denounces the smallness of the contribution that the most con-
spicuous developments of economics in the last quarter of a century have made to the solution 
of the most pressing problems of our times. 
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sources available in the countless economic departments of universities and research 
institutions throughout the world are being misallocated into solving arid theoretic puz-
zles, providing sterile proofs and practicing recreational mathematics while the world’s 
pressing economic and social problems go begging for answers. It is somehow ironic — 
and rather tragic for the great part of humanity currently living in poverty — that the 
practitioners of a science that is supposed to be dealing with issues of allocative efficien-
cy are currently showing such an ineffective allocation of their own intellectual and 
material resources. 
Surprisingly, many mainstream economists do not even deny the existence of such a 
policy-reticence in contemporary economic thought; instead, they prefer to turn vice 
into virtue by declaring that as scientific researchers they have to deal first and foremost 
with positive economics rather than with normative economics. The next section will be 
dedicated to analyze this peculiar and often-heard excuse. 
1.3 Positive vs. Normative Economics 
The proposed distinction between positive and normative economics was originally 
understood as a dividing line between the “scientific” description of the functioning of 
the economic system and the prognostication — as far as possible — of its future de-
velopment, on the one hand, and the practical advice on economic policy on the other. 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century this distinction between scientific theory and 
practical economic policy issues became increasingly entangled and almost completely 
identified with the dichotomy between facts (“is”) and values (“ought”), i.e., between 
supposedly objective and accurate statements about the functioning of the economic 
system and prescriptive evaluations of it. Positive economics was now said to be about 
facts and normative economics about values (Blaug, 1993, p. 112).11 
                                                
 
11 According to Friedman (1966), positive economics has to do with “what is”, while normative 
economics has to do with “what ought to be”. Positive economics is a social science, and as 
such is subject to the same checks on the basis of evidence as any science. By contrast, norma-
tive economics has a moral or ethical aspect, and as such goes beyond what a science can say. 
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How is it possible to distinguish between an is- and an ought-statement? An is-
statement is simply one that is either materially true or false: it asserts something about 
the state of the world and we can employ interpersonally testable methods to discover 
whether it is true or false. An ought-statement, on the other hand, expresses an evalua-
tion of the state of the world — it approves or disapproves, it praises or condemns, it 
extols or deplores — and we can only employ arguments to persuade others to accept it 
(Blaug, 1993, p. 113). 
Those who make such a strict distinction between positive and normative economics 
usually claim that economists should be primarily concerned with positive economics, 
since as long as they limit themselves to the explanation and prediction of economic 
phenomena, they may reach conclusions that will command universal acceptance as 
soon as they are properly understood. If an economist dares to cross the scientific Rubi-
con and starts to prescribe principles of economic policy, though, he or she cannot 
aspire to general acceptance anymore. Since economic policy prescriptions necessarily 
depend upon a scale of social values, economists who profess different social values 
may judge these prescriptions differently. 
Positivist economists also believe that they are not even entitled to set the main goals 
of economic policy, and that the goal-setting task should be left to democratically elect-
ed politicians. Only after these politicians, presumably representing the will of the 
majority of the population, have set the main economic policy goals, economists should 
start thinking about the best way to accomplish them. 
Such a passive view of the economists’ role in setting the main goals of economic pol-
icy is based on the premise that economists cannot agree on the proper goals, but they 
may agree on the suitable tool(s) — essentially the so-called free market — to accomplish 
them. This underlying supposition, though, is flatly wrong. In the real world the level of 
agreement among economists regarding desirable goals is usually much higher compared 
to the level of agreement regarding the proper means to achieve them. In other words, it 
is easier to build consensus about goals and values than about the proper means for 
their practical realization. The eradication of absolute poverty, a highly educated and 
healthy population, a clean environment, a low level of unemployment and inflation, the 
avoidance of huge budget deficits — the majority of economists would agree that these 
are valuable and desirable economic-policy objectives. They may even agree about the 
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relative importance of these specific goals, although this is less certain. Where they will 
most certainly disagree is about the proper means to achieve them. A consensus regard-
ing the relative importance of specific economic policy goals, as well as the proper 
means to accomplish them, presupposes an accurate and uniform economic theory 
about the functioning of the current economic system, which does not exist in contem-
porary economic thought. 
Positivist economists have put considerable effort in presenting themselves as objec-
tive and impartial scientists. Consequently, they have tried to avoid getting involved into 
the arid political debates that accompany any major economic policy issue.12 This scien-
tific masquerade allowed positivist economists to dismiss anyone who questioned the 
scientific objectivity of their economic theories as being mistaken or representing some 
nefarious special interest. 
Mainstream economists like to present the distinction between positive and norma-
tive economics — or economic theory versus policy and facts versus values — as a 
natural and necessary feature of their science. As a matter of fact, though, this distinc-
tion is a peculiar attribute of a specific school of economic thought — neoclassical 
economics. It is quite revealing to acknowledge the fact that the founders of the eco-
nomic science did not conceive the above distinctions as dichotomies. These pioneers 
always defined the objective of the nascent academic discipline as twofold: (1) to explain 
and interpret the functioning and evolution of the economic system; and (2) to advise 
and guide the formulation of economic policy according to the sound principles of po-
                                                
 
12 The positivists’ quest for adopting a scientific pose may be symbolized by the gradual substi-
tution of the traditional term “political economy” for the modern term “economics” in English 
speaking countries during the late nineteenth century. Originally, scientists who theorized about 
the economy used to call themselves political economists. Marshall and his wife explained in their 
Economics of Industry the proposed change of denomination by arguing that it would be better to 
drop “political” from the traditional denomination since “political interests generally mean the 
interest of some part or parts of the nation” rather than the nation as a whole (Marshall and 
Marshall, 1879, p. 2). A brief etymological analysis of the term political economy proves the super-
ficiality of the adduced reason for rebranding the science. The Greek term economia originally 
meant household management. The original intention behind the addition of the word political 
— derived of course from the Greek word for city, polis — in front of “economy” was to distin-
guish the rules of state management from those of household management. For a historic 
analysis of the term political economy, see Arndt (1984). 
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litical economy. Adam Smith, who many consider as the founding father of economics, 
explicitly defines the general purpose of the scientific discipline in the Wealth of Nations 
as followed: 
“Political economy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or legisla-
tor, proposes two distinct objects; first, to provide a plentiful revenue or 
subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to provide such a rev-
enue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or 
commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the publick services. It proposes to 
enrich both the people and the sovereign” (WN, IV.intro.1). 
According to Smith, political economy naturally includes theoretical analysis as well as 
policy prescriptions, positive as well as normative economics. Effective economic poli-
cies have to be supported by accurate and comprehensible theories on the production 
and distribution of wealth or, what to Smith was the same thing, an insightful under-
standing of the operations of the economy. The objective of the classical political 
economists was always to explain how a modern capitalist system actually works, and 
how it ought to work. 
One may enquire whether Smith’s economic analyses necessarily led him to his public 
policy statements, or, to the contrary, whether his public policy proclivities led him to 
his economic theory. The first view suggests a pure scientific vision or idealization of 
how a social scientist works: he or she develops the economic theory first and then 
reaches the public policy conclusions that are logically implied by the theory. In the 
second scenario, Smith would have had at the outset a relatively clear idea of the role 
that he thought government should have in modern capitalist societies. He then would 
work backwards to find a theory that would justify his public policy announcements. 
This would be a pure ideological view upon which economic theories are developed to 
back certain ideological positions. Stated this way, though, the issue is wrongly posed. 
Smith was not an ideologue who simply developed an economic theory to back his po-
litical beliefs. Yet neither was he simply a pure scientist who logically developed policy 
implications from a disinterested abstract theoretical model. Here, as with all the great 
economic theorists, there is a dialectical interaction between the economic theories that 
are constructed and the role that the theorist envisions government should play in mod-
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ern societies.13 The public policy statements that Smith advocates and the technical eco-
nomic theories he elaborates are tightly interwoven and interconnected.14 It is not clear 
which came first for Smith: economic theory or public policy. Yet Smith, great political 
economist that he was, begins his story by prefacing his policy pronouncements with 
economic theory (Pack, 1991, pp. 10-11). 
Contemporary followers of the classical school of economic thought like Nobel lau-
reate economist Amartya Sen have continued the tradition of rejecting the sharp 
fact/value distinction and the supposed meaninglessness of value claims.15 During the 
1960s he presented a sophisticated defense of his claim that reasoned arguments in eco-
nomics could also contain an ethical component (Sen, 1967, pp. 46-62). He developed a 
complex taxonomy of different classes of the uses of ethical words in ordinary language, 
analyzing their respective openness to rational argument, in order to refute Lord Rob-
bins’ well-known opposite opinion.16 
An economic science oriented towards solving real socioeconomic problems does not 
preclude research on the proving of theorems and propositions derived from abstract 
models, which, at the first look, seem to have little resemblance with economic reality. 
Economic research sometimes consists of work that is designed solely to advance theo-
retical or econometric technique. Nevertheless, all this research work is supposed to be 
geared to the dual task of enabling a better understanding of an economic system and 
thereby determining how desired socioeconomic results might be accomplished. The 
ultimate goal of any economic research should always be the elaboration of better and 
more effective economic policies (Eatwell, 1994). 
The supposed dichotomy between positive and normative economics is little more 
than an attempt to distract from the central problem of contemporary economic 
thought: the growing inability of mainstream economic theory to describe the real func-
tioning of the economy. The lack of real progress in economic research and scarce 
                                                
 
13 See Heilbroner (1999); Dobb (1973); and Galbraith (1987). 
14 See Heilbroner (1985). 
15 See Sen (1987, p. 31). 
16 See Robbins (1949, p. 132). 
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relevance of the output in the last decades is a mere symptom and necessary conse-
quence of this central problem.17 The next section will be dedicated to analyze the 
causes for the increasing abyss between economics and its subject of study. 
1.4 Mathematical vs. Literary Economics 
As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not 
certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality. 
Albert Einstein 
Some economists have attributed the growing difficulty in understanding and describ-
ing the real functioning of the economy to the excessive use of mathematics in modern 
economic theory, or what Beed and Kane (1991) have termed the mathematization of 
economics.18 In this context, the mathematization of economics apparently means employ-
ing mathematical techniques beyond simple arithmetic and algebra, such as matrix 
algebra, integral calculus or differential equations. 
The critical comments regarding the allegedly excessive deployment of mathematical 
language and tools in the economic science have already transcended the ranks of non-
mainstream economists — the usual suspects — to become itself a trendy phenome-
non.19 Nowadays any economist can take a bold stance against the excesses of 
mathematical economics without the fear of being immediately stigmatized as a literary 
economist, the usual stigma reserved for early critics of mathematization. On the contrary, 
they can quote prominent mainstream economists  — including some Nobel laureates 
                                                
 
17 See, for example, Blaug (1993, p. 238): “The central weakness of modern economics has been the reluc-
tance to produce theories that yield unambiguously refutable implications, followed by a general unwillingness to 
confront those implications with the real world.” 
18 Blaug (1993, pp. 4-5) writes about this point: “Modern economics is sick; economics has increasingly 
become an intellectual game played for its own sake and not for its practical consequences; economists have gradu-
ally converted the subject into a sort of Social Mathematics in which analytical rigour as understood in math 
departments is everything and empirical relevance (as understood in physics departments) is nothing; if a topic 
cannot be tackled by formal modelling, it is simply consigned to the intellectual underworld.” 
19 For an interesting empirical study about how economic students are trained in the mathemati-
cal techniques, see Klamer & Colander (1987, 1990). 
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— who express similar concerns on the path taken by modern economic theory during 
the last decades.20 
The proposed remedies for the excesses of mathematization cover a wide spectrum, from 
timid recommendations about the proper use of mathematical tools to a complete ban 
of mathematics from economic theory. Before evaluating the effectiveness of the pro-
posed remedies, however, one has to critically appraise if the problem has been correctly 
identified in the first place. 
Blaming mathematics for the current deficits of mainstream economic theory seems 
at least questionable when one consider the crucial contributions that logical reasoning 
and mathematical techniques have made in other scientific disciplines. The spectacular 
scientific advancements in physics and chemistry during the past two centuries, for ex-
ample, are unconceivable without the deployment of applied mathematics, both for the 
statistical evaluation of observations and for the deduction and verification of the theo-
retical propositions themselves. Throughout history, logical thinking and applied 
mathematics have promoted progress in natural and social sciences. Therefore, mathe-
matics should be regarded in principle as a valid and useful tool of research and form of 
expression in every scientific discipline, including economics. 
When deploying logical concepts and applied mathematics in economic research, 
though, economists should always bear in mind the different meaning of the word truth 
in logical-mathematical and in real sciences. In the logical-mathematical sciences, truth is 
essentially a logical criterion; it means merely logical implication and nothing else. A 
conclusion is considered to be “true” if it follows from the premise(s) by means of logi-
                                                
 
20 Take, for example, the self-critique of British economist and Nobel laureate Sir John R. Hicks 
during an interview with Arjo Klamer (1989, p. 180): “I do feel that most of this stuff that I pick up and 
see in the journals seems to have very little relevance to the sort of practical problems that really bother people. I 
mean…what have these mathematical theories got to say about whether Britain should go into the EMS [Euro-
pean Monetary System, added]? Nothing! That is the sort of question about which economists should have 
something to say. (…) A lot of these mathematical models, including some of my own, are really terribly much in 
the air. They lost their feet off the ground.” One can also find critical comments about the increasing 
impenetrability of recent theoretical output of mathematical economists in Gerard Debreu’s 
Presidential address in front of the American Economic Association (Debreu, 1991). It’s quite 
reveling that even the archpriest of mathematical economics seems to be disturbed by the seeds 
he sowed with his Theory of Value (1959). See also Quddus & Rashid (1994). 
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cal deduction. In real sciences, however, the criterion of “truth” is not whether the 
proposition is tautologically deducible from earlier assumptions — i.e. logically true —, 
but whether or not the proposition corresponds to reality. In both natural and social 
sciences, the only criterion of truth is experience, i.e. the comparison of theoretic asser-
tions with reality. Consequently, as Kornai (1971, p. 9) points out, the term theory thus 
requires a dual definition: 
In the logical-mathematical sciences a theory is a theorem or body of theorems 
logically deducible from a set of mutually consistent axioms.  In the real sciences a 
theory is a systematic description of the essential interrelations between the varia-
bles of reality. That is, only those theorems and propositions (deduced from 
assumptions not in conflict with reality) which describe the real world more or less 
accurately may be considered acceptable. 
The above definition of real-science theories does not mean that the rank of theory 
should be reserved exclusively for a completely accurate and perfectly verified system of 
propositions. A theory may be inaccurate and only approximate in character until a 
more accurate one can be established. It may also be temporarily unverified, and there-
fore hypothetical. But only assumptions and hypotheses that have not been shown to 
contradict reality can be employed (Kornai, 1971, p. 10). 
In correspondence with these distinct criteria for establishing the truth of a proposi-
tion, Kornai recommends two types of scientific conscience for those engaged in 
scientific inquiry: 
“The mathematician may sleep soundly if he believes that there are no inconsisten-
cies among his axioms and that the deductions from the axioms to the theorems 
are correct; the mathematical-logical verification of his theorems will be complete. 
Those engaged in the real sciences cannot, however, rest content with that alone. 
Their consciences can only be clear if their propositions correspond to reality” 
(1971, p. 9). 
Leading mathematical economists have affirmed that their methodological approach 
to economics has been inspired and encouraged by the spectacular advances of theoreti-
cal physics, which have often been obtained by logical reasoning and later beautifully 
formulated in concise formulas. By deploying logical terminology and applied mathe-
matics in economics, they have merely wanted to emulate and transplant the successful 
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relationship between physics and mathematics to their field of knowledge.21 The bright-
est minds of physics, however, have not embraced mathematics at the cost of ignoring 
reality. The theoretical physicists have always relied on experimental results or factual 
observations in order to prove their theoretical constructions.22 
The root of the cognitive problem in modern economics is thus not to be found in 
the sphere of formal expression — a more or less deployment of mathematical language 
and tools — but in the specific way that these mathematical tools have been used in 
mainstream economic theory. Correspondingly, the current difficulty of extracting clear 
and consistent trade-policy recommendations from today’s mainstream international 
trade models should not be attributed to mathematics, but rather to the accuracy and 
internal logic of the specific assumptions, concepts and propositions upon which these 
models are constructed. Smith, Ricardo and other classical political economists did not 
face similar difficulties in arriving to economic-policy conclusions, since they made clear 
recommendations in favor of free trade. It is important to recognize, though, that to-
day’s mainstream international trade models are not based on the theoretic framework 
deployed by these classical political economists, but on the theoretic framework of the 
neoclassical23 school of economic thought, which predispose the mindset towards a 
specific way of thinking about international trade. 
The core of the neoclassical framework is the theory of general economic equilibrium, 
which goes back to French economist Léon Walras (1977). According to this theory, a 
                                                
 
21 See Debreu (1991, p. 2). 
22 Albert Einstein, the highest authority of theoretical physics and creator of one of the most 
famous equations in the history of science — E = mc2 —, was absolutely clear about the role of 
experience and reality in proving the truth of logical propositions: “Physics constitutes a logical system 
of thought which is in a state of evolution, whose basis cannot be distilled, as it were, from experience by an induc-
tive method, but can only be arrived at by free invention. The justification (truth content) of the system rests in the 
verification of the derived propositions by sense experiences” (Einstein, 1954, p. 322). “The skeptic will say: It 
may well be true that this system of equations is reasonable from a logical standpoint. But this does not prove that 
it corresponds to nature. You are right, dear skeptic. Experience alone can decide on truth” (Einstein, 1954, p. 
355). 
23 The term neoclassical is used to refer to the school of economic thought which uses the mar-
ginal principle in conjunction with a subjective theory of value in analyzing the problem of price 
and distribution as market processes divorced from the institutional arrangements of the social 
system. See Young (1978, p. 19). 
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state of general economic equilibrium is defined as one in which at the ruling system of 
prices, the supplies and demands of all commodities are equal (no unsatisfied buyers and 
sellers) and no improvement in anyone’s position is possible without a worsening of 
someone else’s position.24 After World War II, neoclassical economists like Kenneth 
Arrow, Gérard Debreu, Lionel McKenzie and Abraham Wald, have further developed 
this theory in terms of logical elegance and precision. This postwar development con-
sisted mainly in setting up a logically watertight system that cannot be further improved 
or perfected. Neo-walrasian general equilibrium theory achieved this state by 1954, with 
the publication of a famous paper by Nobel Laureates Kenneth Arrow and Gerard De-
breu.25 
The Arrow-Debreu paper of 1954 provided a rigorous proof of the existence of mul-
timarket equilibrium in a decentralized economy. The proof was rigorous by logical-
mathematical standards. In order to obtain the desired result, though, it was necessary to 
make assumptions that clearly violated reality. Two prominent features of every-day 
economic activity, imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale, were excluded 
by assumption, because they could not be accommodated within the Walrasian frame-
work. In general, the assumptions of general equilibrium theory were chosen in order to 
satisfy the need for logical consistency. In short, the Arrow-Debreu proof had more to 
do with mathematical logic than with real economics.26 
The basic objection to the Neo-walrasian general economic equilibrium theory is not 
that it is abstract, since no theoretic analysis is possible without abstraction; but that it 
makes the wrong kind of abstractions. The axioms of the general equilibrium theory 
contain assertions about the real world that can be refuted and without which the main 
conclusions of the theory would not hold, as for example, those relating to the laws of 
                                                
 
24 The term equilibrium is used in economics in different contexts: there is the budgetary equilib-
rium, the balance-of-payments equilibrium and the general economic equilibrium. To avoid any 
possible misunderstanding, therefore, it must be noted that in speaking of equilibrium in this 
thesis, I will always refer — unless further indication — to the general economic equilibrium 
theory originally formulated by Walras. 
25 See Arrow and Debreu (1954). 
26 Weintraub (1983, p. 37) affirms: “The “equilibrium” story is one in which empirical work, 
ideas of facts and falsification, played no role at all.” 
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production. There are other axioms that are demonstrably untrue; for example, that all 
prices are given parametrically to all agents and prices constitute the sole kind of infor-
mation on which decisions are based or that the economy operates without either 
material or monetary inventories or reserves. And finally there are axioms that, though 
non-tautological, are incapable, in practice, of being verified or refuted; for example, 
that the action of all agents is guided solely by the criterion of “optimization” by which 
is meant that producers maximize their profits or consumers their “utility” (Kaldor, 
1985, pp. 11-12). 
It is fair to acknowledge that Debreu and his colleagues were generally aware of the 
empirical shortcomings of modern economic equilibrium theory. They defended them-
selves by pointing out that they were merely laying the foundations for the explanation 
of how a decentralized market economy works. The original theoretical framework 
should be seen as something similar to the scaffolding in the construction of buildings. 
The scaffolding has to be erected before permanent building can be built, but it will be 
removed step by step as the permanent building nears completion. However, since 
Walras first wrote down his system of simultaneous equations over 100 years ago, pro-
gress has definitely been backwards not forwards in the sense that the present set of 
axioms are far more restrictive than those of the original Walrasian model. The process 
of removing the scaffolding — i.e. relaxing the unreal basic assumptions — has not yet 
started. Indeed, the scaffolding gets thicker and more impenetrable with every succes-
sive reformulation of the theory, with growing uncertainty as to whether there is a solid 
building underneath (Kaldor, 1985, pp. 12-13).27 
Nevertheless, it is still a deep underlying belief common to all neoclassical economists 
that general equilibrium theory is the one and only starting point for any logically con-
sistent explanation of the behavior of a decentralized economic system. This belief 
sustained the theory despite the increasing arbitrariness of its basic assumptions. Instead 
of bringing economic theory closer to reality, as Kaldor rightly observes, the continued 
fascination exerted by the Neo-walrasian general equilibrium theory on the academic 
community has created the opposite kind of movement: the economists’ view of reality 
                                                
 
27 See also Kaldor (1972, p. 1238-1239). 
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became increasingly distorted, so as to come closer to the theoretical image rather than 
the other way around. Thus, neoclassical theorists increasingly claim to believe that 
competition is virtually perfect; that production functions are linear and that markets are 
continuously market-clearing (Kaldor, 1985, pp. 60-61). 
Given these negative developments, it seems reasonable to affirm that the notion of 
general equilibrium has been deleterious in economics in general, and international trade 
theory in particular. The theoretic framework created by the general economic equilibri-
um paradigm has conducted economic research into a cul-de-sac. Far from improving the 
understanding of how a decentralized market economy may function, it has actually 
inhibited the progress of knowledge, creating a serious brake on the development of 
economic thought (Kaldor, 1985, p. 57).28 
In order to avoid running into this cul-de-sac some economists have proposed a ra-
ther radical29 solution: to dismiss the conceptual framework of general equilibrium 
economics altogether. Without such a major disruption, they argue, it is impossible to 
make any real progress in modern economic thought.30 The main problem with this 
radical solution is that it automatically imposes a major task on the shoulders of its ad-
vocates: he or she has to offer an alternative theoretical framework to replace the 
dismissed one. Otherwise, the proposed breach with the general equilibrium paradigm 
would be regarded as incomplete. Furthermore, a dismissal of the ruling paradigm with-
out offering an alternative would be ineffective. No matter how inconsistent, ivory-
towered or empirically rebutted a specific theoretical system may be — the majority of 
scholars will nevertheless stick to it until a new conceptual framework is available for 
taking its place. 
In the field of international trade theory, though, such an alternative to the neoclassi-
cal framework is already available: the classical free-trade case of Smith and Ricardo. But 
                                                
 
28 See also Kaldor (1975). 
29 I am using here the word “radical” according to its semantic origin, which is “root”, and not 
in the colloquial sense of “extreme”. It is therefore completely stripped from any negative con-
notation. A radical solution is one that addresses the root of a problem. 
30 See Kaldor, (1972, p. 1240). 
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some critics of general economic equilibrium have taken a different approach. Disillu-
sioned by the ruling neoclassical paradigm, they have become skeptical towards any 
attempt to formulate general and systematic theories, arguing against the high-sounding 
principles and the pretentious attitude of the great system-builders. Instead of returning to 
the theoretic framework of classical political economy, these scholars propose to follow 
an inductive method of research.31 
1.5 Deduction vs. Induction 
A theory can be proved by experiment but no 
path leads from experiment to the birth of a theory. 
It is the theory that decides what can be observed. 
Albert Einstein 
Kaldor describes the inductive method of research as the procedure of collecting styl-
ized facts32 and then constructing a hypothesis that fits them. In other words, one should 
subordinate deduction to induction, and discover the empirical regularities first. For 
discovering these empirical regularities without any theoretical predispositions, Kaldor 
proposes such ingenuous scientific tools as the study of statistics or the realization of spe-
cial inquiries — including informal conversations with owners or executives of small 
and big enterprises.33 
Ha-Joon Chang follows a similar methodological approach in his well-known book 
Kicking Away The Ladder (2002), where he analyses the interventionist trade policies fol-
lowed by Britain and the United States before they reached economic supremacy and 
converted into the leading free trade advocates of the nineteenth and twentieth century, 
respectively. Professor Chang is perhaps the most outspoken contemporary advocate of 
the infant-industry argument, which is usually attributed to Friedrich List. An exhaustive 
                                                
 
31 See, for example, Kaldor (1985, p. 9). 
32 He calls them “stylized facts” because in the social sciences it is impossible to establish facts 
that are precise and at the same time suggestive and intriguing in their implications, and that 
admit to no exceptions. 
33 See Kaldor (1985, p. 8). 
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analysis of this argument will be given in section 4.3 of this doctoral thesis. At this mo-
ment, it is only important to point out that the justification for granting protection to 
infant industries was based on pervasive historical examples rather than on a solid theo-
retic system. Such a predominantly inductive research method was used and propagated 
by the German Historical School. Representatives of this school of economic thought 
branded their methodological approach the historical method, which Chang (2002, p. 6) 
describes as followed: 
“This approach, if applied appropriately, does not limit itself to the collection and 
cataloguing of historical facts in the hope that some pattern will naturally emerge. 
Rather, it involves searching for persistent historical patterns, constructing theories 
to explain them, and applying these theories to contemporary problems, while tak-
ing into account changes in technological, institutional and political 
circumstances.” 
I initially professed a great deal of sympathy with the down-to-earth approach of the 
historical method, mainly because of its sharp contrast with the arbitrary assumptions of 
neoclassical international trade models. The study of historical cases and factual exam-
ples seemed to be a necessary counterbalance and possible remedy to the rampant 
ahistorical character of the current discussions on international trade and economic 
growth. Furthermore, a combined use of both methods — deduction and induction — 
seemed to be legitimized by the conclusion of the New Trade Theory that history has been 
a determining factor in the establishment of certain patterns of specialization and trade 
between countries. Moreover, the historical method appeared to compensate the empir-
ical problems of measuring the exact benefits of two popular arguments in favor of 
protection: strategic trade policies and external economies. Finally, the study of the fac-
tual trade policies implemented by the developed countries in their long march towards 
wealth and prosperity could bear some valuable lessons for developing countries cur-
rently trying to catch up with the developed world. 
After becoming more familiar with the free-trade case of the classical political econ-
omy, however, I quickly realized that a predominantly inductive method of research 
without the support of a solid theoretical framework was not suitable for providing a 
compelling answer for the main research question of this doctoral thesis. That is to say 
because classical political economists argue that protectionism would certainly retard a 
nation’s journey towards wealth and economic prosperity, but it would not always be 
capable of preventing that nation from becoming wealthy altogether, and still less of 
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making it go backwards. If a nation could not prosper without implementing free trade, 
there is not a single country in the world that could ever have prospered.34 Therefore, 
Smith and Ricardo would not question the accuracy of Chang’s overwhelming historical 
account regarding the protectionist trade policies of Britain, the US and other developed 
countries, but certainly his conclusion about the proper trade policy to boost economic 
development. They would argue that Britain and the United States, as every other 
wealthy nation in the history of humankind, have become wealthy not because but despite 
the use of a profuse and ingenious arsenal of protectionist policies. 
An effective refutation of the classical case for free trade cannot be obtained by em-
pirical testing or pervasive historical research. It is simply impossible to find a historical 
example where two identical countries facing identical historical circumstances have 
implemented opposing trade policies — the first country a free trade policy and the 
other a protectionist trade policy — in order to find out which economy has grown 
faster. It is equally not suitable to compare the growth statistic of the same country in 
different historical circumstances to prove whether or not it has developed faster when 
implementing a protectionist trade policy instead of free trade. One of the main lessons 
of the classical theory of international trade is that the trade policies of the rest of the 
world have a decisive influence on the economic results of a single country. The interna-
tional division of labor cannot flourish if one country is willing to trade but the others 
not. 
The decision to rely predominantly on a solid theoretical framework for analyzing his-
torical processes should not be misinterpreted as an argument against the study of 
concrete historical data or case studies. Any theoretical system created mainly by deduc-
tive logic should always be complemented with the systematic empirical testing of its 
main propositions. The respective magnum opus of the three great classical political 
economists — i.e., Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, David Ricardo’s Principles and Karl 
Marx’s Das Kapital — are excellent examples of how a theoretical system can serve as a 
valuable guide for better understanding the economic development of specific econo-
mies. One of them, namely Karl Marx, even dedicated his main research effort to 
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discover and investigate the laws that governed the historical process. These three great 
economists used the same theoretical framework: that of the classical political economy. 
Thus, the single most important methodological guideline of this doctoral thesis is 
not the contraposition of positive and normative economics, mathematical and literary 
economics, or deduction and induction; all these contrapositions are essentially fictitious 
and a futile distraction from the single methodological contraposition that truly matters 
when making a reasoned judgment on the virtues and inconveniences of recommending 
a free-trade policy for developing countries: the contraposition between the classical and 
the neoclassical international trade theories. 
1.6 Classical vs. Neoclassical Economics 
Making a contraposition of the classical and the neoclassical international trade theo-
ries is a contested subject in academic circles, since it touches a broader debate about 
the relationship between these two major schools of economic thought. The issue of 
dispute in this century-old debate is not whether they are indeed two distinctive schools 
of economic thought — a view on which the vast majority of scholars in economics 
would agree; the issue at stake is whether classical economics should be seen as a mere 
forerunner of modern neoclassical economics — the predominant interpretation nowa-
days — or as a school of thought that has a distinct and eventually superior theory of 
value and distribution, international trade and economic growth. 
Most neoclassical economists consider their economic theory as essentially continu-
ous with classical economics.35 According to them, there is no hard and fast line 
between classical and neoclassical economics, since the majority of the neoclassical con-
cepts and propositions are also supposed to be found in classical political economy, 
although in a confused or embryonic state. Therefore, neoclassical scholars often con-
sider that the contemporary study of classical political economy has merely an 
antiquarian value, which should be relegated to courses of history of economic thought 
(Peach, 1993). In their view, the classical concepts and insights are not suitable for accu-
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rately understanding and unfolding the real functioning of a modern capitalistic econo-
my. 
Despite these attempts to discredit and hold down the study of classical political 
economy, a process of academic revival of this school of economic thought has taken 
place during the second half of the twentieth century. Walsh (2000) distinguishes two 
separate stages of this revival process: The first stage was mainly centered around the 
works of David Ricardo, with Piero Sraffa as the leading theorist; the second stage of 
this academic revival process has been led by Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen, 
who has worked on the ideas of Adam Smith. 
This doctoral thesis is intended to make a modest contribution to the ongoing revival 
process of classical political economy, at least in the field of international trade theory. 
Any analysis of the classical theory of international trade has to pay equal attention to 
the theoretical insights of Smith and Ricardo, since both made crucial contributions to 
it. As will be demonstrated later on, their contributions to international trade theory are 
essentially complementary and still very relevant. Such an integrative view of the princi-
pal classical economists could be proven crucial for advancing to a new stage in the 
revival process of classical political economy. 
The reemergence of classical political economy in modern economic thought has led 
to three important conclusions: First, the conventional interpretation of the relation 
between the classical and the neoclassical theory, which focuses on the continuity be-
tween the two, is wrong. The new interpretation highlights the substantially different 
approaches of these two schools of economy thought, arguing that the emergence of 
the neoclassical approach should be seen as a discontinuity in the history of economics. 
Second, the classical school did not disappear around 1870 as is commonly supposed, 
but have contested with its neoclassical rival for primacy in the field of economic 
thought until the present. Third, studying the classical approach to economics remains 
relevant, because of its potential for dealing with long-term economic growth and its 
consequences for the social relations of production (Young J. T., 1978). 
For the present doctoral thesis, the important methodological implication of the 
above conclusions is that there is not a single case for free trade, but two very distinct 
cases. In order to work out the main differences between the classical and the neoclassi-
cal cases for free trade, however, several theoretical obstacles have to be removed. The 
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most important one has to deal with the current interpretation of Ricardo’s so-called 
comparative advantage theory.  
Comparative advantage has had a prominent place within the neoclassical case for 
free trade. The integration of this classical insight into the neoclassical international 
trade theory has been presented as an example of continuity between the two schools of 
economic thought. At the same time, the current interpretation of comparative ad-
vantage is responsible for the perceived rift within the classical theory of international 
trade.36 This rift is supposed to be between the Smithean logic of trade and his dynamic 
analyses oriented towards of long-run economic growth, on the one hand, and the Ri-
cardian logic of trade, which has been formalized in terms of the static theory of 
efficient allocation of the given resources, on the other. These two logics of trade are 
seen as radically different and incompatible.37 Moreover, because foreign trade analysis 
in modern economics has been dominated by the Ricardian logic of trade, whereas the 
analysis of the domestic economy has proceeded along Smith’s insights, there has also 
been a perceived rift between the international trade theory and the theory of domestic 
economic development. 
The accurate interpretation of the famous numerical example of chapter 7 of Ricar-
do’s Principles containing the comparative-cost insight, which I obviously cannot 
anticipate here, suggests a completely different perception of the perceived rift in inter-
national trade theory. According to the new interpretation, the rift is not between the 
international trade theories of Smith and Ricardo, but between the classical and the neo-
classical cases for free international trade. Ricardo’s comparative-cost insight should 
now be considered as essentially compatible and complementary to Smith’s theory of 
international trade, but incompatible with neoclassical international trade theory. 
Given the crucial role that comparative advantage has played in international trade 
theory for the past two centuries, it seems to be evident that the implications of any 
significant reinterpretation of this concept have to be necessarily far-reaching. The rein-
terpretation of Ricardo’s numerical example leads to a complete restatement of the 
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classical international trade theory. The logical starting point for this restatement of the 
classical case for free trade, though, has to be the Wealth of Nations, as will be explained 
in the next section. 
1.7 The Primary Sources of the Classical Case for Free Trade 
‘Classic.’ A book which people praise and don’t read. 
Mark Twain 
At the first look, the methodological approach to take the Wealth of Nations as the 
starting point and main primary source for the restatement of the classical case for free 
trade seems uncontroversial. After all, the majority of economists consider the publica-
tion of this book in 1776 as the birth date of economics as an independent academic 
discipline, as well as a milestone in the formulation of the classical case for free trade. 
Indeed, the international trade theory has been very much influenced by this Smith’s 
book, as any comparison of the economic literature in the decades before and after its 
publication would reveal. Before the Wealth of Nations, there was a widespread presump-
tion in economic thought that an appropriate use of import tariffs and other restrictions 
with regard to international trade was likely to constitute a better economic policy than 
free trade. This general presumption in favor of government intervention in internation-
al trade was undermined by Smith’s economic analysis, which established the 
proposition among economic thinkers that free trade was superior to import protection 
in producing a greater amount of wealth. “From this point on”, as Irwin (1998, p. 3) states, 
“the burden of proof in economic debates has been with those advocating restrictions on trade to demon-
strate how such policies would contribute to a country’s economic wealth.” 
The problem with taking the Wealth of Nations as the primary source, though, lies in 
the current negative reception of Smith as an international trade theorist in modern 
economic literature. It seems paradoxical to me that mainstream neoclassical economists 
generally give Smith little credit as an international trade theorist — or ignore him al-
most completely —, while they continue to praise him as the pioneering advocate of 
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free trade.38 Even the scholars who appreciate the importance of Smith’s analysis regard-
ing the growth-stimulating effects of foreign trade endorse the predominant view that 
Smith was not a great trade theorist, because he did not come up with comparative costs 
or reciprocal demand.39 This failure allegedly deprives Smith’s international trade theory 
of its cutting edge. The widespread popularity of Ricardo’s comparative-advantage in-
sight has condemned Smith to a second-class theorist in the field of international trade. 
In addition to this failure to discover comparative advantage, which will be analyzed 
later on40, some well-known scholars have criticized Smith for his alleged lack of creativ-
ity.41 They have expressed bewilderment about the fact that Smith was able to 
accomplish the switch of the burden of proof from free traders to trade interventionists 
without introducing a single truly original concept or insight regarding international 
trade in the Wealth of Nations. According to them, all the important concepts and insights 
in Smith’s free-trade case had already been stated by other authors — and allegedly 
much clearer and more precise than Smith — well before the publication of this book. 
The charge regarding Smith’s lack of originality — if proven right —, would have direct 
consequences on the methodological decision to take the Wealth of Nations as the prima-
ry source for the classical case for free trade. It seems therefore appropriate to analyze it 
here at some length. 
To begin with, it is important to realize that the task of accurately identifying the orig-
inal author of a specific concept or proposition is difficult to accomplish, since it 
requires a truly encyclopedic knowledge of the prolific literature about the subject. Even 
then, it is quite possible that some day another dedicated researcher will come up with 
                                                
 
38 Viner (1937, pp. 108-109), for example, affirms that “all the important elements in Smith’s free-trade 
doctrine had been presented prior to the Wealth of Nations.” Robbins (1971, p. 191) argues that Smith’s 
contribution lacks analytical rigor, and Hollander (1973, Ch. 9) views Smith’s treatment of the 
issue as unclear, contradictory and in parts incompatible with the rest of his analysis. For a vin-
dication of Smith by a mainstream economist, see Samuelson (1977). 
39 See, for example, Bloomfield (1975, pp. 456 and 480-481). 
40 The reader will found a reply of this critique towards Smith in section 2.4 of this thesis. 
41 Schumpeter (1954, p. 184) asserts that the Wealth of Nations “(...) does not contain a single analytic 
idea, principle, or method that was entirely new in 1776.” Moreover, Viner (1927, p. 200) affirms: “On 
every detail, taken by itself, Smith appears to have had predecessors in plenty. On few details was Smith as pene-
trating as the best of his predecessors.” 
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the discovery of a forgotten pamphlet where a hitherto little-known author had already 
described in an obscure language the essence of the concept or proposition. In that case, 
the credit given hitherto to the later author for his/her alleged originality and innovative 
thinking may appear unfounded. In order to prove his lack of originality, though, it is 
not enough to find another thinker who had written something similar before him/her; 
it is also mandatory to prove that he/she was aware of the existence of this newly dis-
covered pamphlet when writing about the subject. 
Notwithstanding the factual correctness of the critique regarding Smith’s lack of orig-
inality, it would be erroneous to judge his merits — or the merits of any other great 
thinker — merely by the novelty of his main concepts and propositions. Such an exces-
sive and/or exclusive emphasis on originality neglects the essentially collaborative nature 
of all scientific inquiry. The history of science may be seen as a spectacular succession of 
revolutionary discoveries and innovations, but if one pick up a single scientist from this 
splendid and incessant stream of human creativity in order to highlight his or her genu-
ine individual contribution, one may find out that he or she is — generally speaking — 
much less innovative and revolutionary than originally thought. That is because the in-
novations of this individual scientist are often preconditioned by the precedent research 
efforts of others. Even his/her well-deserved credit is often the result of the work done 
by his/her colleagues, who have empirically confirmed or further developed the original 
ideas or theories of this scientist. 
Isaac Newton, undoubtedly one of the greatest and most innovative minds in the his-
tory of science, once wrote the famous and often quoted sentence regarding his 
personal scientific contributions: “If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of gi-
ants.”42 The same could be said about the contributions made by Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo or Karl Marx to classical political economy. They are regarded as masterminds 
of the economic science not because they were able to gain their concepts and proposi-
tions from nowhere, but because they were able to draw a new picture out of already 
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(1985) proves that other authors had used this aphorism at least 27 times before Newton wrote 
it in his famous letter to Hooke in 1676. 
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known pieces of insights, and this new picture revolutionized the way we look and ana-
lyze the economic reality from that moment on until now. 
The Wealth of Nations is a paradigmatic example for this kind of innovation. In this 
book Smith succeeds in bringing together formerly disparate and disperse economic 
concepts and propositions into a unified and coherent economic theory, now called 
classical political economy, which has proven to be a powerful and useful theoretic 
framework to analyze the functioning of the economy. Therefore, it might be true that 
Smith had numerous predecessors, and that some of them were even able to find a su-
perior way to express specific ideas; more importantly, however, is the fact that these 
ideas are often to be found in isolated passages not wholly consistent with the views 
expounded in the surrounding text. 43 Consequently, none of Smith’s predecessors were 
able to overthrow established notions of international trade policy, and to create a new 
presumption that free trade was the best policy to be pursued. Thus, Smith’s foremost 
contribution is that, while drawing upon the works of others, he orders these former 
isolated elements in a systematic way, improving the quality of economic analysis in 
support of free trade.44 The importance and continued relevancy of Smith’s systematic 
analysis on international trade is the main reason for making the Wealth of Nations the 
primary source of the classical case for free trade.  
Besides Smith, the most important contributor to classical international trade theory 
is David Ricardo. His magnum opus, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, is the 
other main primary source for the restatement of the classical case for free trade. As 
already been said, the misinterpretation of his numerical example in the famous chapter 
7 of the Principles is responsible for the perceived rift within the classical theory of inter-
national trade. Consequently, Ricardo’s main insights on international trade theory have 
often been presented as incompatible and directly opposed to Smith’s theory. 
The failure to understand the essentially complementary nature of Ricardo’s insights 
may have been also favored by the general plan chosen by him when writing the Princi-
ples. Constantly troubled by self-doubts with respect to his writing skills, he decided to 
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dedicate the Principles only to those aspects that he considered to be new and/or in disa-
greement with already established propositions of political economy, leaving the task of 
presenting a complete view of the science for a future book.45 Such a modus operandi 
tends to artificially emphasize the differences and minimize the level of agreement with 
respect to Adam Smith. Ricardo is well aware of this danger, as the following paragraph 
from the preface of the Principles proves: 
“The writer, in combating received opinions, has found it necessary to advert more 
particularly to those passages in the writings of Adam Smith from which he sees 
reason to differ; but he hopes it will not, on that account, be suspected that he 
does not, in common with all those who acknowledge the importance of the sci-
ence of Political Economy, participate in the admiration which the profound work 
of this celebrated author so justly excites” (Vol. I, p. 6).46 
Unfortunately, Ricardo died six years after the publication of the Principles, at the early 
age of fifty-one, without accomplishing the task of offering his complete view on politi-
cal economy. The Principles remain the main source of his thoughts on political economy 
and international trade. Therefore, it is important to read this book always in close asso-
ciation with the relevant passages of the Wealth of Nations in order to interpret Ricardo’s 
contributions as accurately as possible. 
For accomplishing the difficult task of restating the classical case for free trade, it is 
necessary to strip it from the theoretical ramblings that have been attached to it over the 
years. Therefore, I have followed the principle of consulting first and foremost these 
two sources. To consult the primary source for the understanding of a complex concept 
or theory is a widely recommended and regretfully not always followed practice in scien-
tific research. The reliance on secondary sources, whatever valuable and prestigious they 
might be, always bears the danger of misinterpreting the original thinker. This potential 
danger is widely increased when the researcher decides to rely exclusively on secondary 
sources. By following this approach — which cannot be considered a truly scientific 
                                                
 
45 See Ricardo’s letter to James Mill (VII, p. 112) on December 20th, 1816, responding to Mill’s 
letter of December 16th (VII, p. 106), which is equally worth reading. 
46 Throughout this dissertation, all direct quotations of Ricardo are extracted from The Works 
and Correspondence of David Ricardo, Volume I to XI, 2004, edited by Piero Sraffa. I will refer to 
them usually by indicating the volume and page numbers only. 
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practice —, generations of scholars may unconsciously reproduce and perpetuate the 
possible distortions and errors made by earlier interpreters of the original author. 
The meticulous application of this research principle has resulted in the abundant use 
of direct quotes from the Wealth of Nations and the Principles, particularly in the following 
chapter dedicated to the classical free-trade case. I obviously regard these quotes as nec-
essary, and hope that they do not compromise the fluidity and general understanding of 
the reading. 
Finally, I do not pretend to claim that this doctoral thesis offers the accurate restate-
ment of the classical case for free trade. It merely contains my personal interpretation of 
the classical theory of international trade. It is up to the academic colleagues to judge the 
accuracy of this interpretation. 
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2 The Classical Free Trade Theory 
2.1 Wealth and Real National Income 
The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of 
production prevails, presents itself as an immense accumu-
lation of commodities. 
Karl Marx (Das Kapital) 
Adam Smith, as already pointed out, formulates in the Wealth of Nations the most sys-
tematic and compelling case in favor of free trade until then. His analysis on foreign 
trade, though, is part of a broader investigation concerning the proper means for in-
creasing the wealth of a country to the utmost.47 Consequently, he considers the 
expected effect on the amount of wealth available in a country as the main benchmark 
for judging the merits of particular economic policies, including those directly related to 
international trade. 
Given its role as the main benchmark for evaluating international trade policies, it 
seems clear that the concept of wealth is both central and critical for an accurate under-
standing of Smith’s systematic analysis of foreign trade. As he rightly states, the wealth 
of a country always consists in the “(...) consumable goods annually reproduced by the labor of the 
society” (WN, IV.ix.38, p. 678).48 This notion of wealth seems rather self-evident nowa-
days, but it was certainly not obvious back in 1776, as a brief comparison with the 
wealth-notion of many supporters of mercantilism shows. 
                                                
 
47 To increase the wealth of the country is, according to Smith, the principal aim of the science 
called political economy. He states: “Political economy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman 
or legislator, proposes two distinct objects; first, to provide a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or more 
properly to enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or 
commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the publick services. It proposes to enrich both the people and the 
sovereign” (WN, IV.intro.1). 
48 All references to the Wealth of Nations will be to the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Corre-
spondence of Adam Smith, edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner. Quotations will be 
referenced using the Glasgow convention of citing the book, chapter and paragraph, but will 
also include the page number. 
Chapter 2: The Classical Free Trade Theory 
-37- 
Mercantilism was the predominant school of economic thought before the arrival of 
classical political economy. For many mercantilist writers, wealth consisted in the incon-
sumable riches of money, mainly gold and silver, which were the principal currencies 
during the 17th and 18th centuries. Smith explicitly refers to the consequences of such a 
wrong notion of wealth for the subsequent analysis of foreign trade: 
“The two principles being established, however, that wealth consisted in gold and 
silver, and that those metals could be brought into a country which had no mines 
only by the balance of trade, or by exporting to a greater value than it imported; it 
necessarily became the great object of political economy to diminish as much as 
possible the importation of foreign goods for home-consumption, and to increase 
as much as possible the exportation of the produce of domestick industry. Its two 
great engines for enriching the country, therefore, were restraints upon importa-
tion, and encouragements to exportation” (WN, IV.i.35, p. 450). 
Smith’s notion of wealth is clearly superior compared to the bulk of mercantilist writ-
ers. It is important to acknowledge, though, that it cannot be seen as an innovation to 
economic thought, because the most advanced representatives of mercantilism had al-
ready arrived to the same notion of wealth as Smith. Despite having an accurate concept 
of wealth, though, these advanced mercantilists failed to apply it consistently to their 
foreign trade analysis.49 Instead, they continue to use the money notion of wealth for 
their international trade theory, which necessarily lead them to consider a positive bal-
ance of trade as the foremost objective of international trade. 
Before the advent of classical political economy, another school of economic thought, 
physiocracy, had already argued forcefully against the mercantilists’ theories regarding 
foreign trade, particularly against the fallacies of the balance-of-trade doctrine 
(Bloomfield, 1938, p. 718ff.). The Physiocrats propagated the correct notion of wealth, 
but they made a decisive error with regard to the source of that wealth; they considered 
only the labor that is directly employed to land as productive. According to them, only 
                                                
 
49 Smith himself recognizes this when he states: “Some of the best English writers upon commerce set out 
with observing, that the wealth of a country consists, not in its gold and silver only, but in its lands, houses, and 
consumable goods of all different kinds. In the course of their reasonings, however, the lands, houses, and consum-
able goods seem to slip out of their memory, and the strain of their argument frequently supposes that all wealth 
consists in gold and silver, and that to multiply those metals is the great object of national industry and commerce” 
(WN, IV.i.34, p. 450). 
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the natural produce of the earth — first and foremost agricultural products but also raw 
materials — should be considered the real source of all wealth in society. 
This limited concept about the source of wealth dominates the policy recommenda-
tions of the Physiocrats with respect to foreign trade. In asserting the economic primacy 
of raw materials and agricultural products, they generally judge the exportation of these 
items and the importation of manufactured goods more desirable than the reverse, turn-
ing the ideal commodity composition of trade proposed by the mercantilists on its head. 
In fact, it is save to affirm that the Physiocrats advocated free trade more as a matter of 
convenience than conviction: only because a free trade policy would benefit agriculture 
in their home country — France — in that particular historical moment, they supported 
it. It is easy to image them having a protectionist bias in other geographical latitudes or 
historical circumstances (Irwin, 1998, p. 65ff).50 
Besides the calls for removing the impediments on grain exports, the Physiocrats ac-
tually did not devote much attention to international trade at all. On the contrary, they 
often tried to minimize the role of international trade in the economy, asserting that 
internal trade is of greater importance and, therefore, that a large foreign trade was nei-
ther essential nor desirable.51 Some Physiocrats even considered a large volume of trade 
to be an indication, not of prosperity, but of impoverishment. It might either represent a 
narrow domestic market, resulting in large exports, a scarcity of domestic wealth neces-
sitating large imports, or regional shortages due, for example, to crop failures 
(Bloomfield, 1938, p. 731). Such a negative attitude toward foreign trade would neces-
sarily bring the Physiocrats in direct confrontation with classical political economists in 
some later point of history. 
                                                
 
50 A modern Physiocrat would most probably defend the contemporary trade policies of France, 
which is a particularly strong supporter — and beneficiary — of the Common Agricultural Poli-
cy of the EU. This proves that it is important to go beyond the policy recommendations, which 
can be influenced by changing circumstances, and analyze the economic theory of a particular 
school of economic thought, because the theory is the permanent fundament of its policy rec-
ommendations. Different circumstances might lead to completely opposed policy 
recommendations, although the theoretic body remains unchanged. 
51 As Bloomfield (1938, p. 731) affirms: “In reaction to the mercantilist stress on foreign trade, the Physio-
crats were led to belittle its importance and to view it with disdain.” 
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Smith rejects this narrow concept about the source of wealth proposed by the Physi-
ocrats. Instead, he formulates the well-known distinction between productive and 
unproductive labor52, where the former is involved in the creation of commodities, 
while the latter is involved in the provision of services. By labeling the labor employed 
in the provision of services as unproductive, Smith does not deny the fact that services like 
education, health care, defense, justice or transportation are quite useful and paramount 
for the economic progress of any nation. He merely wants to point out with this distinc-
tion that the labor of the workforce employed in providing these services does not 
directly contribute to aggregate material output, and that the material needs of this peo-
ple — i.e. food, clothing and housing, to only mentioning the fundamental needs — 
have to be provided by the labor of others. 
In summary, it seems save to affirm that Smith’s foremost merit with respect to the 
precedent schools of economic thought is not originality but consistency when applying 
the concept of wealth to foreign trade analysis. This consistency is due greatly to the fact 
that he uses a single main criterion for evaluating the various effects of different com-
mercial policies, namely, if these trade policies tend to increase or decrease the real 
annual revenue of society. 
The term real annual revenue proposed by Smith is the equivalent of the modern de-
nomination real national income (Irwin, 1998, p. 76). Thus, the expected effects on real 
national income should be the main benchmark for judging the economic merits of a 
particular foreign trade policy for any modern follower of classical political economy. 
Nowadays, mainstream economists generally judge the merits of international trade 
policies in terms of their impact on the economic growth of a country, using in most 
cases the gross domestic product (GDP) as the main indicator. There is, however, a subtle 
but important difference when using GDP instead of real national income as the main 
benchmark for assessing the merits of foreign trade policies. 
According to basic national income accounting, GDP is defined as the market value 
of all final goods and services produced in a country in one year. Following the most 
popular national output accounting method, the expenditure approach, GDP is obtained 
                                                
 
52 See Smith (WN, II.iii, pp. 330ff.). 
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by the sum of consumption (C) plus investment (I) plus government spending (G) plus 
exports (X) minus imports (M) — that is: 
 
On the other hand, real national income is the total amount of goods and services avail-
able in an economy (C + I + G), which is gross domestic output (GDP) plus imports 
minus exports or: 
 
When taking GDP as the main benchmark, it appears that exports are more beneficial 
than imports because the former contributes to an increase of the GDP, while the later 
decreases GDP. When taking real national income as benchmark, it is exactly the other 
way around: imports are seen as more beneficial than exports, because imports increase 
and exports decrease real national income. 
The GDP-benchmark often leads to associate a high level of imports and trade defi-
cits with a decline of domestic production and a high unemployment rate. After all, if 
the national government would not let the foreign commodities in, they would have to 
be produced at home. This fallacious conclusion ignores the fact that imports have to be 
paid ultimately with exports. As Ricardo correctly states: “No country can long import, unless 
it also exports, or can long export unless it also imports” (Vol. I, p. 263). 
The fact that national economies can run significant trade deficits during a prolonged 
period of time is not a suitable objection. Looking merely at a negative trade balance 
often omit the exportation of services, for example tourism. It is therefore more appro-
priate to analyze the balance of the current account, which includes commodities and 
services. Current account deficits have to be compensated by a surplus in the capital 
account. Such an inflow of foreign money, either by lending or investment, finds its way 
into national productive activity. 
Smith has a preference for the indicator that highlights the beneficial effects of im-
ports because “(…) consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production” (WN, IV.viii.49-
50, p. 660). A country is ultimately interested in consumable imports, whereas exports 
are what it has to give in exchange. Not only that, in the long-run, a high level of im-
ports must go along with a high level of exports — from an economic point of view, it 
! 
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does not make any sense to export without importing, or to export more than to import 
over a long period of time. 
That being said, it is important to point out that the question of whether foreign trade 
benefits or hurts the domestic economy cannot be resolved by comparing the different 
indicators of national income accounting. A deeper understanding of economic theory is 
required to appreciate the nature of the benefits of international trade for the national 
economy. 
2.2 The Mutual Gains from International Trade 
All these national jealousy which prompt them to spite and ill-
will each other, and refuse to be supplied by them in any con-
venience of life, must lessen the exchange of commodities, hurt 
the division of labor, and diminish the opulence of both. 
Adam Smith 
Smith and Ricardo firmly believed in the proposition that free international trade 
would very powerfully contribute to increase the mass of commodities, and therefore the sum of enjoy-
ments of every nation.53 Their strongly conviction regarding the mutual benefits of free 
trade is not based on wishful thinking, the adherence to a cosmopolitan ideal, or the 
furtive pursued of British national interests — as Friedrich List and many others have 
later suggested. It is rather based on the insightful analysis of the economic gains that 
accrue to every nation engaging in international trade without artificial restraints. 
Smith refers to the gains from international trade in the following well-known passage 
of the Wealth of Nations: 
“Between whatever places foreign trade is carried on, they all of them derive two 
distinct benefits from it. It carries out that surplus part of the produce of their land 
and labor for which there is no demand among them, and brings back in return for 
it something else for which there is a demand. It gives a value to their superfluities, 
by exchanging them for something else, which may satisfy a part of their wants, 
and increase their enjoyments. By means of it the narrowness of the home market 
does not hinder the division of labor in any particular branch of art or manufacture 
from being carried to the highest perfection. By opening a more extensive market 
                                                
 
53 The words in cursive are from Ricardo (Vol. I, p. 128). 
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for whatever part of the produce of their labor may exceed the home consump-
tion, it encourages them to improve its productive powers, and to augment its 
annual produce to the utmost, and thereby to increase the real revenue and wealth 
of the society” (WN, IV.i.31, pp. 446-447). 
According to the above quote, there are two main benefits from foreign trade: first, it 
provides an outlet for the surplus-production of particular commodities, meaning by 
surplus a level of production above domestic requirements, also known as the vent-for-
surplus theory; and second, foreign trade extends the market and thus encourages the divi-
sion of labor and the improvement of the productive powers of the country.54 
Unfortunately, Smith’s well-known reference to the gains from international trade has 
spurred a great deal of controversy, because most scholars consider the first benefit 
mentioned, the vent-for-surplus theory, as a theoretical flaw. Smith’s error cannot be 
excused by pointing out that it is, perhaps, merely a careless formulation, since he re-
peatedly refers to this alleged benefit of international trade in other passages of the 
Wealth of Nations.55 A particularly eloquent exposition of the vent-for-surplus theory can 
be found in the following paragraph: 
“When the produce of any particular branch of industry exceeds what the demand 
of the country requires, the surplus must be sent abroad, and exchanged for some-
thing for which there is a demand at home. Without such exportation, a part of the 
productive labour of the country must cease, and the value of its annual produce 
diminish. The land and labour of Great Britain produce generally more corn, wool-
lens, and hard ware, than the demand of the home-market requires. The surplus 
part of them, therefore, must be sent abroad, and exchanged for something for 
which there is a demand at home. It is only by means of such exportation, that this 
surplus can acquire a value sufficient to compensate the labour and expence of 
producing it” (WN, II.v.33, p. 372). 
                                                
 
54 Productive forces, productive powers or forces of production (in German, Produktivkräfte) refers to the 
combination of the human physical and intellectual labor power with the means of production 
(tools, machinery, infrastructure). This concept is normally associated with Marx's Critique of 
Political Economy, although it already figures prominently in Smith’s reference to the productive 
powers of labor in Book I of the Wealth of Nations. 
55 See, for example, Smith (WN, III.i.1, p. 376) and (WN, IV.iii.c.4, p. 489). 
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Ricardo, who is well-known for his rigorous deductive reasoning56, rejected Smith’s 
vent-for-surplus theory on logical grounds. Referring exactly to the above passage of the 
Wealth of Nations, he writes in a footnote of the Principles: 
“One would be led to think by the above passage, that Adam Smith concluded we 
were under some necessity of producing a surplus of corn, woollen goods, and 
hardware, and that the capital which produced them could not be otherwise em-
ployed. It is, however, always a matter of choice in what way a capital shall be 
employed, and therefore there can never, for any length of time, be a surplus of 
any commodity; for if there were, it would fall below its natural price, and capital 
would be removed to some more profitable employment. No writer has more sat-
isfactorily and ably shewn (sic!) than Dr. Smith, the tendency of capital to move 
from employments in which the goods produced do not repay by their price the 
whole expenses, including the ordinary profits, of producing and bringing them to 
market” (Vol. I, p. 291). 
Ricardo rejects the vent-for-surplus theory because it is in contradiction with the in-
sight that it is always a matter of choice — not necessity — in what concrete manner a 
capital shall be employed. In the above footnote he acknowledges that he learned this 
valuable proposition precisely in the Wealth of Nations, tempering the necessary critique 
of Smith’s erroneous vent-for-surplus theory with a fair tribute to the founder of classi-
cal political economy. 
Ricardo’s refutation of the vent-for-surplus theory is not limited to a mere footnote.57 
His celebrated chapter On Foreign Trade in the Principles starts with the proposition that 
no extension of international trade can immediately increase the amount of value in a 
country, since the value of all foreign goods is measured by the amount of value embod-
ied in the commodities that are given in exchange for them. International trade, though, 
will certainly contribute to an increase of the mass of commodities available in the na-
tional economy.58 
                                                
 
56 Maneschi (2004, p. 435) calls Ricardo the master logician of political economy. 
57 See also Ricardo (Vol. I, pp. 294-296). 
58 Ricardo states: “No extension of foreign trade will immediately increase the amount of value in a country, 
although it will very powerfully contribute to increase the amounts of commodities, and therefore the sum of enjoy-
ments. As the value of all foreign goods is measured by the quantity of the produce of our land and labour, which 
is given in exchange for them, we should have no greater value, if by the discovery of new markets, we obtained 
double the quantity of foreign goods in exchange for a given quantity of our’s” (Vol. I, p. 128). 
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John Stuart Mill is often credited in the economic literature for the refutation of the 
vent-for-surplus theory59, based on a paragraph he wrote thirty years after the publica-
tion of the Principles. J. S. Mill states: 
“The expression, surplus produce, seems to imply that a country is under some 
kind of necessity of producing the corn or cloth which it exports; so that the por-
tion which it does not itself consume, if not wanted and consumed elsewhere, 
would either be produced in sheer waste, or, if it were not produced, the corre-
sponding portion of capital would remain idle, and the mass of productions in the 
country would be diminished by so much. Either of these suppositions would be 
entirely erroneous. The country produces an exportable article in excess of its own 
wants from no inherent necessity, but as the cheapest mode of supplying itself with 
other things. If prevented from exporting this surplus, it would cease to produce it, 
and would no longer import anything, being unable to give an equivalent; but the 
labour and capital which had been employed in producing with a view to exporta-
tion, would find employment in producing those desirable objects which were 
previously brought from abroad: or, if some of them could not be produced, in 
producing substitutes for them. These articles would of course be produced at a 
greater cost than that of the things with which they had previously been purchased 
from foreign countries. But the value and price of the articles would rise in propor-
tion; and the capital would just as much be replaced, with the ordinary profit from 
the returns, as it was when employed in producing for the foreign market. The on-
ly losers (after the temporary inconvenience of the change) would be the 
consumers of the heretofore imported articles; who would be obliged either to do 
without them, consuming in lieu of them something which they did not like as 
well, or to pay a higher price for them than before” (JSM, 1909, III.xvii.11). 
In the above paragraph, though, J. S. Mill merely restates Ricardo’s critique of the 
vent-for-surplus theory without mentioning him. He also misses to give credit to Smith 
for the counterargument presented regarding the tendency of the stockowners to seek 
alternative employment for their capital. Instead, he calls the vent-for-surplus theory a 
“surviving relict of the Mercantile System”, which is particular offensive, given the fact that 
Smith was the most eloquent and relentless detractor of mercantilism. Mill’s accurate 
remarks about the consequences of a cease in export production — the country’s inabil-
ity to pay for its imports and the resulting capital redeployment to produce the formerly 
imported commodities or their substitutes at home — can also be traced back to Ricar-
do. 
                                                
 
59 See, for example, Williams (1929) and Myint (1958). 
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In the past decades, some scholars have tried to partially revive the vent-for-surplus 
theory, arguing that it may be valid for the limited case of joint production, i.e. when 
more than one product category is obtained in the production process.60 In the case of 
multiple-product-processes of production, the surplus- or overproduction of certain 
commodities cannot be avoided, since they constitute a by-product in the production of 
other commodities. In the absence of foreign trade, some part of these by-products 
would be thrown away as things of no value.61 If these superfluous products could be 
sent abroad and exchanged with other commodities, though, they would regain some 
value. 
The problem with this sort of rescue-attempt of the vent-for-surplus theory is that it 
does not take into account that the total amount of value has not been increased by 
exporting the superfluous products, since the value given to these superfluities or by-
products has to be subtracted from the amount of value contained in the main product 
of the joint production. It may be a matter of deliberation how the total amount of val-
ue is distributed between main and by-product(s), but there should be consensus 
regarding the proposition that a certain amount of labor always gives the same amount 
of value to an aggregated production. 
Perhaps the most significant consequence of the vent-for-surplus fallacy is that it diverts 
— at least partially — the attention from the second benefit mentioned by Smith in his 
famous paragraph about the gains from trade, namely, that foreign trade further encour-
ages the division of labor and the improvement of the productive powers of labor by providing a 
more extended market. This positive effect of international trade on labor productivity, 
which Myint labels as Smith’s productivity theory62, is indeed a remarkable insight, which 
more than compensate for the previous flaw. 
The logical rationale behind the productivity theory of international trade might be re-
constructed succinctly as followed: improvements in the productive powers of labor 
                                                
 
60 See Myint (1977) and Kurz (1992). 
61 According to the rule of “free” goods, a commodity that is in excess supply obtains a zero 
price. 
62 See Myint (1958, p. 318; 1977, p. 242). 
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depend greatly on the level achieved by the division of labor, which in turn is limited by 
the extent of the market. An increase in the size of the market via foreign trade allows 
national producers to fabricate commodities at higher scales, in order to sell them not 
only to their fellow citizens but also to foreigners, and often predominantly to the later. 
The real or potential threat of foreign producers eager to sell their own commodities in 
the home market often turns this possibility into a competitive necessity for the national 
producers. The resulting scales of production above domestic requirements encourage 
technical innovations in production techniques and machinery. They also induce the 
deployment of more efficient methods of economic organization. Therefore, interna-
tional trade promotes industrial production techniques for the fabrication of all different 
sorts of tradable commodities. 
The main economic benefit and principal effect of any kind of trade — whether it is 
within or between national borders — is that it boots labor productivity at home. This 
increase in labor-productivity is the wellspring of wealth and raising living standards of 
any economy. The total amount of commodities available in an economy is the sum of 
the home-production — also known as the direct method of production — and imports — 
the indirect method of production. Since imports have to be paid ultimately with the export of 
home-made commodities or services, the total amount of wealth available for consump-
tion always depends on the productivity of the national labor force, irrespective of the 
fact that an important part of the commodities consumed might be actually produced 
outside the national borders. 
By explicitly referring to the beneficial effects of foreign trade on the division of labor 
and the productive forces of labor, Smith connects his international trade theory to the 
dynamic analysis of the domestic economy in Book I of the Wealth of Nations. Foreign 
trade is not essentially different from domestic trade. As a result, his international trade 
theory is directly related and closely interwoven with the goal of long-run economic 
development of the national economy. It is thus Smith’s productivity theory, and not his 
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flawed vent-for-surplus theory, which should be regarded as highly relevant for appreci-
ating the beneficial effects of free trade for developing countries.63 
The division of labor is the key concept in Smith’s explanation of why and how na-
tions become wealthy.64 Some economists have criticized him for allegedly putting too 
much emphasis on the division of labor. Schumpeter, for example, affirms that “nobody, 
either before or after A. Smith, ever thought of putting such a burden upon division of labor. With A. 
Smith it is practically the only factor in economic progress. (…) Technological progress, inventions of all 
those machines — and even investments — is induced by it and is, in fact, just an incident of it” 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 187). 
Schumpeter’s critique, though, seems completely unfounded, since it does not take in-
to account that the division of labor has to be the logical staring point for any theoretic 
analysis of trade, since all exchange relationships presuppose a specialization among 
individuals. There can be no exchange relationship without specialization and division 
of labor. Therefore, all the subsequent improvements of the productive powers of labor 
have to be considered as logical consequences of the division of labor. Smith refers to 
the causes for these improvements as followed: 
“This great increase of the quantity of work, which, in consequence of the division 
of labour, the same number of people are capable of performing, is owing to three 
different circumstances; first, to the increase of dexterity in every particular work-
man; secondly, to the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from 
one species of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number of 
machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work 
of many” (WN, I.i.5, p. 17). 
If the improvement of the productive forces so critically depends on the division of 
labor, then upon what does the division of labor depend? Smith states in second chapter 
of Book I, which carries the title Of the Principle which gives Occasion to the Division of Labor, 
that it depends upon people’s willingness to trade, barter and make deals, which is con-
sidered to be a general characteristic of human nature. Karl Marx, though, with his keen 
                                                
 
63 Myint (1958, 1977) argues that the vent-for-surplus theory remains relevant for developing 
countries. 
64 Smith starts the Wealth of Nations with the following statement: “The greatest improvement in the 
productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is any where 
directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour” (WN, I.i.1, p. 13). 
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eye for spotting the inexorable hand of historically determined economic forces and 
circumstances behind the so-called natural laws, highlights the economic necessity of 
people living in modern societies to be reliant upon each other for the satisfaction of 
their material needs. 
Thus, Smith’s key proposition is that the further development of the division of labor 
is limited by the extent of the market.65 What does he mean by the extent of the market? 
Perhaps one might think that he means a specific place or geographical zone where the 
commercial exchange is taking place. However, Smith always considers the market as a 
synonym for the exchange relations between individuals. These individuals — and not 
companies, countries, cities, economic blocs, or whatever artificial entities may have 
been created — exchange their labor force or their respective output in the marketplace. 
That these individuals usually work for different companies, which are eventually locat-
ed in distant cities or countries, is circumstantial and of secondary importance. Every 
time two individuals agree to exchange something — regardless of the fact that they 
may exchange two or more commodities, commodities for money or their respective 
labor force —, they are carrying out a market transaction. Therefore, when we think 
about the market, we have to think always about the exchange relationships between 
individuals, wherever they might be located. The greatest extension of the market imag-
inable is if these exchange relationships involve all humankind. That would encourage 
the division of labor to the utmost. 
The effective extent of the market also depends upon the existence of proper physical 
means of communication and transportation. Other things being equal, the more devel-
oped these means are, the more exchange is going to take place between people living in 
distant parts of the world. The current process of accelerated economic globalization 
can be seen as a consequence of the continued development of the means of communi-
cation and transportation during the last decades. 
                                                
 
65 Some authors, for example Young (1928), have erroneously paraphrased Smith by stating that 
the division of labor depends upon the extent of the market. This is, however, a tautological 
thought, since any increase in the division of labor is by definition also an extension of the mar-
ket, because people specialize in certain activities in order to trade the product of their 
respective labor. Therefore, the division of labor depends as much upon the extent of the mar-
ket as the later depends upon the former. 
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While highly appreciating the great economic benefits of international trade, Smith 
succeeds in attributing to foreign exchange a more balanced and accurate role as an 
engine for increasing the wealth of the country than his predecessors. Unlike the mer-
cantilists, who usually put too much emphasis on international trade, and the 
physiocrats, who normally belittle its importance, he is able to find the correct balance 
between these two extreme positions: 
“The riches, and so far as power depends upon riches, the power of every country, 
must always be in proportion to the value of its annual produce, the fund from 
which all taxes must ultimately be paid. But the great object of the political econ-
omy of every country, is to encrease the riches and power of that country. It ought, 
therefore, to give no preference nor superior encouragement to the foreign trade 
of consumption above the home-trade, nor to the carrying trade above either of 
the other two. It ought neither to force nor to allure into either of those two chan-
nels, a greater share of the capital of the country than what would naturally flow 
into them of its own accord” (WN, II.v.31, p. 372). 
The analysis presented so far is theoretically solid and widely uncontested. Only few 
economists would question the favorable effects of the division of labor on the devel-
opment of the productive forces. In the next section, two important questions will be 
analyzed: (1) is it convenient for a country to import a certain amount of a specific 
commodity, despite being equally able to produce the same amount of the commodity 
at home? And (2), what are the economic gains for the importing country in such an 
exchange? 
2.3 The Classical Rule for Specialization 
Both questions have been successfully addressed by the formulation of a general rule 
of international specialization and trade. This rule states that “(...) it pays to import commodi-
ties from abroad whenever they can be obtained in exchange for exports at a smaller real cost than their 
production at home would entail” (Viner, 1937, p. 440). The economic gains from this inter-
national exchange can be measured by calculating the difference between the real costs 
of the exported commodities that have been sent in exchange for the imports, and the 
expected real costs of producing the imported commodities at home. 
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Viner labels this rule of specialization the eighteenth-century rule, after spotting it in the 
anonymous pamphlet Considerations on the East-India Trade of 1701, which is now attribut-
ed to English lawyer and journalist Henry Martyn.66 Martyn applies the so-called 
eighteenth-century rule of specialization to refute charges that the East-India trade was 
costing jobs in England. To prove the point that this — or any other — international 
exchange of commodities could not destroy any profitable employment opportunities in 
England, Martyn complements the formulation of the rule of specialization with the 
following numerical example in chapter 10 of the Considerations: 
“Then to imploy to Manufacture things in England, more Hands than are neces-
sary to procure the like from India, is to imploy so many to no profit, which might 
otherwise be imploy’d to profit (…) If nine cannot produce above three Bushels of 
Wheat in England, if by equal Labour they might procure nine Bushels from an-
other Country, to imploy these in agriculture at home, is to imploy nine to do no 
more work than might be done as well by three; (…) is the loss of six Bushels of 
Wheat; is therefore the loss of so much value” (Martyn, 1701, pp. 582-583). 
According to the numerical example, England gains the labor of six men by importing 
wheat from India. Martyn freely admits that international trade results in the displace-
ment of labor from industries that cannot compete with imports; he correctly 
transforms, though, this apparent drawback into a virtue by observing that the displaced 
labor is thereby freed to find more productive employment elsewhere in the economy 
(Maneschi, 2002, p. 237). According to Martyn, no employment opportunities that are 
worth keeping in the first place are lost due to international trade. By forcing its citizens 
— either by import prohibitions or high customs — to consume English instead of 
Indian manufactures in order to secure the jobs of the people actually employed in pro-
ducing them, England would only oblige the commodities “(...) to be provided by the Labour 
of many, which might as well be done by few” (Martyn, 1701, p. 584). 
Martyn repeatedly refers to the similarity between foreign trade and technological 
progress in terms of their potential effect on employment: both may lead to an initial 
increase in unemployment. The point he wants to make is obvious: those who advocate 
against free trade because of the displacement-of-labor-effect should also advocate for 
the destruction of all labor saving devices. 
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The mutually beneficial nature of the international exchange is secured by applying 
the rule of specialization for both parties simultaneously. If circumstances change in a 
way that the general rule of specialization cease to be valid for at least one of the two 
countries, this country would ultimately withdraw from this particular exchange and 
start producing the imported commodities at home. 
Smith applies the same rule of specialization in the following paragraph of the Wealth 
of Nations: 
“If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves 
can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own indus-
try, employed in a way in which we have some advantage. The general industry of 
the country, being always in proportion to the capital which employs it, will not 
thereby be diminished, no more than that of the above-mentioned artificers; but 
only left to find out the way in which it can be employed with the greatest ad-
vantage. It is certainly not employed to the greatest advantage, when it is thus 
directed towards an object which it can buy cheaper than it can make. The value of 
its annual produce is certainly more or less diminished, when it is thus turned away 
from producing commodities evidently of more value than the commodity which it 
is directed to produce. According to the supposition, that commodity could be 
purchased from foreign countries cheaper than it can be made at home. It could, 
therefore, have been purchased with a part only of the commodities, or, what is the 
same thing, with a part only of the price of the commodities, which the industry 
employed by an equal capital, would have produced at home, had it been left to 
follow its natural course. The industry of the country, therefore, is thus turned 
away from a more, to a less advantageous employment, and the exchangeable value 
of its annual produce, instead of being increased, according to the intention of the 
lawgiver, must necessarily be diminished by every such regulation” (WN, IV.ii.12, 
p. 457). 
Martyn’s statement of the rule of specialization might be seen in some way superior 
to Smith’s, because the later does not offer a quantitative analysis of the gains from in-
ternational trade. Smith, though, applies the rule not only to the context of international 
trade, but also to state the gains from trade between individuals67 and between cities and 
countryside.68 Therefore, it is safe to affirm that Smith views it as the general rule of 
specialization in any kind of trade. There is actually no sound reason to suppose that the 
logic behind specialization is altered by the geographic location of individuals, nor that 
                                                
 
67 See Smith’s example of the tribe of shepherds and hunters (WN, I.ii.3, p. 27). 
68 See Smith (WN, III.i.1, p. 376). 
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the beneficial effects of trade on the productive forces of labor have to end at the politi-
cal — i.e. artificial — borders of a country. 
An avid reader may discover that implicit references to the rule of specialization are 
ubiquitous in the classical political economy. Three decades after the publication of the 
Wealth of Nations, James Mill and Robert Torrens make use of this general rule when 
writing against William Spence’s Britain Independent of Commerce (1807), a work occasioned 
by the French blockade of Britain of 1806. Spence drew on the Physiocrats — which 
were called the economists in that time — to make the point that since a nation’s agricul-
ture is the source of its wealth, a blockade of trade could not hurt the British economy. 
Thus, according to Spence, his fellow citizens had no reason to fear from Napoleon’s 
Continental Blockade. In order to refute both Spence and the Physiocrats, and to high-
light the economic benefits of international trade, Mill and Torrens formulate numerical 
examples that are merely variations of the rule of specialization used before by Martyn 
and Smith.69 
Torrens indicates rather precisely how to measure the advantage from international 
trade in The Economists Refuted (1808): 
(...) if I wish to know the extent of the advantage, which arises to England, from 
her giving France a hundred pounds of broad cloth, in exchange for a hundred 
pounds of lace, I take the quantity of lace which she has acquired by this transac-
tion, and compare it with the quantity which she might, at the same expense of 
labour and capital, have acquired by manufacturing it at home. The lace that re-
mains, beyond what the labour and capital employed on the cloth, might have 
fabricated at home, is the amount of the advantage which England derives from 
the exchange (Torrens, Vol. VI, p. 53). 
James Mill’s reply to William Spence, Commerce Defended (1808) contains the following 
quantitative analysis of the gains from trade: 
On making a ton of iron in Great Britain, let us suppose, that the labourers, etc. 
employed [...] have consumed ten quarters of corn. [...] Let us suppose, that in the 
preparation of a certain quantity of British manufactures, nine quarters of corn 
have been consumed; and let us suppose, that this quantity of goods will purchase 
in the Baltic a ton of iron, and afford, besides, the expence requisite for importing 
the iron into Britain. Is there not an evident saving of a quarter of corn, in the ac-
quisition of this ton of iron? Is not the country one quarter of corn the richer, by 
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means of its importation? In the importation of a thousand such tons, is it not a 
thousand quarters richer (Mill, 1808, pp. 36-37)? 
Aldrich (2004, p. 382) states succinctly the differences between the two approaches 
for the quantification of the gains from international trade: 
“Mill treats the gain from opening trade, Torrens the loss from closing it; Mill 
measures the gain by the saving in inputs when the consumption level is given, 
Torrens the loss in consumption when the input level is given.” 
Even Ricardo, who has been credited in the economic literature for formulating the 
comparative-advantage rule of specialization in chapter 7 of the Principles, repeatedly 
applies the same rule used by Martyn, Smith, James Mill and Torrens in other passages 
of that book: 
“The motive which determines us to import a commodity, is the discovery of its 
relative cheapness abroad: it is the comparison of its price abroad with its price at 
home. If a country exports hats, and imports cloth, it does so because it can obtain 
more cloth by making hats, and exchanging them for cloth, than if it made the 
cloth itself” (Vol. I, p. 170).70 
As has been demonstrated by these examples, the so-called eighteenth-century rule of 
specialization was still popular and widely used by the leading thinkers of political econ-
omy at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Despite the differences in the 
formulation of the quantitative gains from trade, they all applied the same rule of spe-
cialization in international trade. Therefore, it seems appropriate to label it the classical 
rule of specialization, in substitution of the denomination proposed by Viner. 
The only possible objection to the new denomination seems to be the fact that the 
classical rule of specialization has been overshadowed by the comparative-advantage 
rule of specialization in international trade — which Viner calls the nineteenth-century rule 
— in modern economic literature. The next section will deal in detail with this objec-
tion, offering a new interpretation of Ricardo’s numerical example that is in 
correspondence with the classical rule of specialization. 
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2.4 Ricardo’s Notion of Comparative Advantage 
Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication. 
Leonardo da Vinci 
2.4.1 The Numerical Example 
It is a widely recommended — and regretfully not always followed — practice in sci-
entific research to consult the primary source for the understanding of a complex 
concept or theory. The reliance on secondary sources, whatever valuable and prestigious 
they might be, always bears the danger of misinterpreting the original thinker. This po-
tential danger is widely increased when the researcher decides to rely exclusively on 
secondary sources. By following this approach — which cannot be considered a truly 
scientific practice —, generations of scholars unconsciously reproduce and perpetuate 
the possible distortions and errors made by earlier interpreters of the original author. 
The excessive reliance on secondary sources seems to have been the standard practice 
regarding comparative advantage. This concept has been generally explained with the 
help of a simple mathematic model called the Ricardian model, which has replaced Ricar-
do’s original statement as the primary source of explanation. I will not follow this often-
transit path, taking Ricardo’s own exposition of the numerical example in the Principles 
as the legitimate and foremost source for interpreting comparative advantage. 
The original version of the numerical example is contained in six paragraphs of the 
Principles. In order to have the original wording of the example at hand, it will be repro-
duced here in its entire length. The paragraphs are numbered to facilitate a quick and 
precise reference. Ricardo states: 
(1) “If Portugal had no commercial connexion with other countries, in-
stead of employing a great part of her capital and industry in the 
production of wines, with which she purchases for her own use the 
cloth and hardware of other countries, she would be obliged to de-
vote a part of that capital to the manufacture of those commodities, 
which she would thus obtain probably inferior in quality as well as 
quantity. 
(2) The quantity of wine which she shall give in exchange for the cloth of 
England, is not determined by the respective quantities of labour de-
voted to the production of each, as it would be, if both commodities 
were manufactured in England, or both in Portugal. 
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(3) England may be so circumstanced, that to produce the cloth may re-
quire the labour of 100 men for one year; and if she attempted to 
make the wine, it might require the labour of 120 men for the same 
time. England would therefore find it her interest to import wine, and 
to purchase it by the exportation of cloth. 
(4) To produce the wine in Portugal, might require only the labour of 80 
men for one year, and to produce the cloth in the same country, 
might require the labour of 90 men for the same time. It would there-
fore be advantageous for her to export wine in exchange for cloth. 
This exchange might even take place, notwithstanding that the com-
modity imported by Portugal could be produced there with less 
labour than in England. Though she could make the cloth with the 
labour of 90 men, she would import it from a country where it re-
quired the labour of 100 men to produce it, because it would be 
advantageous to her rather to employ her capital in the production of 
wine, for which she would obtain more cloth from England, than she 
could produce by diverting a portion of her capital from the cultiva-
tion of vines to the manufacture of cloth. 
(5) Thus England would give the produce of the labour of 100 men, for 
the produce of the labour of 80. Such an exchange could not take 
place between the individuals of the same country. The labour of 100 
Englishmen cannot be given for that of 80 Englishmen, but the pro-
duce of the labour of 100 Englishmen may be given for the produce 
of the labour of 80 Portuguese, 60 Russians, or 120 East Indians. The 
difference in this respect, between a single country and many, is easily 
accounted for, by considering the difficulty with which capital moves 
from one country to another, to seek a more profitable employment, 
and the activity with which it invariably passes from one province to 
another in the same country. 
(6) It would undoubtedly be advantageous to the capitalists of England, 
and to the consumers in both countries, that under such circumstanc-
es, the wine and the cloth should both be made in Portugal, and 
therefore that the capital and labour of England employed in making 
cloth, should be removed to Portugal for that purpose. In that case, 
the relative value of these commodities would be regulated by the 
same principle, as if one were the produce of Yorkshire, and the oth-
er of London: and in every other case, if capital freely flowed towards 
those countries where it could be most profitably employed, there 
could be no difference in the rate of profit, and no other difference in 
the real or labour price of commodities, than the additional quantity 
of labour required to convey them to the various markets where they 
were to be sold” (Vol. I, pp. 134-136). 
The four numbers introduced by Ricardo in the third and forth paragraphs have been 
traditionally interpreted as the amounts of labor needed to produce a single unit of cloth 
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and wine in England and Portugal or, in other words, as unit labor coefficients in the 
production of these commodities in each country.71 But Ruffin (2002) convincingly 
argues that Ricardo’s numbers are not unit labor coefficients, but rather the quantities of 
labor needed to produce the amounts of wine and cloth actually traded by England and 
Portugal. 
After a careful reading of the six paragraphs, it is indeed very difficult to support an 
interpretation different from Ruffin’s.72 The new interpretation is strongly backed by 
Ricardo’s own wording, since it is consistent with the use of the terms the cloth and the 
wine in the third and fourth paragraph, which refer to the quantity of wine which she shall give 
in exchange for the cloth of England mentioned in the second paragraph. It also offers a plain 
explanation for why Ricardo does not specify the units of measurement for each com-
modity: it is simply not relevant for the numerical example he is presenting; all what 
counts is that a certain amount of English cloth is currently exchanged for a certain 
amount of Portuguese wine. 
If the numbers were meant to be unit labor coefficients, than Ricardo would have 
missed to specify not only the units of measurement, but also the terms of trade be-
tween the two commodities. Apart from these omissions, the real labor costs indicated 
by him for the production of a single unit of these commodities would seem grossly 
exaggerated, since the work of 80 men for a whole year is a lot of labor for producing a 
liter or even a hectoliter of wine. 
According to Ruffin’s interpretation, an accurate representation of Ricardo’s numeri-
cal example in a table would have to be like this: 
  
                                                
 
71 Perhaps being Sraffa (1930, p. 541) the single exception who interprets Ricardo’s numbers 
accurately. 
72 Before reading Ruffin’s paper, Maneschi wrote an entire book about comparative advantage, 
presenting, like so many others, the traditional interpretation of Ricardo’s example. After read-
ing the paper, he immediately adhered to the new interpretation, calling it “(…) the first clear 
interpretation of the meaning of the four magic numbers” (Maneschi, 2004, p. 435). To verify this rather 
unusual conversion, see Maneschi (1998, 2004). 
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 Number of men working for a year required to 
produce a given quantity of cloth and wine traded 
 cloth wine 
England 100 120 
Portugal 90 80 
Table 1: Ricardo’s Numerical Example 
If Ricardo would have presented the numerical example in a mathematical language 
! as he would have probably done if he were a contemporary economist and could 
have anticipated the nearly two centuries of misinterpretation of his example !, he 
would have formulated his statement of comparative advantage very similar to this: Let 
X be the quantity of cloth that is actually traded by England for Y units of wine from 
Portugal. England requires 100 men for one year to make the X units of cloth and 120 
men to make the Y units of wine, while Portugal requires only 90 men to produce the X 
units of cloth and 80 men for the Y units of wine. Under the assumption of factor im-
mobility between the two countries, it follows that England would find it in her interest 
to participate in this international exchange since it saves the labor of 20 men by import-
ing the wine and paying for it with the exportation of cloth. Portugal is also interested in 
the exchange because it saves the labor of 10 men by importing the cloth from England 
and purchasing it with its wine-exports. It is important to notice that Portugal also gains 
by this transaction, notwithstanding the fact that it has an absolute real cost advantage 
over England in the production of the x-amount of cloth as well as the y-amount of 
wine subject to exchange. 
The reason for the failure of many economists to correctly understand Ricardo’s nu-
merical example has not to be found in his formulation of the numerical example, but in 
the shortcomings of his numerous interpreters. They have failed to establish the correct 
cost comparisons, as the following section will show. 
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2.4.2 The Cost Comparisons according to Ricardo 
As stated in the precedent section, Ricardo does not built his numerical example upon 
unitary labor costs, but the real labor costs necessary to produce the amounts of cloth 
and wine currently traded by Portugal and England. Then, he proceeds to establish two 
distinct cost comparisons between the four magic numbers, each of these comparisons 
responding to different purposes. 
The first cost comparison is between the real labor costs in the same country for the 
amounts of cloth and wine currently traded between England and Portugal. More pre-
cisely, he compares the cost of obtaining a certain amount of a commodity from 
another country with the real labor costs of producing the same amount internally. The 
cost of the imported commodities always consists in the real labor costs embodied in 
the commodities that the country needs to export in order to pay for its imports. 
By establishing this kind of cost comparison, Ricardo is merely applying the classical 
rule for specialization. As has been already stated, this rule stipulates that it is beneficial 
to import commodities from abroad whenever the country can obtain them in exchange 
for exports whose production entails less real cost than the production of the same 
amount of the imported commodities at home. According to this rule, therefore, a 
country following a free trade policy would obtain all the different commodities it con-
sumes at the lowest possible real costs, by either producing them at home or importing 
them. This constitutes the main gain and advantage of free trade between countries. 
The denomination that Viner has proposed for this cost comparison, though, is high-
ly misleading, because it suggests that the eighteenth-century rule has been replaced by 
another rule later in the nineteenth century. That was indeed Viner’s erroneous view. He 
believed that Ricardo had formulated the nineteenth-century rule for specialization in 
international commerce. However, Ricardo did not propose an alternative rule of spe-
cialization, but applied the same rule as his predecessors. Thus, there has been only one 
consistent rule of specialization throughout the classical school of economic thought. 
Consequently, it should not be called the eighteenth-century rule, but the classical rule for 
specialization. 
That being said, it would be wrong to ignore the innovations in Ricardo’s statement 
of the classical rule of specialization. All previous formulations lack a crucial point: For 
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an international exchange to actually take place, it has to be considered a mutually bene-
ficial transaction for the two countries involved. Therefore, the rule of specialization has 
to be applied simultaneously for each of the participating countries. This requires an 
indication of each country’s real labor costs (or inputs) for the quantities of the com-
modities exchanged. It took the keener mind of Ricardo to express the rule for 
specialization in international trade with the highest level of sophistication, eliminating 
this shortcoming of his predecessors. 
It is also important to realize that Ricardo considers the classical rule for specializa-
tion as the dominant cost comparison, since it establishes the gains from trade and 
therefore the interest of the country in participating in the exchange without bothering 
about another cost comparison. The later confusion with respect to this crucial issue is 
somehow surprising, since Ricardo applies the classical rule for specialization in the 
third paragraph to establish England’s comparative advantage in cloth independently 
from Portugal numbers. He proceeds then to apply the rule for Portugal in the fourth 
paragraph. Only after the respective comparative advantages of England (cloth) and 
Portugal (wine) are established — and therefore their particular interest in the exchange 
—, he proceeds to compare the real labor costs between the two countries in the second 
part of the fourth paragraph. 
James Mill, a close friend and collaborator of Ricardo, reaffirms with clarity the dom-
inant cost comparison when he states in his Elements of Political Economy (1826, p. 123): 
“When a country can either import a commodity or produce it at home, it com-
pares the cost of producing at home with the cost of procuring from abroad; if the 
latter cost is less than the first, it imports. The cost at which a country can import 
from abroad depends, not upon the cost at which the foreign country produces the 
commodity, but upon what the commodity costs which it sends in exchange, com-
pared with the cost which it must be at to produce the commodity in question, if it 
did not import it.” 
Five decades later, Cairnes is only repeating Mill’s statement when he writes: 
“(...) when it is said that international trade depends on the difference in the com-
parative, not the absolute, cost of producing commodities, the costs compared are 
the costs in each country of the commodities which are the subject of exchange, 
not the different costs of the same commodity in the exchanging countries” 
(Cairnes, 1967, p. 312). 
However, Cairnes is severely criticized by Viner (1937) and Chipman (1965) for his 
correct statement of the dominant cost comparison, whereas James Mill’s equivalent 
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statement remains unchallenged. Viner (1937, p. 438f) intends to refute Cairnes by 
pointing out that the comparison has to be made between cost ratios, not costs, and 
therefore he believes that “(…) it is unessential whether the cost ratios which are compared are the 
ratios between the costs of producing different commodities within the same countries or the ratios between 
the costs of producing the same commodities in different countries.” 
Chipman (1965, p. 480) expresses the same objection in algebraic terms: 
“In other words — Cairnes seems to be saying — if among four positive quanti-
ties, the relation a'/b' < a''/b'' holds, this must not be confused with the relation 
a'/a''<b'/b''; but as any high school student ought to know, the two inequalities are 
mathematically equivalent.” 
Both Viner and Chipman are right about the mathematical equivalence of the two in-
equalities, but they are mistaken by establishing a comparison of cost ratios in the first 
place. The comparison of cost ratios is a direct consequence of taking the unitary cost of 
the commodities as the starting point for establishing a comparative advantage in a spe-
cific commodity, since under such an unfortunate logical construction no other kind of 
cost comparison can be established in order to make a meaningful statement. The mere 
fact that the unitary real cost of a commodity is lower with respect to another, without 
explicitly establishing the rate of exchange between the two goods, is hardly a sufficient 
criterion for producing the commodity at home rather than importing it. Ricardo avoids 
this error by directly taking the real labor costs for the amounts of the two commodities 
traded, instead of their respective unitary real costs. 
Even the most skeptical scholar would have to agree that the cost comparison within 
a country is the dominant cost comparison if confronted with a passage in which Ricar-
do himself explicitly rejects the comparison of real costs between countries, declaring it 
irrelevant for the assessment of comparative advantage. Well, this is exactly what Ricar-
do does when commenting Malthus’ Principles of Political Economy.73 Malthus (1989, p. 
428) credits as a factor contributing to the prosperity of the United States her ability to 
                                                
 
73 Viner brings up this quote, as well as many other important insights, which have been very 
helpful for arriving to the new interpretation of Ricardo’s meaning of comparative advantage. 
The reason why Viner fails to draw the same conclusions from them is that he was not aware of 
the erroneous interpretation of Ricardo’s numbers as unitary labor costs. 
Chapter 2: The Classical Free Trade Theory 
-61- 
sell “(…) raw produce, obtained with little labor, for European commodities which have cost much 
labor.” Referring to this phrase, Ricardo (Vol. II, p. 383) writes the following footnote: 
“It can be of no consequence to America, whether the commodities she obtains in 
return for her own, cost Europeans much, or little labor; all she is interested in, is 
that they shall cost her less labor by purchasing them than by manufacturing them 
herself.” 
To further illustrate the supremacy of the cost comparison within a country for the 
assessment of comparative advantage, let us go back to Ricardo’s numbers and intro-
duce a single change, represented in bold: 
 
 Number of men working for a year required to 
produce a given quantity of cloth and wine traded 
 cloth wine 
England 100 120 
Portugal 110 80 
Table 2: Ricardo’s Modified Numerical Example 
The change consists in increasing the number of men working for a year required to 
produce the amount of cloth traded in Portugal from 90 to 110. Such an increase 
amounts to revoking Portugal’s real cost advantage in cloth with regard to England. 
Despite the change introduced, this international exchange between England and Portu-
gal would take place, since both countries continue to be interested in it. Actually, 
Portugal is now even more interested in the exchange, since it gains the labor of 30 men 
instead of the 10 men in the original example. 
Therefore, when it is said that international trade depends on comparative advantage, 
the relevant cost comparison is between real labor costs within a country, and not be-
tween countries. Unfortunately, the erroneous interpretation of Ricardo’s numbers as 
unitary labor costs has led to the mistake of establishing a comparison of real costs and 
relative cost advantages between countries for the assessment of a comparative ad-
vantage in the production of certain commodities. For Ricardo, comparative advantage 
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has always resulted from the comparison of real costs between home-production and 
importing, as the classical rule for specialization suggests. 
Without diminishing the relevancy of the dominant cost comparison, it is important 
to realize that Ricardo’s truly innovative insights are the result of comparing the real 
costs between the two countries. An explanation will be given in the next section. 
2.4.3 Ricardo’s New Propositions 
After applying the classical rule for specialization for England and Portugal respec-
tively, the comparison of real costs between the two countries reveals that Portugal 
might import a certain amount of cloth from England although the former has a real 
labor cost advantage over the later in producing the amount of the commodity traded at 
home. Ricardo refers to this new proposition in the fourth paragraph of the extensive 
quote, when he states: “This exchange might even take place, notwithstanding that the commodity 
imported by Portugal could be produced there with less labour than in England.”  
Every interpreter of comparative advantage has highlighted the above proposition. 
Because of the misinterpretation of Ricardo’s numerical example, there have been some 
misunderstandings regarding the importance of this proposition. A symptomatic indica-
tion of the present state of confusion is the prolific denominations that scholars have 
attached to it. For some economists, it is the law of comparative advantage, while others 
regard it as a mere rule; a third group declares it a theory, whereas another group calls it a 
doctrine. The majority of scholars have used all these different denominations simultane-
ously without even bothering about the different meanings. This is an unacceptable 
practice for a science whose practitioners like to consider as the most precise branch of 
the social sciences. 
If Ricardo’s new proposition is neither a principle nor an economic law, as I am sug-
gesting, then what is it instead? Viner is fundamentally right when calling it a mere 
addition or possible implication of the classical rule for specialization. Indeed, this rule is 
both compatible and indifferent with respect to real cost advantages between countries, 
since they are not relevant for establishing the interest of a country in international 
trade. Understandably, Ricardo refers to this proposition only once and merely in pass-
ing. 
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Ricardo’s numerical example contains a second proposition that has been scarcely 
mentioned in the prolific economic literature about comparative advantage. In order to 
bring it back to light, it is necessary to continue the fruitful practice of consulting the 
Principles as the primary source for the interpretation of Ricardo’s numerical example. 
In the fifth paragraph of our extensive quote, Ricardo writes: 
“Thus England would give the produce of the labour of 100 men, for the produce 
of the labour of 80. Such an exchange could not take place between the individuals 
of the same country. The labour of 100 Englishmen cannot be given for that of 80 
Englishmen, but the produce of the labour of 100 Englishmen may be given for 
the produce of the labour of 80 Portuguese, 60 Russians, or 120 East Indians.” 
This passage is evidently connected to the second paragraph, where he states: 
“The quantity of wine which she shall give in exchange for the cloth of England, is 
not determined by the respective quantities of labour devoted to the production of 
each, as it would be, if both commodities were manufactured in England, or both 
in Portugal.” 
Ricardo is therefore referring not once but twice to a new proposition he has stated 
some paragraphs before the extensive quote, namely that “the same rule which regulates the 
relative value of commodities in one country, does not regulate the relative value of the commodities ex-
changed between two or more countries” (Vol. I, p. 133).74 
If Ricardo’s words and repeated references are to be taken seriously, then it seems ab-
solutely clear that the whole purpose of his numerical example is to prove the new 
proposition that the law of value for domestic transactions does not hold for interna-
tional exchanges. Hence, his labor theory of value cannot be relied on as a valid guide 
for the determination of international prices under the condition of immobility of the 
factors of production. 
Neoclassical economists have omitted the second proposition, although it is indispen-
sable for proving the first proposition. Without the insight regarding the non-appliance 
of the law of value in international transactions, the affirmation that countries do not 
need to have an absolute real labor cost advantage in a particular commodity — or the 
exclusive capacity to produce it — in order to participate in international trade would 
                                                
 
74 Aldrich (2004, p. 385) considers this sentence rightly as the beginning of the comparative-
advantage section. 
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seem not only counterintuitive, but also in contradiction with the labor theory of value. 
Let us explain this important point with the help of a numerical example that is in ac-
cordance with the labor theory of value: 
 
 Number of men working for a year required to 
produce a given quantity of cloth and wine traded 
 cloth wine 
England 80 120 
Portugal 90 80 
Table 3: Numerical Example in Accordance with the Law of Value 
In the above numerical example, the quantity of men needed to produce the cloth in 
England has been reduced from 100 to 80 men, so that the same amount of labor is 
embodied in the exchange of English cloth and Portuguese wine, which is a mandatory 
assumption under the labor theory of value. For Portugal to remain interested in im-
porting cloth from England, the quantity of labor needed to produce the cloth at home 
has to be higher than 80. Otherwise, Portugal could save some labor and would be bet-
ter off with home production. However, if the quantity of labor for producing the cloth 
in Portugal is indeed above 80 men, then it has no real labor cost advantage in the pro-
duction of cloth over England anymore. Therefore, the proposition about the non-
appliance of the law of value between countries under the assumption of labor immobil-
ity is indeed critical for the logical construction of Ricardo’s numerical example, and for 
demonstrating that a country would import a commodity despite having a real cost ad-
vantage over the exporting country. 
A book often functions like a mirror: it lets readers only understand and appreciate 
what they already have in mind. Neoclassical economists have omitted Ricardo’s unam-
biguous statement about the law of value because they reject his labor theory of value. 
Instead, they have interpreted Ricardo’s numerical example as the enunciation of a new 
principle or law leading to free trade, which is certainly not the case.  
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Ricardo himself never claimed to have discovered a new principle or law called com-
parative costs or comparative advantage. Although he mentions the word principle in the 
paragraph immediately following the announcement quoted above, it is necessary, again, 
to read the whole paragraph in order to interpret Ricardo correctly. He states: 
“Under a sys t em o f  per f e c t l y  f r e e  commerce , each country naturally devotes its 
capital and labour to such employments as are most beneficial to each. This pursuit 
of individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good of the 
whole. By stimulating industry, by rewarding ingenuity, and by using most effica-
ciously the peculiar powers bestowed by nature, it distributes labour most 
effectively and most economically: while, by increasing the general mass of produc-
tions, it diffuses general benefit, and binds together by one common tie of interest 
and intercourse, the universal society of nations throughout the civilized world. It 
is th i s  pr in c ip l e  which determines that wine shall be made in France and Portugal, 
that corn shall be grown in America and Poland, and that hardware and other 
goods shall be manufactured in England” (Vol. I, pp. 133-134; emphasis added). 
With this principle, Ricardo is referring of course to the system of perfectly free commerce at 
the beginning of the paragraph — not to a new principle that he would introduce after-
wards.75 According to Ricardo’s exposition, the observance of the principle of free trade 
would naturally lead to a certain degree of specialization among nations, which is mutu-
ally beneficial since it would turn each nation more productive than without such an 
exchange. 
Ricardo does not consider the second proposition to be a new economic principle or 
law, because his claim is a negation (Aldrich, 2004, p. 388). As already said, all what he 
intends to back up with the four magic numbers is that the law of value does not regulate 
international prices. Does he elaborate a new rule for the determination of prices in 
international transactions? Yes, he does. Aldrich (2004, p. 388) spots the rule in chapter 
XXVIII of the Principles, On the Comparative Value of Gold, Corn and Labour in Rich and Poor 
Countries (Vol. I, p. 375), when Ricardo states: 
“(…) the natural price [the money cost of production] of commodities in the ex-
porting country (…) ultimately regulates the prices at which they shall be sold (…) 
in the importing country.” 
                                                
 
75 Here I disagree with Ruffin (2002, p. 741-742) who believes that Ricardo would announce the 
principle later. Ruffin also repeatedly refers to the law of comparative advantage. 
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After taking a closer look at chapter seven of the Principles, though, it appears to me 
that Ricardo already establishes this rule for the determination of prices in international 
transactions right after the numerical example when he states that “(…) cloth cannot be 
imported into Portugal, unless it sell there for more gold than it cost in the country from which it was 
imported; and wine cannot be imported into England, unless it will sell for more there than it cost in 
Portugal” (Vol. I, p. 137). Then, he applies the rule rather consistently to the monetary 
analysis following an improvement in English winemaking that has made the existing 
trade unprofitable (Vol. I, pp. 137-42). 
Ricardo’s two propositions are not laws or principles that lead to free trade. Never-
theless, they do render an invaluable service for the free trade case. Before Ricardo’s 
numerical example, economists believed that all commodities would necessarily tend to 
be produced in the locations where their real costs of production were lowest; if a coun-
try had the lowest real labor costs in producing all kind of commodities, it would, 
therefore, have no interest in engaging in international trade at all. Ricardo’s first propo-
sition refute all these previously prevalent opinions, demonstrating that every country, 
no matter how rich or poor, has the chance to participate, under favorable terms, in 
international trade, because they all become more productive.76 
The second proposition explains why higher real labor costs in the poorer countries 
do not command higher prices for their products in international markets. Although 
poorer countries usually have higher real labor costs compared to the wealthy countries, 
because their labor force is in general less productive, they have, for the same reason, 
inferior nominal costs in certain productions due to their lower salaries. This lack of 
correspondence of real and nominal costs between countries, which contradicts Ricar-
do’s law of value, can be easily explained by the non-appliance of this law in 
international trade under the condition of immobility of the factors of production. 
With the accurate identification and interpretation of Ricardo’s propositions in mind, 
it is possible to prove that the most critical objections raised against him are baseless 
and a direct result of the misinterpretation of his numerical example. 
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2.4.4 Some Charges against Ricardo Refuted 
2.4.4.1 The Gains from Trade in Ricardo’s Numerical Example 
Ricardo has been repeatedly accused of carelessness and logical inconsistency in the 
formulation of his famous numerical example. Chipman (1965, p. 480), in particular, 
criticizes him for announcing the terms of trade just in the fifth paragraph of the exten-
sive quote from the Principles without ever explaining its determination. 
Chipman’s accusation of logical inconsistency is routed, of course, in the erroneous 
interpretation of the numbers as unitary labor costs. The accurate interpretation of the 
numbers absolves Ricardo — the master logician of political economy (Maneschi, 2004, p. 
435) — from the charges of logical inconsistency and carelessness. By stipulating in the 
second paragraph that certain quantities of wine and cloth are currently exchanged be-
tween Portugal and England, Ricardo actually starts his numerical example with the 
terms of trade. Then he goes on to specify the amount of labor needed to produce these 
quantities in both countries, so that each trading partner gains from trade and therefore 
has independently from the other an interest in pursuing that exchange. The fact that 
England uses 100 men to produce the cloth she needs to export in order to pay for the 
imported wine, whereas she would need 120 men to produce the same quantity of wine 
at home, immediately establishes her comparative advantage in cloth without requiring 
any knowledge of Portugal’s labor inputs. Likewise, Portugal’s comparative advantage in 
wine is established by her requiring 80 men to produce enough wine to pay for the cloth 
that she would otherwise produce at home with the labor of 90 men. 
Ricardo’s decision to build the numerical example on an international exchange that is 
already taking place between Portugal and England is consistent with the main purpose 
of any international trade theory: to explain the current pattern of international trade. In 
addition to this, as Ruffin (2002, p. 742) correctly points out, this logical construction is 
valid for any number of commodities and countries. 
Besides the unfounded charge of logical inconsistency, the foremost reason for com-
plaint regarding Ricardo’s formulation of comparative advantage is that he allegedly fails 
to specify the gains from trade and the proportion in which these gains are divided be-
tween England and Portugal. John Stuart Mill raised this critical point for the first time 
— although in a very respectful and apologetic way towards Ricardo —, in his Essays on 
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Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy of 1844 (Mill J. S., 1996). This alleged failure 
by Ricardo is a recurrent reference for all of his critics, and one of the main reasons why 
John Stuart Mill is regarded as something more than a mere popularizer of comparative 
advantage. 
However, it is important to realize that J. S. Mill takes as basis for his critical remark 
the numerical example contained in the Elements, his father’s textbook, and not the nu-
merical example included in the Principles, actually creating the precedent of interpreting 
and correcting Ricardo based on James Mill’s example.77 With the accurate interpreta-
tion of Ricardo’s numerical example, it is easy to prove that the alleged oversight — to use 
J. S. Mill’s term (Mill J. S., 1996, p. 236) — has only existed in J. S. Mill’s mind. 
Ricardo indicates rather precisely the gains from trade for each country, which are the 
result of a simple subtraction. For England, the gains from trade are given by the differ-
ence between the number of men — 100 — she currently employs to produce the 
quantity of cloth exported to pay for the importation of wine, and the number of men 
she would need — 120 — to produce the wine internally. In Portugal’ case, the gains 
from trade are obtained by subtracting the number of men — 80 — she currently em-
ploys to produce the quantity of wine exported to pay for the importation of cloth, from 
the number of men she would need — 90 — to produce the cloth internally. England 
saves the labor of 20 men, whereas Portugal saves the labor of 10 Portuguese. The addi-
tional quantity of commodities or services that these saved men could produce would be 
the gains from trade in terms of an increase in the amount of commodities and services 
available. 
It seems to be an odd or extravagant decision that Ricardo decides to formulate his 
numerical example selecting Portugal as the superior nation in the production of both 
commodities, although he is writing in the heyday of England’s industrial revolution. 
Samuelson (1969, p. 5) explains this peculiar economic geography with Ricardo’s desire 
to prove his readers that a foreign country could not undersell England in everything 
                                                
 
77 Sraffa (1930, p. 541-542) indicates a plausible explanation for J. S. Mill’s flaw when pointing 
out that perhaps he “(…) thought that his father had followed Ricardo so closely and faithfully, 
that anything which the former had said in the Elements could safely be attributed to the later.” 
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even if the former is more productive in producing every commodity. Probably. But in 
addition to this explanation it is also plausible that Ricardo wanted to present England 
as the greater beneficiary of free trade, since — although having an absolute real cost 
disadvantage in both commodities — she would save the labor of more men and there-
fore obtain higher gains from this international exchange than Portugal. 
2.4.4.2 The Constant-Labor-Costs Assumption 
In addition to the complications in relation with the calculation of the gains from 
trade, the erroneous interpretation of Ricardo’s numbers as unitary labor costs has also 
led to the introduction of the assumption of constant labor costs. With the past of time, 
this assumption has turned into a recurrent feature of mainstream international trade 
models. 
The constant-labor-cost assumption has been rightfully regarded as the most unrea-
sonable assumption for any kind of trade model, since the greatest benefit of trading 
commodities and services consists in the encouragement of specialization and mass 
production, which necessarily lead to gains in labor productivity, increasing returns to 
scale and decreasing real and nominal labor costs per unit. These beneficial effects could 
be largely increased by engaging in commerce at an international scale because of the 
greater extension of the market. Therefore, it is perfectly understandable that an econ-
omist who builds up his/her case in favor of international free trade on a theoretic trade 
model that leaves precisely these benefits out will hardly convince anybody about the 
virtues of international trade. 
Having said this, I could not find in chapter seven of the Principles — or in any other 
chapter of this book — an explicit or implicit reference to constant labor costs in con-
nection with international trade. This assumption made its entrance into international 
trade theory by the backdoor, being James Mill, not Ricardo, the one who let it in by 
formulating his explanation of comparative advantage in the Elements with unitary labor 
costs. Because of the fact that countries usually trade more than a single unit of a com-
modity, later economists have assumed that the unitary costs indicated remain constant. 
Moreover, since it was mostly from Mill’s textbook and J. S. Mill’s later remarks that the 
economic profession has learned Ricardo’s comparative-advantage example, the con-
stant cost assumption has been erroneously associated with the later. 
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Aldrich (2004, p. 382) is apparently aware about the true origin of the constant labor 
cost assumption — Mill’ numerical example and not Ricardo’s. Nevertheless, he affirms 
a few pages later that in Ricardo’s example “(...) trade between Portugal and England would not 
take place if English and Portuguese labor had to exchange at parity; if, say, England's cloth consign-
ment were reduced by one-fifth so that its labor content equaled that of Portugal's wine consignment, 
Portugal would withdraw from the trade. Ricardo does not draw this conclusion, but perhaps he thought 
the reader would” (Aldrich, 2004, p. 388). 
Ricardo does not draw the above conclusion, because it is only valid under the con-
stant-cost assumption. In order to Portugal to withdraw from the exchange under this 
modified terms of trade, her real labor costs for the new quantity of cloth traded should 
be equal or below 80 men, the labor costs for the quantity of wine she needs to export 
in order to pay for the imports. If Portugal’s real labor costs for producing the cloth at 
home are also reduced by a fifth (90 – 18 = 72 men), she would certainly retreat from 
the trade, but such a proportional cost reduction implies the assumption of constant 
labor costs. Ricardo never made such an assumption.78 
The reinterpretation of Ricardo numerical example necessarily leads to the dismissal 
of the constant-labor-cost assumption as a dominant feature of the classical theory of 
international trade. This dismissal has far-reaching consequences for the case in favor of 
free trade. Economies of scale, formerly banned from Ricardo’s comparative-advantage 
insight due to the presence of the constant-labor-costs assumption, now can be easily 
integrated. Critical points directly raised against the dismissed assumption, like the well-
known Graham’s Paradox79, all of a sudden become irrelevant with regard to Ricardo’s 
original statement of comparative advantage. 
Perhaps the most important consequence of the dismissal of constant labor costs is 
that it brings light on Ricardo’s dynamic view on the pattern of international trade. If 
                                                
 
78 If Portugal needs more than 80 men for producing the new quantity of cloth traded, she 
would loose her real labor cost advantage in cloth with respect to England, but she would still 
be interested in the exchange. 
79 See Graham (1923). 
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the researcher reads beyond the six paragraphs quoted, then he or she will encounter the 
following passage of the Principles: 
“If the trade were purely a trade of barter, it could only continue whilst England 
could make cloth so cheap as to obtain a greater quantity of wine with a given 
quantity of labour, by manufacturing cloth than by growing vines; and also whilst 
the industry of Portugal were attended by the reverse effects. Now suppose Eng-
land to discover a process for making wine, so that it should become her interest 
rather to grow it than import it; she would naturally divert a portion of her capital 
from the foreign trade to the home trade; she would cease to manufacture cloth 
for exportation, and would grow wine for herself” (Vol. I, p. 137). 
A few pages later, he writes: 
“England exported cloth in exchange for wine, because, by so doing, her industry 
was rendered more productive to her; she had more cloth and wine than if she had 
manufactured both for herself; and Portugal imported cloth and exported wine, 
because the industry of Portugal could be more beneficially employed for both 
countries in producing wine. Let there be more difficulty in England in producing 
cloth, or in Portugal in producing wine, or let there be more facility in England in 
producing wine, or in Portugal in producing cloth, and the trade must immediately 
cease” (Vol. I, p. 140). 
These paragraphs are the best prove that Ricardo had no static approach regarding 
the pattern of international trade. Quite the opposite is true: he indicates rather precisely 
the conditions under which a certain pattern of international trade — with is the result 
of applying the principle of free trade —, could be reverted. 
2.4.4.3 The Assumption of Labor Immobility Between Countries 
Another prominent feature of Ricardo’s international trade theory is the assumption 
of international immobility of labor. This assumption, unlike to one proclaiming con-
stant labor costs, is indeed necessary for the validity of Ricardo’s proposition regarding 
the non-appliance of the law of value for the determination of international prices. Ri-
cardo himself is very much aware of it, since he devotes an important part of his 
exposition to this assumption.80 
Critics of free trade have repeatedly stated that the assumption of immobility of the 
factors of production — particularly capital — is not valid for the contemporary world 
                                                
 
80 Ruffin (2002, p. 734) calculates that from the 973 words Ricardo devoted to explain his in-
sight, he employed 485 to emphasize the importance of factor immobility! 
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economy anymore. Today, no one would seriously dispute the fact that capital is indeed 
more mobile than in Ricardo’s times. With a simple click on a computer mouse, im-
mense amounts of capital can be transferred at incredible speed from one end of the 
world to the other. Therefore, the critics argue, any conclusion gained from a theoretic 
model that uses such an unrealistic assumption cannot be considered valid anymore. 
Let us assume for a moment that there is indeed unrestricted mobility of the factors 
of production in the present world economy. Ricardo explicitly analyzes this possibility 
in the sixth paragraph of the extensive quote in page 55. In this case, the respective 
amount of labor would regulate the relative value of the commodities traded. Conse-
quently, commodities would tend to be produced in those locations where the real labor 
costs are lowest. Labor and capital owners would migrate to these locations in order to 
enjoy the highest possible standard of living. Ricardo’s addition to the classical rule for 
specialization would not hold anymore, but the case in favor of free international trade 
would remain essentially untouched. 
Now, should Ricardo’s assumption of international immobility of the factors of pro-
duction be considered as an unrealistic supposition in the context of the present world 
economy? Natural resources — for example fertile land and raw materials — are immo-
bile. Capital is indeed increasingly mobile, but what about labor? Unquestionably, 
today’s labor force has better means of transportation compared to the first decades of 
the nineteenth century. However, the billions of inhabitants currently living in develop-
ing countries cannot migrate to the developed countries to earn higher salaries and enjoy 
a better standard of living. Strict immigration laws — which have been turned even 
more restrictive in recent years —, effectively limit the legal — and try to prevent the 
illegal — immigration from poor to rich nations. Even within the European Union, 
which grants the citizens of its member states the right to access the labor market of any 
other member state81, the labor force show very little disposition to move to another 
country to seek employment or higher salaries. So today’s world economy can be re-
                                                
 
81 Citizens of the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe are actually banned — 
although on a temporary basis — to seek employment in countries like Austria and Germany. 
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garded as an economic system with partial mobility of factors of production: capital is 
increasingly mobile, but labor not. 
The unrelenting validity and importance of Ricardo’s propositions for the present be-
comes evident when applying it to what has been perceived as a growing threat mostly 
in the developed world in recent years: the emergence of China and India as active play-
ers in the world economy. It has been said that these two countries could soon undersell 
the developed countries in the production of every commodity because of their lower 
nominal labor costs and huge population numbers.  
These widespread fears are unfounded. Inferior nominal labor costs in China and In-
dia are in correspondence with the low level of productivity of their labor force. China 
and India have lower nominal but higher (!) real labor costs compared to the developed 
countries, which is exactly the situation of England in Ricardo’s numerical example. 
Today, as in Ricardo’s time, every nation is interested in trading freely with the rest of 
the world in order to specialize in certain areas according to its comparative advantage, 
and to become more productive so that their citizens can consume more commodities 
and enjoy a higher standard of living. 
2.4.5 Reclaiming Ricardo’s Authorship 
In science the credit goes to the man who convinces the 
world, not to the man to whom the idea first occurs. 
Francis Darwin 
Finally, there is one last point that is necessary to deal with. For approximately two 
hundred years now, there has been an ongoing debate among scholars regarding the 
correct attribution of authorship and fair distribution of merit for the discovery of the 
insight called comparative advantage or comparative costs. While most scholars have followed 
the tradition of granting Ricardo the exclusive credit for it, some have claimed for a 
joint authorship and merit-splitting between Ricardo and Torrens, or Ricardo and John 
Stuart Mill, and a tiny minority have even called for granting the bigger part of the credit 
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to Torrens, John Stuart Mill or James Mill.82 Resuming this controversy, Ruffin (2002, 
pp. 727-728) critically asserts: 
“Historians of the law of comparative advantage have turned a relatively simple 
and beautiful story into a confused tangle of claims of priority, error, incomplete-
ness, and attribution. It has been said that Robert Torrens (1780-1864) deserves 
the credit for discovering the law; James Mill (1773-1836) gave the theory to Ricar-
do; Ricardo had no interest in the law after it appeared; and Ricardo's exposition is 
deeply incomplete.” 
It might be argued, for the sake of appeasement, that this apparently endless debate 
about authorship can be bypassed without consequence, since what truly matters is the 
content of the insight, not its legitimate author. I respectfully disagree with this point of 
view, since it suggests that the question of authorship is unrelated to the content of the 
insight. On the contrary, the reason behind this prolonged dispute has to be found in 
the errors and misinterpretations regarding the true meaning of Ricardo’s numerical 
example. Therefore, the desire to establish a correct and neat attribution of authorship is 
not merely an issue of fairness, nor is it a way to prove one’s own academic merits and 
scientific rigor by contradicting the opinion of prestigious scholars on the subject. It is a 
necessary and consequent step for further clarifying and advancing the understanding of 
comparative advantage. 
In order to deliver a correct attribution of merit, however, it is necessary to start with 
a clear definition and delimitation of the subject for which somebody should get credit. 
Without a clear understanding and precise specification of the achievement, any distri-
bution of merit becomes an arbitrary and non-convincing exercise. So one has to 
address the following question right from the beginning: What is the achievement sur-
rounding comparative advantage? The previous sections have already brought light into 
this question from a positive perspective. Nevertheless, in order to draw the line of de-
limitation even sharper, the same question needs to be addressed now from the 
                                                
 
82 See Seligman (1911) Chipman (1965) Irwin (1998) and Maneschi (1998) for the Torrens sup-
porters; and J. Hollander (1911), Sraffa (1930) and S. Hollander (1979) for Ricardo’s defenders. 
Viner (1937) is neutral with leanings towards Ricardo, whereas Thweatt (1976) promotes James 
Mill. 
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opposite side, establishing what should not be considered an achievement either by 
Ricardo or by the other candidates of this merit-contest. 
As a first step, it is necessary to realize that the real cost comparison between home-
production and importing made in the third and fourth paragraph of the extensive 
quote from the Principles is not an innovative contribution of Ricardo to political econ-
omy. By establishing this cost comparison, as already been said, he is merely applying 
the classical rule for specialization, as several authors had already done before him. 
Therefore, Ricardo should not get credit for that — but Mill and Torrens either. 
For the attribution of merit, therefore, the only relevant part is the proposition that 
that a country would import a certain amount of a commodity although it could pro-
duce it internally at lower real costs. Let us start by analyzing the merits of James Mill 
and John Stuart Mill with respect to this proposition. Both authors wrote their respec-
tive references after the Principles and never failed to recognize Ricardo’s merits on the 
subject.83 Indeed, Mill father, who considered himself as Ricardo’s genuine disciple84, was 
very much pleased with his friend’s exposition85, and would most probably reject in 
emphatic terms to be named author or co-author of the insights of his dear friend Ri-
cardo. John S. Mill corrected his father’s famous error in the Elements, but never 
understood the difference between James Mill’s numerical example and Ricardo’s. Actu-
ally, he never truly grasped the real meaning of the four magic numbers, probably 
because he learned comparative advantage by his father’s textbook.86 Therefore, both 
                                                
 
83 See J.S Mill (1844, p. 232-233; and also 1909) 
84 See Ricardo, Vol. IX, p. 391. 
85 After reading and reviewing the manuscript of the Principles, James Mill wrote to Ricardo: 
“The inquiry concerning foreign trade (...) is like the rest, original, and sound, and excellently 
demonstrated. That foreign trade augments not the value of a nations property: that it may be good 
for a country to import commodities from a country where the production of those same commodities costs more, 
than it would cost at home: that a change in manufacturing skill in one country, produces a new 
distribution of the precious metals, are new propositions of the highest importance, and which you fully 
prove” (Ricardo, Vol. VII, p. 99; emphasis added). 
86 See J. S. Mill (1909), where he gives credit to Torrens, along with Ricardo, for comparative 
advantage based on what Torrens wrote in 1808. 
Chapter 2: The Classical Free Trade Theory 
-76- 
Mills have to be considered at least partly responsible for the misinterpretation of Ricar-
do’ insights, and not as its co-authors.87 
Robert Torrens is the only candidate who could claim to have mentioned the propo-
sition that a country might import a commodity despite having a real cost advantage in 
its production prior to Ricardo. Actually, he is indeed the only one who has made such a 
claim, although not during Ricardo’s lifetime.88 The basis for a certain plausibility of his 
claim is the following passage of the Essay on the External Corn Trade of 1815, written two 
years before the publication of the Principles: 
“If England should have acquired such a degree of skill in manufacturing, that, 
with any given portion of her capital, she could prepare a quantity of cloth, for 
which the Polish cultivator would give a greater quantity of corn, than she [Eng-
land] could, with the same portion of capital, raise from her own soil, then, tracts 
of her territory, though they should be equal, nay, even though they should be su-
perior, to the lands in Poland, will be neglected; and a part of her supply of corn 
will be imported from that country. For, though the capital employed in cultivating 
at home, might bring an excess of profit, over the capital employed in cultivating 
abroad, yet, under the supposition, the capital which should be employed in manu-
facturing, would obtain a still greater excess of profit; and this greater excess of 
profit would determine the direction of our industry” (Torrens, Vol. II, pp. 264-
265). 
This passage can be viewed as an early enunciation of the insight. Torrens was well 
aware of the counterintuitive nature of this proposition, since he writes at the beginning 
of the paragraph: 
                                                
 
87 The principle merit of James Mill consists in having encouraged Ricardo to write the Principles. 
Without his insistence, Ricardo may have not written the book. Ricardo himself recognize this 
when he writes in a letter to Mill: “If I am successful in my undertaking it will be to you mainly that my 
success will be owing, for without your encouragement I do not think that I should have proceeded, and it is to you 
that I look for assistance of the utmost importance to me — the arranging the different parts, and curtailing what 
may be superfluous.” However, with respect to theoretical issues, I agree with Sraffa (Vol. I, p. xx) 
that the influence of Mill on Ricardo is negligible. 
88 De Vivo, the editor of the Collected Works of Robert Torrens (2000) points out that Torrens 
makes two different priority-claims: one regarding the advantages derived from trade in general 
based on The Economists Refuted, and another regarding comparative advantage in the preface of 
the 1826 edition of the External Corn Trade. De Vivo considers both claims far from convincing 
and hardly reconcilable with Torrens' own sweeping acknowledgments of Ricardo’s priority on 
the theory of foreign trade. He even refers to a tract published by an anonymous writer in 1814, 
which contains a much better formulation of comparative advantage than the one we find in 
Torrens (Torrens, Vol. II, pp. xvii-xix; Vol. VI, p. xxii). 
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“Let us suppose, that there are, in England, unreclaimed districts, from which corn 
might be raised at as small an expenditure of labour and capital as from the fertile 
plains of Poland. [...] [It] seems natural to conclude, that if industry were left to 
take its most profitable direction, capital would be employed in raising corn at 
home, rather than in bringing it from Poland at an equal prime cost, and at a much 
greater expense of carriage. But this conclusion, however obvious and natural it 
may, at first sight, appear, might, on a closer examination, be found entirely erro-
neous” (Torrens, Vol. II, pp. 263-264). 
Several scholars have repeatedly brought up this passage for establishing the priority 
— or at least the joint authorship — of Torrens with respect to this insight. Indeed, 
there can be no dispute about the fact that Torrens had already published his essay well 
before the Principles, since Ruffin (2002, pp. 735-743) convincingly proves that Ricardo 
must have developed his insight most probably around the first two weeks of October 
1816. However, is this undisputed fact a sufficient reason for establishing the priority of 
Torrens over Ricardo as the legitimate author? It well might be, but only if a critical 
assessment of Torrens’ passage would prove that it contains a satisfactory formulation 
of the proposition, equal or superior to Ricardo’s exposition. 
When comparing Torrens’ passage with Ricardo’s formulation, there are two crucial 
elements missing in Torrens. First, he fails to mention the factor costs of Poland in the 
production of cloth. His statement only alludes to the fact that England should produce 
cloth and trade it for corn even if it is superior to Poland in corn production. This is 
sufficient for establishing the comparative advantage of England in cloth, and therefore 
her interest in trading cloth for polish corn, but it is not enough for this international 
transaction to actually taking place. Let us add some fictitious numbers — similar to 
Ricardo’s but based on Torrens’s indications — in a box in order to better visualize the 
missing element: 
 Number of men working for a year required to 
produce a given quantity of cloth and corn traded 
 cloth corn 
England 100 120 
Poland ??? 130 
Table 4: Torrens’ Missing Element 
Chapter 2: The Classical Free Trade Theory 
-78- 
In the above numerical example, England has a real cost advantage in cloth and corn 
compared to Poland. Suppose now that Poland also has its comparative advantage in 
the production of cloth, because it only needs 125 men to produce the amount of cloth 
traded at home — where is Poland’s interest in the exchange? In that case, the inevitable 
consequence would be that this international exchange would cease. The missing ele-
ment is not the comparison of cost ratios, as suggested by Robbins (1958, p. 23), but the 
application of the classical rule for specialization to Poland. 
In addition to this shortcoming regarding Ricardo’s first proposition, Torrens has 
nothing to say about Ricardo’s second proposition — the non-appliance of the law of 
value in international transactions —, although it is crucial for the logical prove of the 
first proposition. Because of these missing elements, Torrens should not get the credit 
for comparative advantage. He did not bequeath the tools that would have enabled his 
successors to easily prove the proposition. As Ruffin (2002, p. 731) correctly states: 
“There is a difference between hinting at a result and providing the tools to prove a theorem.” 
Torrens’ supporters have been aware of the shortcomings of their preferred candi-
date. Their argument in favor of granting him the authorship over Ricardo has always 
rested not so much on his merits, but on the alleged inconsistencies and omissions in 
Ricardo’s exposition. After having sufficiently proved that these accusations are un-
founded, any attribution of authorship to someone other than Ricardo for the two 
propositions contained in the numerical example of chapter 7 of the Principles has to be 
rejected. 
2.5 Sources of Comparative Advantage 
According to the classical rule for specialization, a country imports a given amount of 
a particular commodity from abroad and pays for them with its exports because by do-
ing so, it incurs only in a fraction of the real costs required to produce the same amount 
of the imported commodity at home. Such gains from international trade are only pos-
sible when there are persistent real cost differences between countries in producing the 
given amounts of commodities traded. 
In order to prove the above proposition, let us reassemble Ricardo’s famous numeri-
cal example, assuming that the amounts of cloth and wine traded between England and 
Portugal are produced in both countries with the same real labor costs: 
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 Number of men working for a year required to 
produce a given quantity of cloth and wine traded 
 cloth wine 
England 100 120 
Portugal 100 120 
Table 5: Ricardo’s Example without Real Cost Differences between Countries 
If England were supposed to produce the cloth and Portugal the wine under these 
terms, such an exchange would not continue for a very long time, since it is in England’s 
but not in Portugal’s interest. Portugal would gain the labor of 20 men if she produces 
the cloth at home, instead of importing it from England. 
Now let us assume that Portugal only needs 80 men to produce the amount of wine 
traded, as Ricardo states in his numerical example: 
 
 Number of men working for a year required to 
produce a given quantity of cloth and wine traded 
 cloth wine 
England 100 120 
Portugal 100 80 
Table 6: Ricardo’s Example with Real Cost Differences between Countries 
Under these terms the exchange of cloth and corn between the two countries would 
go on, since each country gains the labor of 20 men. What factors may enable Portugal 
to produce the amount of wine traded with the labor of only 80 men, i.e., 40 men less 
compared to England? 
The existence of persistent real cost differences among countries in producing partic-
ular commodities can be explained in terms of natural conditions — such as soil, 
climate and geographic location — and acquired or artificial advantages, for example 
Chapter 2: The Classical Free Trade Theory 
-80- 
education, production skills, economies of scale and historical development. These fac-
tors are usually labeled in the literature as sources of comparative advantage. 
Ricardo has been repeatedly criticized for missing to specify the sources of compara-
tive advantage. Having already refuted prior accusations towards him, it might be no 
surprise to discover that this last one can also be proven wrong. Anyone who dedicates 
some time and effort to read the Principles may find the following passage: 
“It is quite as important to the happiness of mankind, that our enjoyments should 
be increased by the better distribution of labour, by each country producing those 
commodities for which by its situation, its climate, and its other natural and 
artificial advantages, it is adapted, and by their exchanging them for the com-
modities of other countries, as that they should be augmented by a raise in the rate 
of profits (Vol. I, p. 132, bold added).” 
In the above paragraph Ricardo explicitly mentions two natural sources of compara-
tive advantage, namely the climatic conditions and the geographical location of the 
country. His reference to other natural advantages may imply, for example, the abundance 
of fertile land and raw materials. No economist would deny that these natural ad-
vantages are indeed important sources of comparative advantage, and that they play a 
determining role in explaining the commodity composition of international trade. More 
controversial seems to be his general reference to artificial advantages. Artificial means 
of course the product of human endeavor. For example, demand-side differences like 
taste and cultural traditions in specific countries, economies of scale and history — all of 
these may be considered as artificial sources of comparative advantage. 
Ricardo apparently sees no need for elaborating more specifically what he considers 
to be artificial advantages. Moreover, he does not even bother to differentiate between 
natural and artificial sources for the international division of labor. At the first look, his 
approach seems to be a bit superficial, because it ignores the fact that people are much 
more willing to accept natural rather than artificial differences. The explanation for his 
superficial and undifferentiated treatment of natural and artificial sources of compara-
tive advantage has to be found in the following paragraph of the Wealth of Nations: 
“Whether the advantages which one country has over another, be natural or ac-
quired, is in this respect of no consequence. As long as the one country has those 
advantages, and the other wants them, it will always be more advantageous for the 
latter, rather to buy of the former than to make. It is an acquired advantage only, 
which one artificer has over his neighbour, who exercises another trade; and yet 
they both found it more advantageous to buy of one another, than to make what 
does not belong to their particular trades” (WN, IV.ii.15, p. 458). 
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Smith states in the above paragraph that the specific causes of the real cost differ-
ences — whether natural or acquired — are irrelevant for grasping the benefits from 
internal as well as international trade. Contemporary economists have concentrated on a 
narrow set of factors in order to explain why a country has greater facility in producing 
certain types of commodities and services than others, such as consumer tastes, a supe-
rior technology, economies of scale or the relative abundance of certain factors of 
production. Mainstream international trade models usually highlight a single factor and 
exclude all others by assumption. Such a modeling approach seems inappropriate, since 
comparative advantage is often the result of several factors working simultaneously. 
In the Wealth of Nations there are actually a very interesting examples of how Smith 
combines natural and artificial sources of comparative advantage in order to explain the 
optimal pattern of trade and specialization for the North American colonies and China. 
His recommendations are based of an accurate analysis of factor supplies and relative 
prices of the factors of production. 
The North American colonies, whose Declaration of Independence in 1776 coincided with 
the publication of the Wealth of Nations, were accurately characterized by Smith as having 
abundant land and relative scarcity of labor and capital. In correspondence with its fac-
tor supply, rents would be generally lower and wages and profits higher in the North 
American colonies than in Europe. Therefore, the comparative advantage of the North 
American colonies would be in the production and exportation of agricultural products 
and raw materials rather than in the home-production of refined manufactures. 
 “Agriculture is the proper business of all new colonies; a business which the 
cheapness of land renders more advantageous than any other. They abound, there-
fore, in the rude produce of land, and instead of importing it from other countries, 
they have generally a large surplus to export. In new colonies, agriculture either 
draws hands from all other employments, or keeps them from going to any other 
employment. There are few hands to spare for the necessary, and none for the or-
namental manufactures. The greater part of the manufactures of both kinds, they 
find it cheaper to purchase of other countries than to make for themselves” (WN, 
IV.vii.c.51, p. 609).  
Imperial China, on the other hand, had abundant labor densely settled, resulting in 
low wages and high rents. In opposition to the economic policies of the Chinese gov-
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ernment, which favored agriculture more than all other employments89, Smith identified 
China’s comparative advantage in the production and exportation of manufactures. 
Furthermore, he warned that China was approaching economic stagnation, having ac-
quired the amount of wealth that its actual institutions and economic policies permit it 
to acquire. The expansion of foreign commerce, which China had neglected, could 
however give a fresh impetus to her economic development. 
“The home market of China is, perhaps, in extent, not much inferior to the market 
of all the different countries of Europe put together. A more extensive foreign 
trade, however, which to this great home market added the foreign market of all 
the rest of the world; especially if any considerable part of this trade was carried on 
in Chinese ships; could scarce fail to increase very much the manufactures of Chi-
na, and to improve very much the productive powers of its manufacturing 
industry. By a more extensive navigation, the Chinese would naturally learn the art 
of using and constructing themselves all the different machines made use of in 
other countries, as well as the other improvements of art and industry which are 
practised in all the different parts of the world. Upon their present plan they have 
little opportunity of improving themselves by the example of any other nation; ex-
cept that of the Japanese” (WN, IV.ix.41, p. 681). 
By taking into account the relative abundance of land and labor, as well as the corre-
sponding relative prices of these factors in the North American colonies and China, 
Smith clearly anticipated the Heckscher-Ohlin approach to international trade theory. 
However, instead of assuming the artificial factor endowments of a country to be exog-
enously given, Smith was able to treat the broad pattern of changes in the factor 
supplies and their relative prices as a part of the process of long-run economic devel-
opment (Myint, 1977, p. 235). 
As a preliminary conclusion, it is possible to affirm that according to the classical the-
ory of international trade there are plenty of sources of comparative advantage. The 
simultaneous operation of these natural and artificial factors explains the persistent dif-
ferences in labor productivity that give rise to international division of labor and the 
observable pattern of trade. Therefore, neither Smith nor Ricardo can be accused of 
having failed to explain the sources of comparative advantage. 
                                                
 
89 Consequently, Smith analyzes the economic policies of China in the chapter about Physiocra-
cy. See Smith (WN, IV.ix.40, pp. 669ff.). 
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2.6 The Classical Case against Government Intervention in Trade 
2.6.1 Adam Smith and the Laissez-faire Doctrine 
Neoclassical supporters of free trade have usually based their case against government 
intervention in international trade on the laissez-faire doctrine. This explains today’s 
close identification of the case for free trade with laissez-faire economics.90 Nowadays, if 
an economist argues in favor of free international trade, he or she is automatically con-
sidered to be also an enthusiastic supporter of laissez-faire capitalism. If the same 
economist also envisions an active role for the government in specific areas of the 
economy, out of the conviction that markets are far from being perfectly competitive 
and need regulation and supervision for their proper functioning, he/she would rather 
be seen as an inconsequent and contradictious scholar. If an economist does not believe 
in the proposition of self-regulating markets, he/she has to support — at least in princi-
ple — government intervention in international trade as well. 
At the first look, this close association of free trade with the laissez-faire doctrine ap-
pears to be indeed compelling and historically accurate. After all, the Physiocrats, who 
coined and popularized the maxim laissez faire et laissez passer — implying freedom to 
produce and freedom to trade —, were also known for their explicit support of free 
international trade. However, as already pointed out in section 2.1, the Physiocrats’ sup-
port for free trade was based on a specific theoretical analysis, which is in many respects 
contrary to the insights of classical political economy. It is a historically proven fact that 
the Physiocrats’ support for free trade was merely circumstantial and temporary. 
Those who have presented the free-trade case as a logical and necessary extension of 
the general case for laissez-faire in the economy have often mischaracterized Adam 
Smith as an eloquent spokesperson of the laissez-faire doctrine. According to this inter-
pretation, as Rosenberg (1974, p. 1177) critically points out, the Wealth of Nations has 
                                                
 
90 A good example for the identification of the free trade case with the laissez-faire doctrine can 
be found in Krugman (1987, p. 134): “The view that free trade is the best of all possible policies is part of 
the general case for laissez-faire in a market economy, and rests on the proposition that markets are efficient. If 
increasing returns and imperfect competition are necessary parts of the explanation of international trade, however, 
we are living in a second-best world where government intervention can in principle improve on markets outcome.” 
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been regarded as the locus classicus of the laissez-faire ideology, a book that established 
“(…) a powerful economic justification for the untrammeled pursuit of individual self-interest” 
(Hirschman, 1977, p. 100). 91 
The erroneous notion that Smith was a supporter of the laissez-faire maxim seems to 
root partly in the fact that the bulk of his critique of the two earlier theoretic systems of 
political economy — concentrated in Book IV of the Wealth of Nations — is directed 
towards mercantilism.92 However, to infer from this undisputed fact that he was sympa-
thetic towards the economic doctrine of the Physiocrats is flatly wrong, since it ignores 
the explanation given by Smith himself about the genuine reason that impelled him to 
concentrate his critique on mercantilism rather than physiocracy: 
“That system which represents the produce of land as the sole source of the reve-
nue and wealth of every country, has, so far as I know, never been adopted by any 
nation, and it at present exists only in the speculations of a few men of great learn-
ing and ingenuity in France. It would not, surely, be worth while to examine at 
great length the errors of a system which never has done, and probably never will 
do any harm in any part of the world” (WN, IV.ix.2, p. 663). 
Smith treats physiocracy with relative benevolence — compared to his relentless hos-
tility towards the economic doctrines of mercantilism — not because he agrees with the 
main theoretical propositions and economic theories advanced by this school of eco-
nomic thought93, but because it was less relevant in the political arena. At the time when 
Smith wrote the Wealth of Nations, physiocracy was merely a local phenomenon of scarce 
political relevance outside France. In the early years of the nineteenth century, however, 
it would have been virtually impossible for any British economist to regard physiocracy 
as an eccentric, ephemeral and peculiarly French body of economic thought. These were 
                                                
 
91 Pack (1991) gives credit to Jacob Viner for refuting the view that Smith was in favor of lais-
sez-faire. Indeed, Viner affirms in his paper Adam Smith and Laissez Faire that Smith “(...) was not 
a doctrinaire advocate of laissez-faire” (1927, p. 231). However, Viner also affirms in his well-known 
book Studies in the Theory of International Trade that “(…) the antecedents of Smith’s laissez-faire and free-
trade views are probably rightly to be sought mainly in the philosophic literature, and perhaps also the writings of 
the Physiocrats, rather than in the earlier English economic literature” (1937, p. 91). Such contradictious 
statements clearly contribute to perpetuate and propagate the erroneous but persistent view of 
Smith being a laissez-faire advocate. See also Viner (1960). 
92 Eight of the nine chapters of Book IV of the Wealth of Nations are dedicated to critizise the 
Mercantilists, whereas the critique of the Physiocrats is concentrated in the final chapter. 
93 As suggested, for example, by Pack (1991, p. 41). 
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the years of the great debates among British scholars and politicians over the validity of 
the physiocratic economic principles (Meek, 1951, p. 26). It was not possible for Smith, 
though, to anticipate this course of event a quarter of a century earlier. 
Any objective and thoughtful comparison of the physiocratic doctrine with classical 
political economy would lead to the conclusion that they are indeed two opposing and 
mutually incompatible systems of economic thought. Nevertheless, physiocracy has 
often been presented in the economic literature as a direct precursor and guiding inspi-
ration for Smith’s economic thinking, whereas the role of the opponent has been 
assigned exclusively to mercantilism.94 It would certainly be more accurate to consider 
both mercantilism and physiocracy as antecedents but also as opponents of classical 
political economy. 
A mayor topic where classical political economists strongly disagree with the physio-
cratic doctrine is precisely the one related to the general maxim of laissez faire in the 
economy. No one is perhaps better suited to demonstrate this than Smith himself. In 
order to prove this affirmation, I am going to analyze in some detail Smith’s thoughts 
related to the main proposition of the laissez-faire doctrine: the proclaimed harmony of 
private self-interests with the general interests of the society, and the consequent belief 
in the perfect functioning of an unregulated capitalistic economic system. 
The reception of Smith in present-day economic literature is usually limited to a few 
quotations from the Wealth of Nations95, in which he apparently proclaims the general 
harmony of private and public interests: 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address our-
selves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our 
own necessities but of their advantages (WN, I.ii.2, pp. 26-27). 
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous 
employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, in-
deed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own 
advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer that employment 
which is most advantageous to the society (WN, IV.ii.4, p. 454). 
                                                
 
94 For a prominent example of this view, see Viner (1937, p. 91). 
95 See Gramm (1980). 
Chapter 2: The Classical Free Trade Theory 
-86- 
As every individual, therefore, endeavors as much as he can both to employ his 
capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its 
produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labor to render 
the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither 
intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. 
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only 
his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce 
may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in 
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which has no part of 
his intention. Nor is it always the worse of the society that it was no part of it. By 
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectu-
ally that when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good by 
those who affected to trade for the public good (WN, IV.ii.9, p. 456). 
The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered to 
exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, 
and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth 
and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions with which 
the folly of human laws too often incumbers its operations; though the effect of 
these obstructions is always more or less either to encroach upon its freedom, or 
to diminish its security (WN, IV.v.b.43, p. 540). 
The selective and out-of-context quotation of the above passages of the Wealth of Na-
tions has necessarily led to the misguided impression that Smith was an eloquent 
advocate of laissez faire capitalism. Therefore, in order to interpret the above statements 
accurately it is necessary to put them first in the appropriate historic context. 
Before the publication of the Wealth of Nations, mercantilist thinkers had established 
the proposition that the self-interest of private agents in the economic realm, in particu-
lar the profit motive of merchants, were not capable of bringing any positive outcome 
for the society at all. Private and public interests were presented as mutually incompati-
ble. Both of the reasons mercantilist writers set down for regulating trade — to promote 
a favorable balance of trade and to secure greater manufacturing production — were 
derivative of a more general view of trade where an inherent disharmony between pri-
vate and public interests led to a misallocation of economic resources that could only be 
remedied by government intervention. Therefore, the mercantilists considered govern-
ment officials in general better suited than private producers to determine the proper 
channels for economic activity. As far as objections were raised against public regula-
tions of the self-interested activities of merchants, they usually rested on concerns about 
the incompetence of the regulators, or the unavailability of unbiased advisers, or the 
inability of the government to cope with the strength of the profit motive (Viner, 1937, 
p. 95ff.). 
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In this historical context, the proposition advanced in the Wealth of Nations that the 
self-interest of private economic agents could perform a beneficial service to society was 
neither widespread nor particular popular. Therefore, Smith needed to convince the 
reader first that self-interest is indeed a common and powerful force behind the most 
ordinary economic activities of daily life, like selling bread or meat. 
When one read these passages of the Wealth of Nations out of context with the rest of 
the text and in isolation from Smith’s other writings, though, it appears the he has 
adopted the ideas attributed to a contemporary, Bernard Mandeville, who links in his 
famous “The Fable of the Bees” all human motivation with selfish passions, and considers 
selfishness as a natural and beneficial force in the economic realm.96 Based on this inter-
pretation, Smith is credited for having solved the dichotomy between natural selfish 
passions and public interests. 
Such an interpretation, however, does not accurately reflect the content and spirit of 
Smith’s thinking on the subject. The most accurate scholars of Smith have arrived to 
this conclusion. It was Mandeville — not Smith —, who concluded that the private 
vices of selfishness and greed could lead to public benefits. Smith did not agree with 
Mandeville’s propositions that human beings are solely motivated by selfish passions, 
and that selfishness could perform a beneficial role in the society.97 
Self-interest and not selfishness is the foundation of Smith’s economic analysis; it is the 
important driving force in economic activity, ethically positive and of social benefit un-
der definite conditions.98 Thus, the butcher and the baker are not necessarily selfish but 
simply indifferent to the interests of others, at least in economic affairs, except when 
those interests affect their business concerns (Werhane, 1991, p. 5). 
In parallel to the recognition that self-interest has a dominant role in the creation of 
wealth, Smith develops a more elaborated view of this concept. It is important to recog-
nize that self-interest means to him not only rational pecuniary interest, but also self-
love in all its possible manifestations. In addition to the traditional meaning of relentless 
                                                
 
96 See Mandeville (1988). 
97 For Smith’s comments on Mandeville, see (TMS, VII.ii.4.6-14, pp. 308-314). 
98 See Recktenwald (1978, p. 58). 
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pursuit of material gain — the “constant, uniform and uninterrupted effort of every man to better 
his condition” (WN, II.iii.31, p. 343) —, Smith also considers the desire for ease and en-
joyment, envy, malice and resentment as manifestations of self-interest (Viner, 1927, p. 
212). The desire for ease and inactivity, therefore, acts as a major counterbalance to the 
pursuit of wealth, because “it is the interest of every man to live as much at his ease as he can” 
(WN, V.i.f.7, p. 760). 
In addition to his broader conception of self-interest, Smith also distinguishes be-
tween what a person is interested in and what is to his/her interest. It is what an 
individual regards as its personal interest, even though mistakenly, that guides his ac-
tions. Therefore, every possible motive to action is included under self-interest except a 
deliberate intention to promote the welfare of others than one’s self (Viner, 1927, p. 
213). 
Based on the recognition of the often-conflicting forces that impel the economic 
agent to action, Smith distinguishes between the desire for wealth and its attainment in 
order to assess the effects of wealth on human actions. Whereby he regards the desire 
for material prosperity as a force, which prods and lures the human being to put forth 
the greatest efforts, he almost regards the resulting attainment and possession of wealth 
as universally corrupting. For, once such wealth has been acquired, the individual natu-
rally gives vent to his desire for ease (Rosenberg, 1960, p. 557f.). 
It may be surprising for those who have considered Smith as an apostle of greed and 
profit maximization, to read the following statement about the effect of high profits 
upon the business class: 
“The high rate of profit seems every where to destroy that parsimony which in 
other circumstances is natural to the character of the merchant. When profits are 
high, that sober virtue seems to be superfluous, and expensive luxury to suit better 
the affluence of his situation” (WN, IV.vii.c.61, p. 612).  
Therefore, far from regarding the highest possible level of profits as the major source 
and incentive for accelerated capital accumulation, Smith is preoccupied with the nega-
tive effects of great wealth on the motivation and behavior of private economic agents. 
The individual applies himself with maximum industry and efficiency when the reward 
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for effort is neither too low (slaves, apprentices) nor too great (monopolists, large land-
owners).99 
Moreover, Smith is not only concerned with the appropriate level of intensity of the 
human effort, but also with the direction into which this effort is channeled. He regards 
human beings as naturally deceitful and unscrupulous in their pursuit of wealth, perfect-
ly capable and willing to employ predatory practices so long as such practices are 
available to them (Rosenberg, 1960, p. 560).100 Far from assuming an automatic compat-
ibility between selfish private interests and the interests of the society as a whole — the 
existence of perfect harmony in the economic order —, Smith is actually foremost pre-
occupied with the elaboration of a detailed institutional framework which will best 
harmonize the individual’s legitimate pursuit of self-interest with the broader interests of 
society. His main goal is to construct an institutional framework that would place indi-
viduals under the proper amount of psychic tension to overcome their desire for ease 
and also that would cut off all avenues along which wealth may be pursued without 
contributing to the welfare of society. He wants to compel private economic agents to 
use only the good instruments. Such an ambitious goal requires in practice a careful 
balancing of incentive, of provision of opportunities to enlarge one’s income, against 
the need to minimize the opportunities for abuse, i.e., possibilities for increasing one’s 
income in an antisocial fashion. 
A central cornerstone of Smith’s institutional framework is of course the competitive 
market. This competitive order envisioned by Smith can be defined, negatively, by the 
absence of all special privilege and sources of market influence and, positively, by the 
all-pervasive and uninhibited pressures of the market place (Rosenberg, 1960, p. 560). 
                                                
 
99 Smith writes about slaves: “The experience of all ages and nations, I believe, demonstrates that the work 
done by slaves, though it appears to cost only their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any. A person who 
can acquire no property, can have no other interest but to eat as much, and to labour as little as possible. Whatev-
er work he does beyond what is sufficient to purchase his own maintenance, can be squeezed out of him by violence 
only, and not by any interest of his own” (WN, III.ii.9, pp. 387-388). On the other hand, as already 
cited: “A man of a large revenue, whatever may be his profession, thinks he ought to live like other men of large 
revenues; and to spend a great part of his time in festivity, in vanity, and in dissipation” (WN, V.i.g.42, pp. 
813-814). 
100 In Smith’s own words: “Such, it seems, is the natural insolence of man, that he almost always disdains to 
use the good instrument, except when he cannot or dare not use the bad one” (WN, V.i.g.19, p. 799). 
Chapter 2: The Classical Free Trade Theory 
-90- 
However, Smith regards the establishment and proper functioning of a competitive 
market as a necessary but insufficient condition to secure the linkage between unham-
pered pursuit of self-interest and social well-being. On the contrary, he is obsessed with 
the urge to go beyond the ordinary market-structure definition of competition and to 
define ways in which appropriate institutions may contribute to the productivity of the 
human agent as a factor of production. 
The secondary literature on Smith, although, has put too much emphasis on the 
proposition that the establishment of a free market would promote economic efficiency. 
This emphasis on the allocative efficiency of the free market has led to an oversimplified 
interpretation of Smith’s views, which can be summarized with the following syllogistic 
reformulation. First, the wealth of a nation is the aggregate wealth of its citizens; second, 
every individual desires to increase his wealth as much as possible; third, every individual 
can judge better than a distant statesmen what use of his/her labor and capital is likely 
to produce the highest increase of his/her personal wealth; forth, the means employed 
by individuals to increase their wealth are always in correspondence with the interests of 
society; therefore, the wealth of a nation will increase most rapidly if every individual is 
left free to conduct his own affairs without state intervention. 
The problem with this syllogistic statement is that it short-circuits Smith’s profound 
and complex thinking on these subjects. By jumping directly from the conception of the 
economic agent as a rational creature to the policy recommendation of laissez-faire, 
most of the real substance of Smith’s insights are oversimplified or left out completely 
(Rosenberg, 1960, p. 557). Because of the increasingly formal nature of economics as an 
academic discipline, the institutional content and preoccupations of Smith have suffered 
prolonged neglect. Consequently, this moral philosopher and distinguished representa-
tive of the Scottish Enlightenment has been misrepresented as a doctrinaire advocate of 
laissez-faire. 
A quick look at Smith’s analysis about profits and wages is sufficient for refuting the 
notion of him as a fervent supporter of laissez-faire capitalism. One might expect from 
any enthusiastic supporter of laissez-faire capitalism that he or she would consider high 
profits as desirable and high wages as undesirable. Yet in Smith’s case, quite the oppo-
site is true. He treats high wages as being unqualifiedly a good thing, and high profits as 
being unqualifiedly a bad thing (Rosenberg, 1974, p. 1178). 
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After dividing the annual produce of the society into three categories — the rents of 
the landowner, the wages of the workers and the profits of the capitalists —, Smith 
concludes that the interest of the capitalists — to achieve the highest possible rate of 
profit — does not coincide with those of society: 
“The rate of profit does not, like rent and wages, rise with the prosperity, and fall 
with the declension, of the society. On the contrary, it is naturally low in rich, and 
high in poor countries, and it is always highest in the countries which are going 
fastest to ruin. The interest of this third order [i.e., capitalists], therefore, has not 
the same connexion with the general interest of the society as that of the other two 
[i.e., landowners and workers]” (WN, I.xi.p.10, p. 266). 
As a result, capitalists as a class are simply not to be trusted: 
“The interest of the dealers, however, in any particular branch of trade or manu-
factures, is always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of 
the publick. To widen the market and to narrow the competition, is always the in-
terest of the dealers. To widen the market may frequently be agreeable enough to 
the interest of the publick; but to narrow the competition must always be against it, 
and can serve only to enable the dealers, by raising their profits above what they 
naturally would be, to levy, for their own benefit, an absurd tax upon the rest of 
their fellow-citizens. The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce 
which comes from this order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, 
and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, 
not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It 
comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of 
the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the pub-
lic and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed 
it” (WN, I.xi.p.10, p. 267). 
Why does this allegedly advocator for laissez-faire capitalism treat high profits with 
such unrelieved hostility? The answer to this question revolves primarily around the 
belief that high profits are the necessary result of a low level of competition between 
individual capitalists in a particular branch of the economy. In addition to this, as al-
ready been said, Smith believes that easily earned high profits destroy the effectiveness 
with which the capitalist carries out his social role. 
When Smith turns from the examination of the economic behavior of the capitalist to 
that of the laborer, his attitude shifts from that of compulsive and cantankerous criti-
cism and suspicion to one of compassion and understanding. In sharp contrast with his 
negative appreciation of high profits, he considers high wages as universally desirable: 
“Is this improvement in the circumstances of the lower ranks of the people to be 
regarded as an advantage or as an inconveniency to the society? The answer seems 
at first sight abundantly plain. Servants, labourers and workmen of different kinds, 
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make up the far greater part of every great political society. But what improves the 
circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as an inconveniency to the 
whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater 
part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who 
feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of 
the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed 
and lodged” (WN, I.viii.36, p. 96). 
This favorable position towards higher salaries and labor income was in sharp con-
trast with the economic doctrines of the majority of his predecessors and 
contemporaries, who were mostly concerned with the undesirable social consequences 
of high wages and rising income of the working class (Marshall M. G., 1998; 2000). It 
was part of the conventional wisdom prior to the Wealth of Nations that high wages 
would reduce the labor effort of the working class.101 Compared to these prior notions, 
Smith’s views on high wages were both novel and enlightened. Not only did he believe 
that high wages were intrinsically desirable because they improved the standard of living 
of the majority of the population, but he also believed — and here he clashes head-on 
with the prevailing view — that higher wages called forth greater effort and not less: 
“The liberal reward of labour (…) increases the industry of the common people. 
The wages of labour are the encouragement of industry, which, like every other 
human quality, improves in proportion to the encouragement it receives. A plenti-
ful subsistence increases the bodily strength of the labourer, and the comfortable 
hope of bettering his condition, and of ending his days perhaps in ease and plenty, 
animates him to exert that strength to the utmost. Where wages are high, accord-
ingly, we shall always find the workmen more active, diligent, and expeditious, than 
where they are low” (WN, I.viii.44, p. 99). 
Although Smith concedes that higher wages are likely to induce some workers to re-
duce the number of hours worked, he believes that they would constitute only a 
minority of the labor force. Indeed, Smith appears to be genuinely concerned over the 
opposite possibility, that a system of incentive wages will cause many workers to suffer 
the deleterious effects of overwork. In this respect he might be regarded as one of the 
first economists for whom this was a major concern.102 
                                                
 
101 For the transition from the old view to Smith’s position, see Coats (1958). 
102 Smith states: “Some workmen, indeed, when they can earn in four days what will maintain them through 
the week, will be idle the other three. This, however, is by no means the case with the greater part. Workmen, on 
the contrary, when they are liberally paid by the piece, are very apt to over-work themselves, and to ruin their 
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Smith’s analysis of profits and wages is also very interesting with regard to a proposi-
tion often heard in the present context of accelerated economic globalization: that high 
wages diminish national competitiveness with respect to foreign competitors. Smith 
unmasks the hypocritical nature of this proposition, closing the chapter on profits with 
the following statement: 
“Our merchants and master-manufacturers complain much of the bad effects of 
high wages in raising the price and thereby lessening the sale of their goods both at 
home and abroad. They say nothing concerning the bad effects of high profits. 
They are silent with regard to the pernicious effects of their own gains. They com-
plain only of those of other people (WN, I.ix.24, p. 115).” 103 
After reading all these less-quoted passages of the Wealth of Nations someone who has 
been taught to regard Smith as a spokesperson for unfettered laissez-faire capitalism 
might start wondering what sort of peculiar capitalist apologetic he is. One would expect 
to read praises for high wages and critique for high profits in Marx’s Das Kapital, but not 
in the Wealth of Nations. The obviously flawed notion of Smith as an advocate of laissez-
faire capitalism can only be the result of a very selective and biased reading of the Wealth 
of Nations. 
Smith may have coincided with the Physiocrats in the philosophical proposition that 
self-interested actions of individuals can perform a beneficial service for the society. The 
crucial difference resides in the respective level of compatibility attributed. The Physio-
crats believe that there is complete harmony — the highest level of compatibility 
conceivable — between private actions and the public interest. Smith holds to a more 
                                                                                                                                     
 
health and constitution in a few years. A carpenter in London, and in some other places, is not supposed to last 
in his utmost vigour above eight years. Something of the same kind happens, in many other trades, in which the 
workmen are paid by the piece, as they generally are in manufactures, and even in country labour, whenever wages 
are higher than ordinary” (WN, I.viii.44, pp. 99-100). Smith also pioneered the analysis on the dele-
terious consequences of the division of labor upon the work force. See Smith (WN, V.i.f.50, pp. 
781-782), Rosenberg (1965), and West (1964, 1969). 
103 He actually believes so strong about this issue, that he repeats the above statement, substan-
tially unchanged, in another part of the Wealth of Nations: “Our merchants frequently complain of the 
high wages of British labour as the cause of their manufactures being undersold in foreign markets; but they are 
silent about the high profits of stock. They complain of the extravagant gain of other people; but they say nothing 
of their own. The high profits of British stock, however, may contribute towards raising the price of British manu-
factures in many eases as much, and in some perhaps more, than the high wages of British labour” (WN, 
IV.vii.c.29, p. 599). 
Chapter 2: The Classical Free Trade Theory 
-94- 
nuanced position that competition within the framework of natural liberty ensures a 
broad but imperfect harmony of the private interests of individuals and the general in-
terest of the society, with the government creating an institutional framework that 
would regulate the economic activities of the private economic agents where a conflict 
of interest may subsist. Under this conception, government interference with the free 
operation of self-interest is not only allowed but also necessary in order to secure the 
economic progress of the country. 
Acknowledging the existence of specific areas and multiple circumstances in which 
the government has to play an active role in guaranteeing the proper functioning of the 
economic system, does not mean to give the government a carte blanche for interfering in 
every economic activity, for example in the international exchange of commodities and 
services. Any specific government intervention has to be evaluated in terms of the pro-
posed objectives and probable effects. The next section deals with the main arguments 
of classical political economy against government intervention in international trade. 
2.6.2 Smith’s Arguments Against Trade Intervention 
The proclaimed objectives of protectionism have always been to boost national pro-
duction and to create new jobs. Agreeing with the mercantilists that a tariff would 
usually expand the output and level of employment in the protected sector, Smith poses 
a more penetrating consideration rarely raised by others: he takes into account the 
economy-wide impact of these trade interventions, instead of looking merely at the in-
crease in real output and employment in the targeted sector.104 
The amount of capital available in an economy is fixed at any given point in time. A 
protectionist measure cannot immediately increase the total amount of capital; it can 
                                                
 
104 Smith states: “That this monopoly of the home-market frequently gives great encouragement to that particu-
lar species of industry which enjoys it, and frequently turns toward that employment a greater share of both the 
labor and stock of the society than would otherwise have gone to it, cannot be doubted. But whether it tends either 
to increase that general industry of the society, or to give it the most advantageous direction, is not, perhaps, alto-
gether so evident” (WN, IV.ii.2, p. 453). 
Chapter 2: The Classical Free Trade Theory 
-95- 
merely divert a part of it to the protected sector.105 This has a direct implication for 
evaluating policies that aimed to protect or promote certain industries or sectors. It is no 
longer sufficient to declare that an import tariff is beneficial for the economy simply 
because it increases the output and employment in a single sector; it is also necessary to 
take into consideration the probable negative effects on real output and employment in 
those sectors from which capital is artificially withdrawn. 
Smith believes that the increase in the output of the protected sector would be ob-
tained at the cost of decreasing the level of output and employment in other branches of 
the economy, first and foremost the export sectors that produces the commodities 
which are given in exchange for the imports. As a result, the most probable effect of any 
protectionist measure would be the exact opposite of the proposed objectives: 
“It is thus that every system which endeavours, either, by extraordinary encour-
agements, to draw towards a particular species of industry a greater share of the 
capital of the society than what would naturally go to it; or, by extraordinary re-
straints, to force from a particular species of industry some share of the capital 
which would otherwise be employed in it; is in reality subversive of the great pur-
pose which it means to promote. It retards, instead of accelerating, the progress of 
the society towards real wealth and greatness; and diminishes, instead of increasing, 
the real value of the annual produce of its land and labour” (WN, IV.ix.50; p. 687). 
By asserting which commodities should be produced at home, and which ones should 
be imported, government officials usurp an economic function usually carried out by 
private economic agents. The self-interests of these private economic agents, though, 
are in this particular area essentially compatible with the general interests of the society. 
Their own economic interest would require them to make investment decisions based 
on the classical rule of specialization, which is very favorable to the general goal of in-
creasing the wealth of the nation to the utmost. Smith states: 
“All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely 
taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its 
own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left 
perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his indus-
try and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men. The 
                                                
 
105 In Smith’s own words: “No regulation of commerce can increase the quantity of industry in any society 
beyond what its capital can maintain. It can only divert a part of it into a direction into which it might not other-
wise have gone; and it is by no means certain that this artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the 
society than that into which it would have gone of its own accord” (WN, IV.ii.3, p. 453). 
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sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform 
which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper 
performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; 
the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it to-
wards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society” (WN, IV.ix.51; 
p. 687). 
Having an accurate understanding and practical insight about the nature and function-
ing of the aristocratic English government of his time, it was impossible for Smith to 
believe in the myth that trade interventions were made on behalf of the general interest 
of the society. The real motive behind the recurrent and ubiquitous trade interventions 
was invariably to satisfy some private — one may say selfish — interests of powerful 
groups, mostly aristocratic landowners and rich merchants. They were the sponsors and 
only beneficiaries of the protectionist trade policies of the time. It is safe to assume that 
the English aristocratic politicians were not primarily concerned with the economic 
interests of the commoners. The English consumers, and in particular the poor, had to 
confront the economic hardships directly occasioned by these trade interventions. Smith 
criticizes this neglectfulness of the consumers’ legitimate interests: 
“Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of 
the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for pro-
moting that of the consumer. (...) But in the mercantile system, the interest of the 
consumer is almost constantly sacrificed to that of the producer; and it seems to 
consider production, and not consumption, as the ultimate end and object of all 
industry and commerce. In the restraints upon the importation of all foreign 
commodities which can come into competition with those of our own growth, or 
manufacture, the interest of the home-consumer is evidently sacrificed to that of 
the producer. It is altogether for the benefit of the latter, that the former is obliged 
to pay that enhancement of price which this monopoly almost always occasions” 
(WN, IV.viii.49-50, p. 660). 
The Wealth of Nations was foremost a political tract for the times. It was conceived by 
Smith as a specific attack on certain types of government polices which he was con-
vinced, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, operated against national prosperity, 
namely, bounties, duties and prohibitions in foreign trade; apprenticeship and settlement 
laws; legal monopolies; laws of succession hindering free trade in land. Smith’s primary 
objective was to secure the termination of these government policies. 
The unifying theme in the Wealth of Nations is the critique of human institutions based 
on whether or not they are so contrived as to frustrate man’s baser impulses and antiso-
cial proclivities and to make possible the pursuit of self-interest only in a socially 
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beneficial fashion. Government intervention had to be restrained, especially when it was 
possible to demonstrate that a particular government intervention, for example in inter-
national trade, was usually exercised on behalf of those vested interests which perverted 
the natural course of opulence. The basis of Smith’s harsh critique of the mercantile 
system lay in the fact that it enables merchants to better their condition in a manner that 
does not contribute to the nation’s economic wealth. Because of the dispensation of 
monopoly grants, of the arbitrary bestowal of “extraordinary privileges” and “extraordi-
nary restraints” upon different sectors of industry by the government, the individual 
merchant was able to enrich himself without at the same time enriching the nation. 
As a preliminary conclusion, it can be affirmed at this point that the classical case for 
free trade does not build nor depend on the general laissez-faire doctrine. Smith under-
mines what is ordinarily regarded as the main proposition of the laissez-faire doctrine — 
the proclaimed harmony of private self-interests with the general interests of the society, 
and the consequent belief in the perfect functioning of an unregulated capitalistic eco-
nomic system — by demonstrating that the natural order, when left to take its own 
course, in many respects works against, instead of for, the general interests of the socie-
ty. 
The classical case for free trade is rather based on an accurate analysis regarding the 
benefits and mutual gains from free international trade, as well as the selfish motives 
behind most trade interventions. The main benefit of foreign commerce is that it in-
creases the amount of commodities available in a country to the utmost. For an 
international exchange to be mutually beneficial, each country has to observe the classi-
cal rule of specialization, which states that it pays for a country to import commodities 
whenever the real costs of the exported commodities are lower than the estimated real 
costs of home production. 
That being said, it is important to realize that the contemporary case for free trade is 
fundamentally different from the one presented in this chapter. The mainstream interna-
tional trade theory currently behind the modern free-trade case is that of the neoclassical 
school of economic thought, which is essentially incompatible with classical political 
economy. The next chapter is dedicated to work out the main differences between the 
classical and neoclassical international trade theories. 
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3 The Neoclassical Case for Free Trade 
3.1 Classical vs. Neoclassical Framework of International Trade 
Neoclassical economists have usually coincided with classical political economists on 
the proposition that free trade is the most suitable commercial policy for achieving long-
term economic growth. This consensus between classical and neoclassical economists 
on international trade policy may explain why many contemporary economists consider 
the case for free trade as if it were based on a unified and consistent economic theory. If 
one takes a deeper look into the economic theory deployed by each school of economic 
thought in order to sustain the recommendation in favor of free trade, however, one 
may discover that these recommendations are based on different and mutually exclusive 
theoretical frameworks. 
Generally speaking, the main point of disruption between the classical and the neo-
classical school of economic thought consists in their competing theories of value and 
distribution. The theory of value and distribution of the neoclassical school of economic 
thought — also known as the general economic equilibrium paradigm — states, for 
example, that the relative or exchange value of a commodity is determined by its utility, 
whereas the main representatives of the classical school of economic thought — Smith, 
Ricardo and Marx — explicitly rejected the idea that the utility — or value in use — of a 
commodity determines its relative value. 
The general economic equilibrium paradigm is also the main theoretic framework de-
ployed by neoclassical economists for ruling out all sorts of government interventions in 
the economy, including the ones in international trade. This neoclassical reliance on the 
general economic equilibrium paradigm for rejecting government interventions in inter-
national trade has had far-reaching implications for the theoretical case in favor of free 
trade. In order to better understand these implications, it is necessary to explain with 
greater detail some other points of disruption between the classical and the neoclassical 
framework of international trade. 
To start with, it is important to realize that the classical case for free trade does not 
build upon nor rely on the general economic equilibrium paradigm for ruling out gov-
ernment intervention in international trade. As already been stated, Smith’s plea against 
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government intervention in international trade is based on the argument that free trade 
is by and large compatible with the general purpose of increasing the wealth of the soci-
ety to the utmost. Instead of proclaiming the intrinsic equilibrium of the unfettered 
market, Smith asserts an important but limited compatibility between private and social 
interests with regard to the decision on which commodities and services should be pro-
duced within national borders or otherwise imported.106 
The incorporation of the general economic equilibrium paradigm into mainstream in-
ternational trade theory is a consequence of the ascension to dominance of the theory of 
value and distribution promoted by the neoclassical school of economic thought. As a 
result, there has been a significant but rather subtle shift of focus in economic analysis 
with respect to the classical school of economic thought. According to classical political 
economy the most important decisions that individuals have to confront in the econom-
ic sphere are the choice of occupation and the level of specialization within the chosen 
occupation. These kinds of decisions are also known as the problem of economic organization, 
which essentially consist in finding the efficient level and pattern of the division of labor 
in order to reduce scarcity by trading off productivity gains against transaction costs. 
With the theoretical works of Carl Menger (2006)107, Leon Walras (1977)108 and Alfred 
Marshall (1920) oriented towards the demonstration of the existence of a general eco-
nomic equilibrium, though, the focus of economic analysis has been gradually shifted 
from the function of the price system in coordinating individual specialization to the 
function of the price system in allocating resources. The essence of the problem of resource 
allocation is to find the efficient quantities of different commodities, and the efficient 
quantities of factors dedicated to produce those commodities, for a given degree of 
scarcity (or a given transformation function) and a given pattern and level of the divi-
sion of labor (Yang, 2001, p. 10). 
Marshall in particular has been credited for successfully formalizing the problem of 
resource allocation in his Principles of Economics (1920). To accomplish the mathematical 
                                                
 
106 See Smith (WN, IV.ii, pp. 452ff.). 
107 First published in 1871. 
108 First published in 1874. 
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formalization, however, he had to assume a strict dichotomy between consumers’ deci-
sions and firms’ decisions in order to avoid inframarginal analysis of corner solutions 
(Yang, 2001, pp. 8-9). Assuming a strict dichotomy between consumers and firms 
means that consumers cannot choose the self-provision of any of the commodities that 
they demand, nor the level of specialization in producing them, but must buy all com-
modities from firms. Furthermore, it implies that consumers cannot survive in the ab-
absence of firms and the corresponding market system that link them to these firms. In 
Marshall’s framework, therefore, the existence of firms and markets are exogenously 
given. 
Despite the arbitrary nature of the above assumption, Marshall ’s dichotomy has been 
very popular among later economists, since it is an essential pillar for the formulation of 
the aggregated supply and demand functions, which are at the core of modern general 
economic equilibrium theory. On the intersection point of the aggregate supply func-
tions with the aggregate demand function it is said that the economy is in a state of 
equilibrium. 
For the required symmetry of the two opposite forces supply and demand, neoclassi-
cal economists had to define a law of supply in such a way that can be coordinated with 
the corresponding law of demand. For accomplishing this, they defined a supply curve 
based upon the laws of increasing and diminishing returns, whose origin can be traced 
back to classical political economy.109 In order to obtain the desired result, though, they 
had to introduce certain modifications in the original form of these laws of returns. 
Relatively little modification was necessary with regard to the law of diminishing returns, 
which merely required to be generalized from the particular case of land to every case 
where there is a constant quantity of a specific factor of production available. The law of 
increasing returns, though, had to be subjected to a much more radical transformation: 
the part played in it by the division of labor was greatly restricted, because the division 
                                                
 
109 In addition to that, Sraffa (1926, p. 537) points out that these laws of returns have been re-
moved from the positions they used to occupy according to the traditional partition of political 
economy — decreasing returns under the heading “distribution” and increasing returns under 
“production” —, and have been transferred to the chapter of “exchange value” in neoclassical 
economics. 
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of labor within a firm, which is rendered possible by an increase in the dimensions of an 
individual firm, was entirely abandoned, as it was regarded as incompatible with the 
assumption of perfect competition.110 Consequently, the core of classical economics 
concerning the crucial role of the division of labor in increasing the general level of 
productivity has been mostly relegated to footnotes in mainstream neoclassical econom-
ic theory. On the other hand, the importance of external economies was more and more 
emphasized — that is, of the advantage derived by individual producers from the 
growth, not of their own individual undertakings, but of the aggregate industry (Sraffa, 
1926, pp. 537-538). 
In classical political economy, by contrast, the law of increasing returns occupied a 
less prominent role in explaining increases in productivity. It was regarded merely as an 
important effect of the division of labor, and thus rather as a result of general economic 
progress than of an increase in the scale of production. Furthermore, the functional 
connection between cost and quantity produced — for which the neoclassical econo-
mists created the concept of economies of scale — was not given a prominent place in 
classical political economy.111 
The marginalization of the concept of division of labor within the neoclassical eco-
nomic theory is also due to the fact that firms — and not individuals — are the basic 
and only productive units in the neoclassical framework, and a firm’s productivity is 
primarily explained by its size. This can be easily demonstrated by analyzing the neoclas-
sical theory of production. In neoclassical textbooks a firm’s production is often 
expressed formally with the help of so-called production functions, which describe the 
relationship between inputs and outputs of a firm. The most important feature of this 
relationship is the connection between the scale of a firm’s operations and its productiv-
ity, whereas the scale of operation is defined by either the output size or the input size. 
In other words, the only variables involved in neoclassical production functions are 
output levels of commodities and input levels of production factors (capital and labor). 
Consequently, a firm’s productivity is determined solely by its size. Other contributing 
                                                
 
110 See Buchanan & Yoon (1999). 
111 See Sraffa (1926, p. 537) and Yang (2001, p. 43). 
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factors to a firm’s productivity like the level of specialization and division of labor of the 
individuals within the firm, or the level of specialization of this group of individuals with 
respect to the economic system in which the firm operates, are literally left out of the 
equation. Furthermore, variables that relate to the degree of interpersonal dependence, 
individuals’ levels of specialization, the level of division of labor in the firm or in society, 
and the related size of the market in determining the general level of productivity in the 
society, are also absent in these neoclassical production functions (Yang, 2001, p. 38). 
It is important to be aware of these crucial differences mentioned above between the 
classical and neoclassical framework when analyzing the critique of mainstream interna-
tional trade models since the 1980s, because these international trade models are 
implicitly built upon the neoclassical framework — not the classical framework. As it 
turned out, the neoclassical framework has important theoretical flaws, which conse-
quently have put into doubt the merits of the theoretic case in favor of free trade. 
3.2 Some Critical Remarks on the Neoclassical Framework of Inter-
national Trade 
As already pointed out, Marshall was able to formulate a mathematical solution for 
the problem of resource allocation by assuming a strict dichotomy between pure con-
sumers and pure producers (firms). The immediate consequence of this assumption is a 
switch of focus within the neoclassical framework from an individual producer to an 
artificial entity: the firm.112 At the first sight, such a switch of focus from individuals to 
firms may seem as a rather necessary and appropriate step for any modern economic 
theory, since nowadays the overwhelming part of the production and distribution of 
products and services is carried out by firms and not by individual producers. Further-
                                                
 
112 It is quite an irony that the basic productive unit in the general economic equilibrium para-
digm, whose ultimate purpose is to minimize or completely ban government intervention in the 
economy, is an artificial entity created by the very same government. Historically, individuals 
have produced and exchanged commodities and services well before the creation of the firm as 
an institution. After all, a firm is a legal entity that can only exist by laws sanctioned and en-
forced by a government entity, and therefore presupposes the existence of some sort of 
government. Individuals, however, have exchanged commodities and services well before the 
formation of States and governments. 
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more, the strict dichotomy between consumers and producers seems also supported by 
the empirical observation that consumers living in economically developed countries 
indeed do not produce by themselves but a very small percentage — if any — of the 
commodities and services of their daily consumption. To assume from this undisputed 
fact, however, that consumers cannot provide by themselves any of the commodities or 
services that they demand — which is a necessary implication of assuming a strict di-
chotomy between consumers and firms —, is obviously contrary to practical experience. 
Nowadays people living in developed countries usually specialize in a very limited range 
of economic activities and exchange the result of their labor for a wide range of prod-
ucts and services because by doing so, they can often consume a greater amount of 
commodities and services than with self-provision. A high level of individual specializa-
tion is generally regarded as beneficial for labor productivity — a main insight of 
Smith’s analysis regarding the division of labor in the Wealth of Nations —, but in most 
cases the decision regarding the extent of the specialization is still a matter of individual 
choice. 
Besides the arbitrary and unrealistic nature of assuming a strict dichotomy between 
consumers and producers, it has proven to be very harmful for the evolution of eco-
nomic thought. As Yang (2001, pp. 8-9) correctly points out, this dichotomy makes 
Marshall’s neoclassical framework incapable of explaining many interesting and im-
portant economic phenomena. These include, for example, the emergence of firms, 
cities, money, middlemen, business cycles, the hierarchical structure of transactions 
from the division of labor; the evolution of the extent of the market, productivity, com-
parative advantage, and trade dependency. 
In order to explain increases in productivity, the neoclassical framework relies instead 
rather exclusively on the concept of economies of scale. Marshall was probably aware of 
the limitations of the concept of economies of scale for explaining the gains in produc-
tivity that accrue as a result of the steady progress in the division of labor. After all, 
gains in productivity often result from factors that are external to an individual firm. 
Marshall tried to overcome this conceptual shortcoming by distinguishing between in-
ternal and external economies of scale. Internal economies of scale correspond to the 
ordinary definition of economies of scale; that is, a firm’s productivity goes up as its 
operation scale expands. External economies of scale imply that a firm’s productivity 
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goes up as the operation size of the industry or the size of the whole economy ex-
pands.113 
Despite their important role within the neoclassical framework, it is quite hard to find 
satisfactory definitions of external economies in the economic literature. As a matter of 
fact, external economies have turned out to be one of the most elusive concepts in eco-
nomic theory. It is agreed that they mean services — and disservices — rendered free 
— without compensation — by one producer (firm) to another; but there is no agree-
ment on the nature and form of these services or on the reasons for their being free. It 
is also agreed that external economies are a cause for divergence between private profit 
and social benefit and thus for the failure of perfect competition to lead to an optimum 
situation; but for this there are many reasons, and it is nowhere made clear how many 
and which of these reasons are subsumed under the heading of external economies 
(Scitovszky, 1954, p. 143). Moreover, it appears that the notion of external economies of 
scale involves a logical inconsistency, since economies of scale that are external to all 
firms are an empty economic box (Knight, 1925, p. 333). 
Compared to the classical analysis based on the division of labor, the neoclassical em-
phasis on economies of scale seems rather partial and insufficient for explaining the 
broader economic benefits of specialization. Gains in productivity that result from the 
progress of the division of labor cannot be fully explained by observing only the size of 
an individual firm or a particular industry. Important aspects like the progressive subdi-
vision and specialization of industries114, which should be considered external to an 
                                                
 
113 See Marshall (1920, p. 314). 
114 Allyn Young (1928, p. 537-538) brings up the following example of progressive subdivision 
and specialization of industries: “The successors of the early printers, it has often been observed, are not only 
the printers of to-day, with their own specialised establishments, but also the producers of wood pulp, of various 
kinds of paper, of inks and their different ingredients, of typemetal and of type, the group of industries concerned 
with the technical parts of the producing of illustrations, and the manufacturers of specialised tools and machines 
for use in printing and in these various auxiliary industries. The list could be extended, both by enumerating other 
industries which are directly ancillary to the present printing trades and by going back to industries which, while 
supplying the industries which supply the printing trades, also supply other industries, concerned with preliminary 
stages in the making of final products other than printed books and newspapers. I do not think that the printing 
trades are an exceptional instance, but I shall not give other examples, for I do not want this paper to be too 
much like a primer of descriptive economics or an index to the reports of a census of production. It is sufficiently 
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individual firm or industry but have an important effect of a firm’s productivity, are 
mainly left out. As Allyn Young (1928, p. 539) correctly points out, the use of the no-
tion of large-scale production misses the phenomenon of economies of division of 
labor, and “(…) the mechanism of increasing returns is not to be discerned adequately by observing the 
effects of variations in the size of an individual firm or of a particular industry, for the progressive divi-
sion of labor and specialization of industries is an essential part of the process by which increasing 
returns are realized.” 
Therefore, the distinction between internal and external economies necessarily implies 
a partial view of the nature of industrial production. Industrial operations, though, 
should be seen as an interrelated whole. Moreover, internal and external economies of 
scale are a rather limited and inadequate substitution for the economies of division of 
labor, which are emphasized in classical political economy.115 
Despite the intrinsic vagueness and limitation of the concept of external economies 
of scale, it has been very popular among neoclassical economists. The reason for this 
popularity has to be found in the usefulness of this concept for the general economic 
equilibrium paradigm, since internal economies of scale would lead to imperfect compe-
tition, which is said to be incompatible with a state of equilibrium. 
It is indeed a deep underlying belief, shared by all economists of the neoclassical 
school of economic thought, that the general economic equilibrium paradigm is the one 
and only starting point for any logically consistent explanation of the behavior of decen-
tralized economic systems. This belief sustained the theory despite the increasing — not 
diminishing — arbitrariness of its basic assumptions, which was forced upon its practi-
tioners by the ever more precise cognition of the needs of logical consistency. 
An enumeration and extensive analysis of each of these basic assumptions would lead 
too far away from the main subject of this thesis. It seems enough to state that unlike 
many scientific theories, where the basic assumptions are chosen on the basis of direct 
observation, the basic assumptions of general economic equilibrium paradigm are either 
                                                                                                                                     
 
obvious, anyhow, that over a large part of the field of industry an increasingly intricate nexus of specialised under-
takings has inserted itself between the producer of raw materials and the consumer of the final product.” 
115 Supply and demand can also be seen as the two sides of the division of labor. 
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of a kind that are unverifiable — such as that producers maximize their profits or con-
sumers maximize their utility — or of a kind which are directly contradicted by observa-
observation — for example, perfect competition, perfect divisibility, linear-homogenous 
and continuously differentiable production functions, wholly impersonal market rela-
tions, exclusive role of prices in information flows and perfect knowledge of all relevant 
prices by all agents and perfect foresight (Kaldor, 1972, p. 1238). 
Taken at its purest and most abstract level, the pretensions of general economic equi-
librium theory are modest enough. Although Debreu describes the subject matter of his 
book as “the explanation of the price of commodities resulting from the interaction of the agents of a 
private ownership economy”, it is clear that the term explanation is not used in the ordinary 
everyday sense of the term. It is intended in a purely logical and not in a scientific sense; 
in the strict sense, as Debreu himself states, the theory is logically entirely disconnected 
from its interpretation. It is not put forward as an explanation of how the actual prices 
of commodities are determined in particular economies or in the world economy as a 
whole.116 By the term explanation Debreu means a set of theorems that are logically de-
ducible from precisely formulated assumptions; and the purpose of the exercise is to 
find the minimum basic assumptions necessary for establishing the existence of an equi-
librium set of prices (and output/input matrixes) that is unique, stable, and satisfies the 
conditions of Pareto optimality. The scientific effort during the last decades has been 
oriented towards finding these minimum requirements, without any attempt at verifying 
the realism of those assumptions, and without any investigation of whether the resulting 
theory of equilibrium prices has any explanatory power or relevance in relation to actual 
prices. 
In terms of gradually converting Debreu’s “intellectual experiment” into a scientific 
theory — in other words, into a set of theorems directly related to observable phenom-
ena — the development of economic theory was one of continual digress, not progress: 
the ship appears to be much further away from the shore now than it appeared to its 
originators in the nineteenth century. The latest theoretical models, which attempt to 
construct an equilibrium path through time with all prices for all periods fully deter-
                                                
 
116 See Debreu (1959, p. vii). 
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mined at the start under the assumption that everyone foresees future prices correctly to 
eternity, require far more fundamental relaxations for their applicability than was thought 
to be involved in the original Walrasian scheme. The process of relaxing the unreal basic 
assumptions — also known as the process of “scaffolding” — has not yet started. In-
deed, the scaffolding gets thicker and more impenetrable with every successive 
reformulation of the theory, with growing uncertainty as to whether there is a solid 
building underneath (Kaldor, 1972, pp. 1238-1239). 
Yet the main conclusions of this increasingly abstract and unreal theoretical construct, 
as Kaldor critically observes, are also increasingly taken on trust — as if in the social 
sciences, unlike the natural sciences, the problem of verification could be passed over or 
simply ignored. Kaldor states: 
It is generally taken for granted by the great majority of academic economists that 
the economy always approaches, or is near to, a state of equilibrium; that equilibri-
um, and hence the near-actual state of the world, provides goods and services to 
the maximum degree consistent with available resources; that there is full and effi-
cient utilisation of every kind of resource; that the wage of every kind and quality 
of labour is a measure of the net contribution (per unit) of these varying kinds and 
qualities of labour to the total product; that the rate of profits reflects the net ad-
vantage of substituting capital for labour in production, etc., — all propositions 
which the pure mathematical economist has shown to be valid only on assump-
tions that are manifestly unreal — that is to say, directly contrary to experience and 
not just abstract. In fact, equilibrium theory has reached the stage where the pure 
theorist has successfully (though perhaps inadvertently) demonstrated that the 
main implications of this theory cannot possibly hold in reality, but has not yet 
managed to pass his message down the line to the textbook writer and to the class-
room (Kaldor, 1972, p. 1240). 
The general economic equilibrium paradigm has set the precedent for today’s ubiqui-
tous practice in mainstream economic theory of making arbitrary assumptions in order 
to obtain logical proofs, without taking into consideration the factual truth of these 
assumptions, or the further consequences which result from formulating a theory based 
on them. Therefore, the powerful attraction of the habits of thought engendered by 
equilibrium economics has turned into a major obstacle to the development of econom-
ic theory (Addleson, 1995). 
A direct consequence of adopting the general economic equilibrium paradigm as the 
main theory of value and distribution has been the marginalization and subsequent 
omission of any references to the classical labor theory of value in economic theory. 
This can be verified by analyzing the two traditional models of international trade, the 
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so-called Ricardian model and Heckscher Ohlin model, which are built upon the neoclas-
sical framework. From chronological as well as logical considerations, which will be 
evident to the reader later on, the starting point has to be the Ricardian model. 
3.3 Neoclassical Models of International Trade 
3.3.1 The “Ricardian” Model 
The concept of comparative advantage has occupied a prominent place within the 
neoclassical international trade theory. Neoclassical economists have taken over Ricar-
do’s proposition that a country would import a certain amount of a commodity 
although it can produce the same amount at lower real costs than the exporting country, 
converting it into the basic model of international trade, the so-called Ricardian model of 
international trade. 
Turning Ricardo’s demonstration of the above proposition into a neoclassical interna-
tional trade model amounts to a tour de force, which cannot be successfully accomplished 
without omitting the main purpose and altering the internal logic of the original numeri-
cal example. Thus, one should not be surprised to find out that the majority of 
neoclassical economists have carefully avoided quoting directly from the Principles, alt-
hough they have kept crediting Ricardo for the formulation of comparative advantage. 
Obviously, they have felt quite uncomfortable with the original numerical example. An-
other indication for the troubles that the neoclassical economists have had with 
Ricardo’s propositions is that there is no standardized and generally accepted definition 
of comparative advantage in neoclassical textbooks. Having said that, let us blank out 
for a moment section 2.4 of this doctoral thesis and present the Ricardian model of in-
ternational trade without any critical references first, leaving the necessary critique for 
the aftermath. 
One can find many variations of the Ricardian model in modern economic textbooks. 
While most textbook authors neither quote directly from the Principles nor use Ricardo’s 
original numbers, a few of them formulate numerical examples that come very close to 
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the original.117 In either case, though, the numbers are always defined as labor costs 
necessary for producing a single unit of the commodities traded in the respective coun-
tries. 118 This unitary labor costs are supposed to remain constant regardless the amounts 
of the commodities produced. Because the subsequent analysis is meant to be valid for 
every version of the Ricardian model, it might be useful to use parameters instead of 
specific numbers. The following example is taken from Ruffin (2002). 
There are two countries, home and foreign, that produce commodities 1 and 2 (for-
eign quantities are designated by an asterisk). The two commodities are produced by a 
single factor of production, labor, and each unit of commodity i requires ai (ai*) units of 
labor in the home (foreign) country, which stays constant regardless the amount of 
goods produced. There is perfect mobility of labor between industries in the same coun-
try, but immobility of labor between countries. The relative cost of commodity 1 is 
cheaper in the home country, so that a1/a2 < a1*/a2*. Let pi be the world price of good i 
in some imaginary world currency. 
Since 1/ai is the output of one unit of labor, the value of that output is simply pi/ai , 
which represents the earning of the worker per unit of labor. If there were no interna-
tional trade, both commodities would have to be produced at home and workers would 
allocate themselves so that earnings were the same in both occupations, that is, p1/a1 = 
p2/a2. The simple labor theory of Smith and Ricardo holds in autarky. 
But with international trade, and the prices of the two goods being the same every-
where (tariffs or transport costs are ruled out), it must be that: 
a1/a2 ! p1/p2 ! a1*/a2* (1) 
                                                
 
117 See Caves et al. (1993), Kenen (1994) and Krugman & Obstfeld (2000) for the first approach, 
Haberler (1936), Viner (1937) and Dunkley (2004) for the second approach. 
118 For example, Gottfried Haberler (1936, p. 128) begins his analysis of the theory of compara-
tive cost by asserting the following: ‘‘In chapter VII of his Principles he [Ricardo] gives the following 
celebrated example: In England a unit of cloth costs 100 and a unit of wine 120 units of labour; in Portugal a 
unit of cloth costs 90 and a unit of wine 80 units of labour.’’ Jacob Viner (1937, p. 445) presents a table 
containing the same four numbers, described as the amounts of “labor required for producing a 
unit” of cloth and wine in UK and Portugal. 
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If (1) were not true, for example p1/p2 < a1/a2 < a1*/a2*, than it follows that in both 
countries p1/a1 < p2/a2 and p1/a1* < p2/a2*. In that case, however, workers in both coun-
tries would migrate to the industry that produces the commodity 2, because they can 
earn more money than in industry 1. As long as commodity 1 is demanded, its price 
would have to rise relative to commodity 2 until the inequality (1) is reestablished. 
When (1) holds, it always pays the home country to produce the commodity 1 and the 
foreign country to produce commodity 2 because workers move to the high-paying 
industry. If the price ratio is strictly in between the two labor-cost ratios, both countries 
will be completely specialized. 
This is a succinct formulation of the Ricardian model that can be found in any modern 
economic textbook. It explains the commodity composition of international trade by a 
single cause: persistent differences in the productivity of labor between nations, which 
are the result of employing different production technologies. These technological dif-
ferences are supposed to be persistent, because the unitary labor costs in the two 
countries differ and are assumed to remain constant.119 
The assumption of persistent technological differences between countries seems to 
suggest either that there are cultural barriers that preclude the less developed country 
from emulating the productive techniques of the advanced country, or that the later can 
effectively prevent the emulation of its technological advantages by other countries. 
Both explanations for the persistency of technological differences between countries 
may be valid in the short run, but they are not particularly convincing in the long run. 
One may find plenty of historical examples where a backward country initially copies 
and later improves the production technologies of advanced countries. Japan, the se-
cond largest economy after the United States, is probably the best example in recent 
economic history. 
                                                
 
119 This neoclassical version of comparative advantage is firmly established even in the minds of 
scholars who have been critical to the neoclassical paradigm. For example, Blaug (1993, p. 185) 
affirms: “Ricardo found the cause of foreign trade in the relative immobility of capital across national frontiers 
and he explained the commodity composition of world trade by persistent differences in the productivity of labor 
between nations; by assuming that relative commodity prices vary proportionally with relative labor costs, he 
showed that free trade will cause each country to export those goods in which it possessed a comparative price 
advantage and that such trade will result in mutual gains as compared to a state of self-sufficiency.” 
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Moreover, singling out technological differences as the only cause for international 
trade has an important limitation: it cannot explain trade between national economies 
that are at the same level of economic development. With countries achieving similar 
levels of economic development and technological differences among them eroding 
over time, the single cause for international trade according to the Ricardian model 
would disappear and the national economies would become autarkies with no reason to 
trade with each other. 
These problems associated with the Ricardian model of international trade have led to 
the formulation of a genuine neoclassical model of comparative advantage: the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model (H-O model). This international trade model owns its academic 
reputation to the fact that it offers an alternative explanation for international trade. 
Instead of technological differences, the H-O model indentify the differences in factor 
endowments as the primary cause for international trade, assuming that the production 
technology is identical everywhere. A brief overview of the H-O model will be given in 
the following section. 
3.3.2 The Heckscher-Ohlin Model 
3.3.2.1 Antecedents and Assumptions 
The Heckscher-Ohlin model (H-O model) was first sketched by Swedish economist 
Eli Heckscher in a seminal 1919 article, and later refurbished and expanded by his stu-
dent Bertil Ohlin in Interregional and International Trade (1967).120 In its present form, 
though, the H-O model is the result of several articles published by Samuelson in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s.121 Therefore, it is sometimes called the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson model. The standard Heckscher-Ohlin model contains two countries that 
produce two commodities employing two homogenous factors of production. There-
fore, some authors refer to it as the 2 x 2 x 2 model. 
                                                
 
120 The book was originally published in 1933. 
121 See, for example, Samuelson (1948; 1949).  
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The H-O model has several assumptions in common with the Ricardian model, for 
example, constant return to scale and perfect factor mobility within a country. The later 
means that capital and labor can be redeployed to produce different commodities, and 
this is supposed to happen at no cost. But the H-O model departs from the Ricardian 
model in two important aspects: 1) it incorporates capital as the second factor of pro-
duction; and 2) it assumes that the production technologies for the two commodities are 
identical in both countries. The subsequent analysis will be centered on the second dif-
ference, while the first disparity will be omitted at this point. 
The H-O model differs from the Ricardian model most drastically by assuming that 
the production functions available in each country are identical, which means that pro-
ducing the same output of either commodity could be done with the same technology — 
i.e., the same proportion of labor and capital — in either country. The H-O model as-
sumes that the only difference between countries is the relative abundances of labor and 
capital. 
Factor endowment in a country is defined by the ratio of capital (K) to labor (L). If 
the capital-labor ratio in the home country (h) is greater than in a foreign country (f), the 
home country is said to be relatively capital-abundant (and labor-scarce), while the for-
eign country is labor abundant (and capital-scarce). This can be stated as 
(K/L) h > (K/L) f (1) 
The production of the two commodities is said to require different factor propor-
tions. The production of commodity y is relatively capital-intensive and commodity x is 
relatively labor-intensive if the capital-labor ratio used for producing y is higher.  
(K/L) y > (K/L) x (2) 
For example, developed countries have a comparatively high ratio of capital to labor 
in relation to developing countries. This makes the developed country capital-abundant 
relative to the developing country, and the developing country labor-abundant in rela-
tion to the developed country. Based on these assumptions, economists have derived 
four theorems of the H-O model, which will be presented in the next section. 
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3.3.2.2 The Four Theorems of the H-O Model 
The H-O model culminates in what is now generally known as the Heckscher-Ohlin the-
orem (HOT) of the pattern of international trade: a country exports those commodities 
whose production entails an intensive use of the country’s relatively abundant factor of 
production and imports the commodities whose home production would entail an in-
tensive use of the country’s relatively scarce factor of production.122 
According to the HOT, relative endowments of labor and capital determine a coun-
try’s comparative advantage in certain commodities. Countries have a comparative 
advantage in those commodities for which the required factors of production are rela-
tively abundant locally. This is because the commodity prices are ultimately determined 
by the input prices. Therefore, commodities that require inputs that are locally abundant 
will be cheaper to produce than those commodities that require inputs that are locally 
scarce. For example, a country where capital and land are relatively abundant but labor 
is scarce will have a comparative advantage in producing commodities that require a 
high amount of capital and land, but little labor. Labor-intensive commodities on the 
other hand will be very expensive to produce since labor is scarce and its price is high. 
Therefore, the country is better off importing those commodities. 
From the HOT have emerged three related corollaries that describe the responsive-
ness of output and factor prices to changes in output prices and factor supplies. The 
Polish economist Tadeusz Rybczynski stated a corollary of the HOT in a paper pub-
lished in 1955, whose purpose was to investigate the effect of an increase in the quantity 
of a factor of production upon production, consumption and the terms of trade, thus 
linking outputs to factor supplies under given output prices and full employment 
(Rybczynski, 1955, p. 336). 
The Rybczynski theorem states that “(...) the maintenance of the same rates of substitution in 
production after the quantity of one factor has increased must lead to an absolute expansion in produc-
tion of the commodity using relatively much of that factor, and to an absolute curtailment of production 
of the commodity using relatively little of the same factor” (Rybczynski, 1955, pp. 337-338). Fur-
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thermore, this leads to a worsening in the terms of trade or the relative price of the 
commodity using relatively much of the factor whose quantity has increased.123 
Paul Samuelson and Wolfgang Stolper derived another theorem from within the 
framework of the H-O model back in 1941. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem describes a 
relation between factor prices — i.e. real wages and real returns to capital — and output 
prices, holding fixed factor supplies. The theorem states that — under some economic 
assumptions — a rise in the relative price of a commodity will lead to a rise in the return 
to that factor which is used most intensively in the production of this commodity, and 
conversely, to a fall in the return to the other factor. 
Worried that their theorem could be served as an argument in favor of protection, 
Stolper and Samuelson (1941, p. 73) state: 
“We are anxious to point out that even in the two factor case our argument pro-
vides no political ammunition for the protectionist. For if effects on the terms of 
trade can be disregarded, it has been shown that the harm which free trade inflicts 
upon one factor of production is necessarily less than the gain to the other. Hence, 
it is always possible to bribe the suffering factor by subsidy or other redistributive 
devices so as to leave all factors better off as a result of trade.” 
As first presented by Stolper and Samuelson, the theorem was obtained under very 
restrictive assumptions. However, subsequent theoretical work has shown that essential 
features of the theorem hold much more generally. For example, Jones and Scheinkman 
(1977) show that with many goods and factors, a tariff change will always raise the real 
return of at least one factor and lower the real return of at least one other factor. This 
generalization of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem does not contradict the basic predic-
tion of international trade theory that economies facing fixed world prices will gain 
overall from tariff reductions. However, it highlights the potential for distributional 
conflict over trade policy. Unless compensation for income losses is actually paid, there 
are always both winners and losers from any change in trade policy.  
Another key assumption is that all factors are fully mobile between sectors. Relaxing 
this for one of the two factors in the simplest case yields the specific-factors model, which 
provides an illuminating contrast with the Heckscher-Ohlin model. In line with the gen-
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eral results of the last paragraph, protection continues to raise the real return of one 
factor, the one specific to the import-competing sector, and to lower the real return of 
another factor, that specific to the export sector. However, its effect on the real return 
of the mobile factor is now ambiguous. The specific-factors model can also be viewed 
as depicting a short-run equilibrium. Over time, the specific factors lose their distinc-
tiveness and become intersectorally mobile, so the Stolper-Samuelson predictions are 
restored.124 
Among many applications, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem has been used to address 
the trade-and-wages debate. This asks to what extent globalization in general, and in-
creased imports from low-wage countries in particular, are responsible for widening the 
differential between skilled and unskilled wages in developed countries. The original 
Heckscher-Ohlin model was a two-factor model with a labor market specified by a sin-
gle number. Therefore, the early versions of the theorem could make no predictions 
about the effect on the unskilled labor force in a high-income country under trade liber-
alization. However, more sophisticated models with multiple classes of worker 
productivity have been shown to produce the Stolper-Samuelson effect within each 
class of labor: Unskilled workers producing traded goods in a high-skill country will be 
worse off as international trade increases, because, relative to the world market in the 
good they produce, an unskilled first world production-line worker is a less abundant 
factor of production than capital. The results of these models are consistent with a wid-
ening differential, though most authors have preferred to explain the fall in demand for 
unskilled labor by skill-biased technological progress. 
Finally, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is closely linked to the factor-price-equalization 
theorem (FPET), which is the third corollary of the HOT. The FPET states that under a 
number of special conditions125, and regardless of international factor mobility, factor 
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125 According the Blaug (1993, p. 186), these assumptions are: perfect competition, zero 
transport costs, incomplete specialization, identical linearly homogeneous production functions, 
identical homothetic preferences, absence of external economies, constant relative factor inten-
sities at all relative factor prices, factors homogeneous in quality, and the number of factors no 
greater than the number of commodities. 
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prices will tend to equalize across countries that do not differ in technology.126 Thus, 
this theorem deals with the responsiveness of factor prices to factor supplies, holding 
fixed output prices. 
After having briefly sketched the main theoretical models and theorems that form the 
neoclassical case for free trade, I will proceed with a critique of the neoclassical theory in 
the following section. The starting point will be a comparison between the Ricardian 
model and Ricardo’s original propositions on international trade. 
3.4 A Critique of the Neoclassical Models of International Trade 
3.4.1 Ricardo versus the Ricardian  Model 
To begin with, it is important to realize that one always has to distinguish between the 
Ricardian model and what Ricardo really wrote in chapter 7 of the Principles, taking the 
later as the original and the former merely as a rational reconstruction (Blaug, 1999) of Ri-
cardo’s thoughts by others. Following this crucial distinction, it is rather easy to 
recognize that the Ricardian model departs in key aspects — main purpose, logical con-
struction, assumptions and implications — from Ricardo’s numerical example in 
chapter 7 of the Principles. Lets start with the disparity regarding the main purposes be-
tween the Ricardian model and the original numerical example. 
First and foremost, the Ricardian model omits any reference to the main purpose of 
Ricardo’s numerical example, which is to prove the new proposition that the labor theo-
ry of value does not determine international prices when the factors of production are 
immobile between countries. Instead, the Ricardian model concentrate on proving a 
corollary of this proposition — i.e. that a country might import a certain amount of 
cloth from another country although the former has a real labor cost advantage over the 
later in producing the amount of the commodity traded at home — without making any 
                                                
 
126 Stolper and Samuelson (1941, p. 59) state: “And as a result of the shift towards increased production 
of those goods in which the abundant factors predominate, there will be a tendency — necessarily incomplete — 
towards an equalization of factor prices between the two or more trading countries. It is clear that the equalization 
is only partial because otherwise we would be involved in the contradiction that differences in comparative cost 
would disappear, and there would be no trade.” 
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reference to the labor theory of value. Without this reference to the main proposition, 
though, the corollary highlighted in the Ricardian model seems counterintuitive and ra-
ther difficult to understand. 
As a consequence of this omission, it is hard to grasp the rigorous logic and elegance 
of Ricardo’s proof. The starting point of Ricardo’s original numerical example is a spe-
cific exchange that is already taken place between England and Portugal. The labor 
quantities required for the production of the traded commodities in the respective coun-
tries are chosen in accordance with the classical rule for specialization, so that both 
countries have an interest, independently from each other, in the exchange of English 
cloth for Portuguese wine, because it enables each country to save a specific amount of 
labor. The exchange featured in Ricardo’s numerical example, though, clearly contra-
dicts the labor theory of value, because England is giving the output of a 100 men’s 
labor in exchange for the output of only 80 Portuguese. However, this should not be 
seen as a problem, because the non-appliance of the labor theory of value in interna-
tional trade when labor is immobile between countries is precisely the main proposition 
that Ricardo wants to prove with the numerical example. This also explains why he only 
takes into consideration the real labor costs of producing cloth and wine in the respec-
tive countries, abstracting from the costs of the other factors of production. 
In the Ricardian model, as already pointed out, the exclusive emphasis is given on the 
corollary while omitting any reference to the main proposition regarding the labor theo-
ry of value. As a result of this omission, later economists have found it rather difficult to 
grasp the theoretical antecedents and logical fundaments of Ricardo’s numerical exam-
ple. The usual reaction — starting with John Stuart Mill — has been to reprimand 
Ricardo for his careless and defective demonstration, and to try to correct the alleged im-
perfections of the numerical example. Consequently, Ricardo’s rigorous and elegant yet 
simple proof of chapter seven of the Principles has been “corrected” and “enriched” with 
a different logical construction and additional assumptions that later on have proven to 
be very problematic for the free-trade case. 
In terms of logical construction, the main difference between Ricardo’s numerical ex-
ample and the Ricardian model is that in the later the four numbers are defined as unitary 
real labor costs of producing cloth and wine in the respective countries, while in the 
former they are defined as the labor necessary to produce the amounts of the commodi-
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ties actually traded. Consequently, Ricardo starts with the terms of trade, whereas in the 
Ricardian model the terms of trade are not explicitly specified. 
The logical construction followed in the Ricardian model has led to a confusion re-
garding the relevant cost comparison for international specialization, since the relevant 
cost comparison in the Ricardian model appears to be the unitary labor costs of the same 
commodity in the respective countries. For Ricardo, though, the relevant cost compari-
son for international specialization is always the one between home production and 
importing, in correspondence with the classical rule for specialization. 
Furthermore, the logical construction followed in the Ricardian model requires sever-
al assumptions, which are not necessary in Ricardo’s numerical example. An immediate 
implication of taking unitary labor costs as the basis for the numerical example is the 
logical requirement of assuming constant labor costs. The Ricardian model is heavily 
dependent on this assumption, because with variable unitary labor costs it would be very 
difficult to identify the most beneficial pattern of international specialization. 
Furthermore, in the Ricardian model it is assumed that there are no transportation 
costs. This assumption seems to be implicit in Ricardo’s numerical example as well, 
since there is no explicit reference to the cost of carrying the commodities from one 
country to the other in the original numerical example. Ricardo, however, abstracts from 
the transportation costs, which is quite different then assuming that there are no trans-
portation costs at all. One has to remember that Ricardo builds his numerical example 
on the amounts of cloth and wine currently traded between England and Portugal. This 
logical construction allows an abstraction from the costs of transportation, because they 
are usually included in the value of the commodities imported and exported. 
According to the logical construction of the Ricardian model, however, the assump-
tion of zero transportation costs is neither the result of an abstraction nor an omission 
but a consequence of assuming constant labor costs. Transportation costs per unit usu-
ally depend on the amount of the commodities transported: the more commodities are 
transported in a single lot, the less is the cost of transportation per unit. Therefore, tak-
ing into consideration the costs of transportation would infringe the constant labor cost 
assumption. The alternative option to assume that the transportation costs per unit also 
remain constant defies the most elementary notion of reality. 
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Finally, the Ricardian model also assumes perfect internal mobility of the factors of 
production. It has often been said that the classical political economists — first and 
foremost Smith and Ricardo — considered that the factors of production would move 
to the production of other commodities smoothly enough so that the costs of free trade 
would not outweigh the benefits. A careful consultation of the Wealth of Nations and the 
Principles proofs that neither Smith nor Ricardo ever assumed perfect internal mobility of 
the factors of production. On the contrary, they were quite concerned about the nega-
tive consequences — capital may have sunk (irrecoverable) costs and workers may find 
it hard to get new jobs at equivalent pay — of any sudden short-term adjustment in 
international trade, advocating protection on a temporary basis.127 Ricardo, for example, 
states: 
From contingencies of this kind, though in an inferior degree, even agriculture is 
not exempted. War, which in a commercial country, interrupts the commerce of 
States, frequently prevents the exportation of corn from countries where it can be 
produced with little cost, to others not so favourably situated. Under such circum-
stances an unusual quantity of capital is drawn to agriculture, and the country 
which before imported becomes independent of foreign aid. At the termination of 
the war, the obstacles to importation are removed, and a competition destructive 
to the home-grower commences, from which he is unable to withdraw, without 
the sacrifice of a great part of his capital. The best policy of the State would be, to 
lay a tax, decreasing in amount from time to time, on the importation of foreign 
corn, for a limited number of years, in order to afford to the home-grower an op-
portunity to withdraw his capital gradually from the land. In so doing, the country 
might not be making the most advantageous distribution of its capital, but the 
temporary tax to which it was subjected, would be for the advantage of a particular 
class, the distribution of whose capital was highly useful in procuring a supply of 
food when importation was stopped. If such exertions in a period of emergency 
were followed by risk of ruin on the termination of the difficulty, capital would 
shun such an employment. Besides the usual profits of stock, farmers would ex-
pect to be compensated for the risk which they incurred of a sudden influx of 
corn; and, therefore, the price to the consumer, at the seasons when he most re-
quired a supply, would be enhanced, not only by the superior cost of growing corn 
at home, but also by the insurance which he would have to pay, in the price, for 
the peculiar risk to which this employment of capital was exposed. Notwithstand-
ing, then, that it would be more productive of wealth to the country, at whatever 
sacrifice of capital it might be done, to allow the importation of cheap corn, it 
                                                
 
127 See, for example, Smith (1776, I, p. 491). 
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would, perhaps, be advisable to charge it with a duty for a few years (Vol. I, p. 266-
268).128 
Taking into account these significant differences in terms of main purpose, logical 
construction and assumptions between Ricardo’s original numerical example and the 
Ricardian model, it seems natural to expect different theoretical implications as well, for 
example, regarding the extent of the specialization. The Ricardian model implies, of 
course, complete specialization by each trading partner according to its comparative 
advantage. Yet Ricardo himself explicitly refers in a note to partial specialization: 
“It will appear then, that a country possessing very considerable advantages in ma-
chinery and skill, and which may therefore be enabled to manufacture commodities 
with much less labor than her neighbors, may, in return for such commodities, im-
port a por t ion  of the corn required for its consumption, even if its land were more 
fertile, and corn could be grown with less labor than the country from which it was 
imported” (Vol. I, p. 136ff.; emphasis added). 
According to Ricardo, even if a country were much more advanced in manufacturing 
than its neighbors, it would still satisfy part of its national demand for corn by home 
production. What does complete specialization actually mean when applying the classical 
rule for specialization? It means that a country following a free trade policy would end 
up completely specialized in the production and exportation of a single type of com-
modity, for example cloth. It would do so if, by exporting cloth, it could procure all 
other commodities demanded by its residents at lower real costs than by producing 
them internally. Therefore, complete specialization is a very unlikely outcome of free 
trade, theoretically possible only for a scarcely populated country. 
Finally, the Ricardian model explains international specialization and the commodity 
composition of international trade by a single exogenous cause: persistent differences in 
labor productivity among countries. Ricardo, however, explains the benefits of interna-
tional specialization and the actual commodity composition of international trade by the 
gains in labor productivity in the home country, and explicitly mentions several sources 
                                                
 
128 Ricardo’s analysis, for example, fits quite well to the situation faced by many Latin American 
manufacturers after the termination of WW I, when they had to confront increased competition 
from European manufacturers. 
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— not a single source as the Ricardian model — for having a comparative advantage in 
the production of certain commodities.129 
Taking into consideration all these significant differences between the Ricardian model 
and Ricardo’s original numerical example, the continued association of this international 
trade model with Ricardo’s name seems highly misleading und unjustified. The so-called 
Ricardian model of international trade has actually very little in common with the main 
purpose and logical construction of the numerical example which can be found in chap-
ter 7 of the Principles. Consequently, the current denomination should be dismissed and 
replaced by a more appropriate one, for example the Constant Unitary Labor Costs Model 
(CULC), which highlights the main features of this theoretical model of international 
trade, or (John Stuart)-Mill’s model of international trade, which directly refers to the 
original misinterpreter of Ricardo’s numerical example. 
Many neoclassical trade theorists have propagated a misinterpretation of Ricardo’s 
numerical example under a misleading label. For any supporter of the general equilibri-
um paradigm, John Stuart Mill’s misunderstanding of the main purpose and logical 
construction of Ricardo’s numerical example is indeed very convenient, because the 
original numerical example refers directly to the labor theory of value, which is of 
course the Ricardian theory of value and distribution — the rival and very opposite of 
general equilibrium economics. That is precisely why many neoclassical economists may 
still appreciate Mill’s incorrect restatement of Ricardo’s numerical example. Neverthe-
less, it seems inaccurate to regard the CULC model as a neoclassical international trade 
model, since John Stuart Mill is usually considered to be a member of the classical 
school of economic thought. Consequently, any critique of neoclassical models of inter-
national trade should be mainly concentrated on the H-O model, which is a genuine 
neoclassical model of international trade. 
                                                
 
129 Ricardo states: “It is quite as important to the happiness of mankind, that our enjoyments should be in-
creased by the better distribution of labour, by each country producing those commodities for which by its situation, 
its climate, and its other natural and artificial advantages, it is adapted, and by their exchanging them for the 
commodities of other countries, as that they should be augmented by a raise in the rate of profits” (Vol. I, p. 
132). 
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3.4.2 Some Critical Remarks on the Heckscher-Ohlin Approach 
The great tragedy of Science — the slaying of a beautiful 
hypothesis by an ugly fact. 
Thomas H. Huxley 
A scholar familiar with what is branded nowadays as the Heckscher-Ohlin model of 
international trade will be quite surprised when actually reading the main works of Eli 
Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin. To begin with, the scholar will not find in the original 
works the precise two-by-two model, which has been extracted and distilled from the 
writings of Heckscher and Ohlin by other scholars. The genuine economic theory of the 
two Swedish economists is mainly verbal, whereas today’s standard version of the H-O 
model has a high degree of mathematical formalization. Furthermore, as Flam and 
Flanders point out (1991), of the four theorems currently associated with the H-O mod-
el, only two are explicitly stated in the original writings: (1) the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theorem; and (2) the factor-price equalization theorem. This second theorem, however, 
is announced but only to be refuted on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Accord-
ing to Flam and Flanders (1991), neither the Stolper-Samuelson nor the Rybczynski 
theorems are spelled out in the original writings of Heckscher and Ohlin. 
More importantly, Ohlin’s steady concern about being realistic and incorporating real-
world features into his economic theory is completely absent in the standard version of 
the H-O model. On the contrary, the H-O model relies heavily on assumptions which 
Ohlin himself has repeatedly criticized in his writings. The H-O model, for example, 
assumes complete intracountry mobility and total intercountry immobility of factors of 
production, although Ohlin explicitly rejected both assumptions because he considered 
them to be unrealistic.130 According to him, neither total immobility nor perfect mobility 
of the factors of production was an appropriate assumption; the real world is to be de-
scribed in terms of partial mobility of the factors of production within as well as 
between countries. Moreover, the H-O model also assumes constant returns to scale, 
while Ohlin considered economies of scale to be a major factor in explaining interna-
                                                
 
130 See Heckscher and Ohlin (1991, pp. 115 ff.). 
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tional trade. In fact, he ranked economies of scale as equal in importance to differences 
in factor endowments.131 
I have just mentioned the most evident differences between the original writings of 
Heckscher and Ohlin, on the one hand, and the standard version of the H-O model, on 
the other. With the appropriate amount of time and dedication, it is possible to bring to 
light some additional differences.  Due to this significant level of divergence between 
the H-O model and the original writings of Heckscher and Ohlin, an accurate critical 
review would require as a prerequisite to draw a clear line of separation between the 
two, but such an endeavor is beyond the scope of this doctoral thesis. 
Despite the significant differences, the H-O model and the original writings of 
Heckscher and Ohlin share a common theoretical approach towards international trade, 
which can be denominated as the Heckscher-Ohlin approach. Two general elements of this 
approach can be easily identified: (1) the critique and rejection of the classical theory of 
international trade, and, consequently, the aspiration of formulating an alternative to this 
theory; and (2) its close association with the general economic equilibrium paradigm. 
The following critical remarks will be centered on these two elements of the Heckscher-
Ohlin approach.132 
The Heckscher-Ohlin approach to international trade has often been presented as an 
important innovation with respect to the classical theory of international trade, particu-
larly to Ricardo’s comparative-advantage insight. However, if Heckscher’s alleged 
innovation consists of attributing disparities in comparative costs to dissimilarities in 
factor endowments rather than to innate and unchanging differences in labor productiv-
ity — as highlighted in the CULC-model —, it might be regarded as an innovation with 
                                                
 
131 Ohlin states: “There are thus two causes of interlocal trade: (1) differences in endowments of productive 
factors and (2) the limited divisibility of these factors, that is, the advantages of large-scale production” 
(Heckscher & Ohlin, 1991, p. 83). See also Ohlin (1967, p. 73-74). 
132 This means that the well-known debates about the empirical validity of particular theorems 
of the H-O model will not be reproduced here. Leontief (1953) empirically proved that despite 
the USA being endowed with an abundance of capital, US imports were relatively more capital-
intensive than US exports, which is in contradiction with the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem (HOT) 
of the pattern of international trade. The tendency towards factor-price equalization has been 
challenged by James and Pearce (1951-1952). 
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respect to this particular model of international trade, but it can hardly be considered as 
a novelty with respect to Ricardo’s and Smith’s international trade theory, as Flam and 
Flanders (1991, p. 1) wrongly claim. Both Smith and Ricardo had clearly anticipated 
Heckscher’s brilliant idea133 regarding the importance of the differences in the relative fac-
tor supplies and relative factor prices for the determination of comparative advantage 
and the pattern of international trade.134 But instead of assuming the quantities and the 
productivity of resources to be static and exogenously given — as the Heckscher-Ohlin 
approach does —, the classical political economists were able to incorporate the longer-
run changes in factor supplies and their productivity into their analysis as the outcome 
of the two major forces of domestic economic development: capital accumulation and 
the division of labor (Myint, 1977, p. 232). Therefore, rather than as an innovation to 
classical international trade theory, Heckscher’s brilliant idea should be seen as an unequiv-
ocal proof of his misunderstanding of Ricardo’s comparative advantage insight. 
Ohlin did not only inherit the brilliant idea of his teacher Heckscher, but also his mis-
understanding of Ricardo’s comparative-advantage insight. This can be easily 
demonstrated by referring to Ohlin’s critique of the classical theory of international 
trade, where he gives credit first and foremost to John Stuart Mill for stating the propo-
sition that the labor theory of value does not apply to international exchanges, although 
it is the main proposition that Ricardo wanted to proof with his famous numerical ex-
ample.135 
Consequently, Ohlin fails to understand the specific role of the immobility-
assumption of the factors of production in Ricardo’s comparative-advantage insight. As 
already pointed out, Ricardo considers the relative difficulty by which the factors of 
production — capital and labor — move from one country to another as the main rea-
son why his labor theory of value does not regulate the relative value of the 
commodities exchanged between two or more countries in the same way as it regulates 
                                                
 
133 This denomination is taken from Flam and Flanders (1991, p. 1). 
134 Viner (1937, pp. 500-507), for example, explicitly recognizes the fact that this line of reason-
ing was not unknown to classical political economists. 
135 See Heckscher and Ohlin (1991, pp. 204 ff.) 
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the relative value of commodities within a country. If one day in the distant future both 
capital and labor would move between country borders in the same way as they already 
do within country borders, than Ricardo’s labor theory of value would regulate the rela-
tive value of all commodities, whether they have been produced in the same country or 
in different countries. 
Ohlin considers both the perfect internal mobility and the international immobility of 
factors of production as unrealistic assumptions. He is certainly right about this, but his 
critique of classical international trade theory on this subject is unfounded, since neither 
Ricardo nor Smith ever considered that the factors of production were perfectly mobile 
within a country but perfectly immobile between countries. Ironically, Ohlin’s critique 
does apply to the H-O model — the neoclassical model of international trade which 
carries his name —, because this model indeed assumes perfect mobility within the 
country and complete international immobility of the factors of production. 
The real innovative element of the Heckscher-Ohlin approach with respect to classi-
cal international trade theory consists in linking the current case for free trade to the 
general economic equilibrium paradigm. Whereas the attachment of the CULC-model 
to the general economic equilibrium paradigm can be induced from the persistent omis-
sion of the slightest reference to the labor theory of value, the close relationship 
between the Heckscher-Ohlin approach to international trade and the neoclassical theo-
ry of value and distribution is straightforward. After all, Ohlin repeatedly states that the 
main objective of his research effort is the formulation of an international trade theory 
that is independent from the classical labor theory of value.136 
                                                
 
136 Ohlin states in the preface to the first edition of his book Interregional and International Trade of 
1933 that he wants to make a contribution in order “(…) to build a theory of international trade in 
harmony with the mutual-independence theory of pricing — and thus independent of the classical labor theory of 
value” (Ohlin, 1967, p. ix). In the essay entitled “Reflections on Cotemporary International Trade Theo-
ries”, which Ohlin added as Appendix II to the revised edition of 1967, he states: “It still seems very 
obvious to me that the most natural and advantageous approach to international trade theory is to start from the 
mutual interdependence price theory that was developed in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The simplest 
form is probably the Walràs system as modified by Cassel” (Ohlin, 1967, p. 305). Flam and Flanders 
(1991, p. 13) credit Heckscher and Ohlin for bringing neoclassical price and distribution theory 
into international trade theory. 
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Moreover, it seems that the general aim of the so-called Ohlin-Samuelson research program 
is to reduce the case for free trade to a mere extension of the general economic equilib-
rium paradigm to international trade. If one can theoretically rule out any form of 
government intervention in the economy, as the supporters of general economic equi-
librium theory claim to have accomplished, then one has also ruled out government 
intervention in international trade. Therefore, the assessment of the Ohlin-Samuelson 
research program cannot be separated from the assessment of the wider Hicks-
Samuelson-Arrow-Debreu general economic equilibrium research program of which it 
forms an integral part.137 
As already pointed out, one of the weakest points of the general economic equilibri-
um paradigm consists of its failure to provide a satisfactory and straightforward 
explanation for increases in productivity and economic growth. This intrinsic weakness 
makes it the least suitable theoretic framework for an appealing case for free trade, 
which should be built upon the beneficial effects of international trade on the produc-
tive forces of labor and the economic growth of a country. Consequently, the 
Heckscher-Ohlin approach cannot integrate the dynamic advantages of international 
specialization and large-scale operations into its theoretical framework. It is a significant 
fact that economies of scale are regarded as an independent cause — rather than as an 
integral and interconnected cause — in Ohlin’s explanation of the pattern of interna-
tional trade, along with the relative scarcity of factors of production.138  
                                                
 
137 Thirty years after the publication of his celebrated book, Ohlin appears to recognize that his 
research effort has not led to the desired result: “In 1933 I still regarded the mutual interdependence 
model and the factor proportion model as the foundation of a huge building. All the upper floors in the building 
had to rest on this base. I now realize that one cannot construct such a building containing all the essential parts 
of the theory. This becomes most evident when development aspects are the subject of analysis. Yet it would be a 
mistake to assume that a number of different theoretical models without any natural contact or harmonious rela-
tion between them can be accepted as a satisfactory theoretical structure. It is a great merit if the strategic 
simplifications in each model can be made in such a way that a natural coherence between them becomes evident. 
In this respect I still maintain that a consistent price theory is superior to a conglomerate of price and real cost 
analysis of the neoclassical type” (Ohlin, 1967, p. 307). 
138 See Ohlin (1967, pp. 73-74). 
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The general economic equilibrium paradigm has not only promoted alternative theo-
retic models of international trade, but also a different benchmark for judging the merits 
of free trade, as the following section will show. 
3.5 The Neoclassical Benchmark for International Trade 
3.5.1 The Welfare Indicator 
Neoclassical economists often use a distinctive benchmark for evaluating the merits 
of alternative international trade policies; instead of the classical benchmark wealth or real 
national income, they prefer to measure the so-called welfare-effect of trade policy pro-
posals. The concept of welfare has been profoundly influenced by utilitarian economists 
such as Francis T. Edgeworth (1967)139, Alfred Marshall (1920) and Arthur C. Pigou 
(1960)140. The general aim of utilitarian welfare economics is to provide a general 
framework for testing the efficiency of economic institutions and public policies in making 
use of the productive resources of the society. This efficiency is judged in terms of the 
Pareto criterion. 
Under the Pareto criterion, an outcome is said to be more efficient if at least one per-
son is made better off and nobody is made worse off. Under ideal conditions, exchanges 
of commodities and services are supposed to be always Pareto efficient since individuals 
would not voluntarily entered into them unless they were mutually beneficial. In prac-
tice, however, exchanges are not always Pareto superior — or even voluntary for that 
matter. For example, an exchange may not be Pareto superior if it causes considerable 
external costs to a third party in the form of pollution. 
At the first look, the approach of blending considerations regarding economic effi-
ciency and distribution into a single indicator — as the Pareto criterion does —, appears 
to be a positive step forward in the development of economic analysis; after all, it seems 
legitimate to judge public policies in democratic societies not only in term of efficiency 
but also fairness in the sense that nobody should be left worse-off as a consequence of a 
                                                
 
139 First published in 1881. 
140 First published in 1920. 
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public policy change. The problem with regard to the Pareto criterion, though, is that it 
is basically impractical in the real world, since it is doubtful that there is a single eco-
nomic policy change that matches this criterion.141 
Later economists have proposed modifications to the Pareto criterion in order to 
make it operational. Kaldor states that an activity will contribute to Pareto optimality if 
the maximum amount the gainers are prepared to pay is greater than the minimum 
amount that the losers are prepared to accept (Kaldor, 1939). Hicks affirms that an ac-
tivity will contribute to Pareto optimality if the maximum amount the losers are 
prepared to offer to the gainers in order to prevent the change is less than the minimum 
amount the gainers are prepared to accept as a bribe to forgo the change (Hicks, 1939). 
The Hicks compensation test is from the losers’ point of view, while the Kaldor com-
pensation test is from the gainers’ point of view. 
After some technical problems with the Kaldor criterion and the Hicks criterion were 
discovered, they were combined into the Scitovsky criterion, more commonly known as 
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, which is supposed to eradicate these flaws. According to the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion, an outcome is said to be more efficient if those that are made 
better off could theoretically compensate those that are made worse off and lead to a 
Pareto optimal outcome. The key difference between the Pareto and the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion is the issue of compensation. Kaldor-Hicks does not require compensation to 
be actually paid, merely that the possibility for compensation exists, and thus does not 
necessarily make each party better off (or neutral). Thus, a more efficient outcome can 
in fact leave some people worse off. Pareto efficiency does require making each party 
better off (or at least no worse off). 
While every Pareto improvement is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement, most Kaldor-Hicks 
improvements are not Pareto improvements. This is because the set of Pareto im-
provements is a subset of Kaldor-Hicks improvement, which also reflects the greater 
flexibility and applicability of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion relative to the Pareto criterion. 
                                                
 
141 See Hicks (1939, p. 706): “Under private enterprise, any ordinary change in economic policy involves a 
change in the price-system, and any change in prices benefits those on one side of the market, and damages those 
on the other. Thus no simple economic reform can be a permitted reorganisation in our sense, because it always 
inflicts a loss of some sort upon some people.” 
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For example, in a society with two people, a farmer (F) and a manufacturer (M), sup-
pose initially that F has ! 100 and M ! 1000. Assume that some economic policy change 
results in a situation where F ends up with ! 200 and M with ! 999. This outcome 
would not be a Pareto improvement since M is now worse off, but it does satisfy the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion since F could theoretically pay M anywhere between 1 and 100 
Euros to accept the policy change. 
3.5.2 Critical Comments on the Welfare Indicator 
Taking welfare — instead of wealth — as the central indicator for judging the relative 
merits of alternative economic policies in general and international trade policies in par-
ticular has important consequences for the economic analysis. It implies, first and 
foremost, taking utilitarianism142 as the starting point for policy prescription.143 The neo-
classical theory of price determination and distribution is based on the concept of 
marginal utility.144 Neoclassical economists use the concept of utility in such constructs 
as the indifference curve, which plots the combination of commodities that an individu-
al or a society requires to maintain a given level of satisfaction. Individual utility and 
social utility can be construed as the dependent variable of a utility function — such as 
an indifference curve map — and a social-welfare function respectively. 
Judging the merits of a public policy change in terms of its potential consequences for 
individual utility and satisfaction opens the door for subjectivism and arbitrariness in 
economic analysis. Besides the speculative nature of any conjectures regarding the level 
of utility and satisfaction of an individual, it is not possible to compare the level of utility 
and satisfaction of two or more individuals, known as the problem of interpersonal compari-
                                                
 
142 The philosophic doctrine of utilitarianism sees the maximization of utility as a moral criterion 
for the organization of society. According to utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stu-
art Mill, society should aim to maximize the total utility of individuals, aiming for the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number. 
143 For the close relationship between the welfare economics and the utility theory, see Hicks 
(1939) and Sen (1979, 1999). 
144 Despite the neoclassical origin of utilitarian welfare economics, there have been some at-
tempts to associate this doctrine to classical political economy. Scitovszky (1941, p. 77), for 
example, suggests that classical economists also made welfare propositions like perfect competition, 
free trade and direct taxation. 
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sons of utility. Without introducing additional arbitrary assumptions like that of equal ca-
pacity for satisfaction, an economist is precluded from asserting that a public policy 
change — for example the repeal of the Corn Laws — would increase the general wel-
fare of the society.145 
The expected distributional effects of the repeal of the Corn Laws may be summa-
rized as follows: (i) it would immediately result in a reduction in the price of corn at 
home, so that the same money income will now represent a higher real income for con-
sumers; (ii) it would lead to a shift in the distribution of income, because the landlords’ 
real income will be lower than before, and the consumers’ real income will be higher. In 
their role as consumers the landlords may also benefit from a reduction in the price of 
corn, but their real income losses would be without any doubt higher compared to their 
pity gains as consumers, resulting in a net loss of real income. Therefore, the repeal of 
the Corn Laws would result into a welfare loss for landowners. 
Nevertheless, the repeal of the Corn Laws could be Pareto efficient if it is accompa-
nied by a corrective redistribution of income fully compensating the landowners, 
financed by a government tax on those who have been favored by the cheapening of 
corn. Regarding the distributional consequences of this measure, Kaldor (1939, p. 550) 
states: 
But it is always possible for the Government to ensure that the previous income-
distribution should be maintained intact: by compensating the “landlords” for any 
loss of income and by providing the funds for such compensation by an extra tax 
on those whose incomes have been augmented. In this way, everybody is left as 
well off as before in his capacity as an income recipient; while everybody is better 
off than before in his capacity as a consumer. For there still remains the benefit of 
lower corn prices as a result of the repeal of the duty. 
On the issue of whether or not the proposed compensation should be actually grant-
ed, Kaldor assumes a positivist point of view, declaring it a subject that is beyond the 
scope of a scientific economist: 
Whether the landlords, in the free-trade case, should in fact be given compensation 
or not, is a political question on which the economist, qua economist, could hardly 
pronounce an opinion. The important fact is that, in the argument in favour of free 
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trade, the fate of the landlords is wholly irrelevant: since the benefits of free trade 
are by no means destroyed even if the landlords are fully reimbursed for their loss-
es (Kaldor, 1939, pp. 550-551). 
Let’s analyze Kaldor’s claim that consumers are better off even after the government 
has granted compensation to the landlords. It seems not clear how consumers may ben-
efit from lower corn prices when the government decides to tax their incomes in order 
to provide full compensation to the landowners, effectively restoring the previous dis-
tribution of income. If that were the case, consumers would not profit from lower 
nominal corn prices, because their gains in terms of real income would be ultimately 
transferred to the landlords. That being said, it is true that free trade encourages the 
productive forces and the aggregate real income of the national economy, but this in-
crease-of-the-pie effect does not occur immediately after the repeal of an onerous duty. 
Besides this, Kaldor misses the fundamental issue that by the mere use of the welfare 
criterion for the evaluation of the distributional consequences of repealing the Corn 
Laws, the economist automatically concedes to the landlords — a privileged wealthy 
minority — the proper conceptual framework for justifying or legitimizing compensa-
tion, irrespective of the fact that this privileged group has previously benefited from the 
Corn Laws at the expense of the English consumer. In making the case to preserve the 
income distribution prior to the repeal of the Corn Laws, utilitarian welfare economics 
clearly favor the safeguarding of the status quo.146 Under the strictly classical analysis 
based on the concept of wealth — i.e. without the reliance on utilitarian welfare criteri-
on — it would be much harder to claim compensation for the landlords. Therefore, the 
main point of critique towards the utilitarian welfare criterion is that it is an instrument 
for legitimizing and preserving the status quo in international trade policy. 
The above analysis is actually an excellent example for proving that the proposed sep-
aration of positive and normative economics is ultimately based on an illusion. Allegedly 
positive economic theories generally favor a particular distribution of income. The label-
ing of these theories as positive is often merely a crude attempt to shield them from 
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criticism of undue partisanship. By separating “objective” positive economics from 
normative economic policy recommendations, positivist economists want the public to 
believe that the formulation of economic theories is always the result of a scientifically 
objective process, whereas the clash of material interests is strictly confined to the 
sphere of economic policy, an arena which the scientific economist should abstain from 
entering altogether. In the real world, though, the material interests of powerful groups 
leave their imprints in the formulation of economic theory, although these interests 
seldom manifest themselves in an evident way. This has to be expected, since any debate 
on economic policy is very much influenced by the underlying economic theory, which 
sets the general framework for the political dispute about feasible alternatives. Instead of 
abstaining from making economic policy recommendations that clearly favor the vast 
majority of the population, economists should be suspicious and ready to challenge the 
allegedly objective nature of many economic theories. 
Furthermore, by declaring that economists should abstain from making professional 
statements on issues affecting income distribution, positivists like Kaldor make the 
economists’ job both sterile and worthless. There is simply no point in soliciting the 
professional advice of an economic expert on a public-policy issue when the potential 
benefits of this policy change are universal and non-controversial, except in order to 
enlighten those brainless individuals who cannot even figure out what their true benefit 
really is. 
As a preliminary conclusion, it is possible to affirm that the classical and the neoclas-
sical cases for free trade are based on different and mutually exclusive theoretical 
frameworks and international trade models. In the few cases where the neoclassical the-
ory seems to build upon classical concepts and insights, one inevitably discovers that the 
classical concepts have been tergiversated and distorted in order to make them fit into 
the neoclassical framework. Furthermore, the neoclassical theory of international trade 
promotes the use of unrealistic assumptions which are absent in the classical theory of 
international trade. The two distinct approaches to international trade do not even share 
the same benchmark for judging the merits of a particular trade policy, as the present 
section has shown. 
Unfortunately, the current mainstream case for free trade is the one promoted by the 
neoclassical school of economic thought, based on international trade models with un-
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realistic assumptions. As a result, economists critical with respect to the merits of free 
trade have been able to successfully challenge the premises and main propositions of 
this mainstream case for free trade, diminishing the general support for free trade 
among scholars and the general public. In the next section the main arguments against 
free trade will be reviewed in the light of the reformulation of the classical case for free 
trade of chapter 2. 
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4 Some Arguments against Free Trade Revisited 
4.1 Reviewing the Assumptions of the Free-Trade Case 
For it is the premises of the free trader, not his conclusions, 
that have always been and always must be the object of 
any effective attack. 
Frank D. Graham 
Critics of free trade have often pointed out that the supporting theories and models 
rely heavily on unrealistic and arbitrary assumptions like perfect competition, constant 
returns to scale, no learning effects, full employment, small-country terms of trade, 
lump-sum compensation, the absence of externalities, internal mobility of factors and 
external immobility of factors, to name the most important ones. The failure of one, 
some or all of these assumptions would allegedly reduce the gains from trade and thus 
partially invalidate the case for free trade.147 
After having worked out the main differences between the classical and the neoclassi-
cal international trade theory, it should be clear now that economists cannot refer to the 
assumptions of the case for free trade as if there were a single and unified economic 
theory in favor of free trade. There are actually two different cases for free trade: the 
classical and the neoclassical case. Correspondingly, economists have to differentiate 
between classical and neoclassical assumptions. 
The classical international trade theory merely assumes a certain degree of internal 
mobility and external immobility of the factors of production.148 The remaining assump-
tions mentioned in the above paragraph have all been introduced by the neoclassical 
theory of international trade. Consequently, the potential failure of these neoclassical 
assumptions has no consequence whatsoever for the classical case for free trade. Only 
the eventual failure of the two classical assumptions may have an effect on the proposi-
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tion that free trade is the most advantageous international trade policy for any country. 
Thus, let us analyze with more detail the degree of realism of these two classical as-
sumptions, as well as the implications of their expected failure. 
Let us start by affirming that if perfect internal mobility and external immobility of 
the factors of production were considered to be unrealistic assumptions, the same ob-
jection should be made for the reverse set of assumptions: absolute internal immobility 
and perfect external mobility of capital and labor. Starting with the first assumption, it 
would certainly be a difficult challenge finding an economist which denies the fact that 
in the real world there is at least a partial internal mobility of the factors of production. 
Every-day economic life shows that fertile land, buildings and a great part of the indus-
trial machinery can be redeployed to produce other commodities and services. Labor, 
which should be considered as the most versatile factor of production, generally switch-
es from one industry to the other, sometimes carrying out very different tasks. 
The point of dispute among economists is that neoclassical trade models assume that 
this process of internal redeployment of the factors of production occur instantaneously 
and at no cost. This is clearly an unrealistic assumption, because some buildings, ma-
chineries and tools may indeed have to be written off (sunk costs). For some workers it 
may be difficult to find new jobs at equivalent pay, and part of their skills — the ones 
most specialized and directly linked to the previous occupation — may not be required 
for the new job. These workers may need expensive and prolonged retraining in order 
to accomplish the new tasks. Based on these reasonable objections, the critics of free 
trade argue that these costs of redeployment somehow diminish the gains from trade. 
Following this premise, they claim that it is likely — although not certain — that these 
redeployment costs may reduce, neutralize or even turn the initial gains from trade into 
a net loss. At least, they render the benefits of free trade more ambiguous, contingent 
and subject to a wider range of qualifications than free traders generally admit.149 
The critics are essentially right when labeling perfect — i.e. instantaneous and no-cost 
— internal mobility of capital and labor as an unrealistic assumption. It is important to 
recognize, though, that neither Smith nor Ricardo have ever assumed perfect internal 
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factor mobility. Both classical political economists were aware of the disruptive conse-
quences of an abrupt modification of international trade policies. That is precisely why 
they invariably recommended a gradual implementation of free trade.150 
Nevertheless, Smith and Ricardo would strongly reject the premise that sunk costs 
and retraining expenses have to be somehow subtracted from the benefits of free inter-
national trade. As one might remember from section 2.2, the main gain from free 
international trade is that it provides an extension of the market, encouraging the divi-
sion of labor and the improvement of the domestic productive powers of labor to the 
utmost. Furthermore, the gains from trade are calculated by applying the classical rule of 
specialization. According to this rule, it simply does not make any sense from an eco-
nomic point of view to employ labor and capital in producing commodities and services 
at home when the country can acquire them from other countries by paying with ex-
ports whose production requires less real costs. In other words, whenever the indirect 
method of production is cheaper than the direct method of production, home-
production should be regarded as a waste of valuable human and material resources. 
Consequently, expected costs of redeployment and restructuring do not diminish the 
gains from trade in any meaningful way. 
The analysis regarding the classical assumption of international immobility of the fac-
tors of production also bears very interesting insights. Ricardo introduces this 
assumption in order to explain why his labor theory of value, which regulates transac-
tions within a country, does not hold for international exchanges. The assumption of a 
certain degree of international immobility of the factors of production is directly derived 
from economic reality. It is an undisputed fact that nowadays the labor force cannot 
move freely from one country to another in order to take advantage of higher real wag-
es. Compared to labor, capital is increasingly more mobile between political borders, but 
still to a lesser extent than within a country. 
The misinterpretation of Ricardo’s numerical example has led to a misunderstanding 
regarding the implications of dropping the international immobility assumption of the 
factors of production. If in some distant day in the future labor and capital could and 
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would move freely throughout the world, the law of value would regulate internal as 
well as international transactions, and Ricardo’s two propositions of the famous numeri-
cal example would not be valid any more.151 This outcome, however, would not damage 
the case for free trade in any meaningful way. 
The often-heard fear that in a truly globalized economy — i.e. freedom of movement 
for labor, capital, commodities and services — the world’s population would massively 
migrate to and concentrate in a few advanced countries is largely unfounded. The eco-
nomic conditions I am referring to have already been implemented within some 
member states of the EU, and neither the Portuguese nor the Greeks have migrated in 
considerable numbers to Germany, France or the Scandinavian countries. Cultural bar-
riers and other factors hinder the concentration of production in a few locations. 
Specific factors of production — for example fertile land, raw materials and particular 
climatic conditions — cannot be easily transferred to other geographic locations. Some 
conditions might be artificially reproduced in other latitudes — for example greenhous-
es —, but at considerable expenses of resources, capital and labor. 
Critics of free trade have correctly pointed out that the neoclassical case for free trade 
is partially based on unrealistic assumptions. They may also be right when they argue 
that these assumptions have been made in order to obtain pro free-trade results.152 What 
the classical international trade theory shows — and these critics of free trade often 
omit — is that the same conclusion in favor of free trade can be obtained without hav-
ing to rely on unrealistic assumptions. 
4.2 Increasing Returns to Scale and the Free-Trade Case 
4.2.1 The New Trade Theory 
The neoclassical international trade theory has brought a great deal of inconsistency 
and confusion to the theoretical case in favor of free trade. This can be shown best 
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when taking into account the rather erratic treatment of increasing returns to scale in the 
neoclassical theory of international trade during the last decades. Until the late 1970s, 
neoclassical international trade theory had been completely dominated by the assump-
tions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition. Consequently, the crucial role 
of increasing returns in explaining the pattern of international trade was relegated to 
footnote — if not completely omitted — in mainstream international trade theory.153 
What seems particularly striking is the justification given for the initial exclusion of 
increasing returns to scale from international trade theory: apparently, they were omitted 
because it was not possible then to integrate them into general equilibrium models.154 
Except under the implausible hypothesis that increasing returns to scale are completely 
external to firms, they must lead to imperfect competition. Until the 1970s, though, 
neoclassical economists did not know how to integrate imperfect competition into gen-
eral equilibrium models (Krugman, 1987, pp. 132-133). 
The 1980s mark the starting point of a renaissance of increasing returns to scale and 
economies of scale in mainstream international trade theory. During that decade increas-
ing returns to scale were brought back to front page of neoclassical international trade 
theory. This unexpected comeback was the result of specific circumstances both in aca-
demic research and economic reality, which set the stage for this renaissance. It is 
important to refer briefly to these circumstances in order to understand the origin, 
scope and limitations of this comeback of increasing returns to scale to mainstream 
neoclassical international trade theory. 
Before 1980 international trade was usually modeled assuming constant returns to 
scale and perfect competition. Under these set of assumptions, international trade could 
only arise to the extent that countries differ in tastes, technology or factor endowments. 
Countries were said to specialize and trade with each other in order to take advantage of 
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these differences. Other causes for the international division of labor and specialization, 
which are in contradiction with the stated assumptions, were ruled out by definition and 
simply ignored. The logical consequence of this sort of autistic behavior from the part 
of the majority of neoclassical economists was that mainstream international trade theo-
ry could not account for most of the kind of international exchanges that have been 
taking place since World War II. 
Several authors have highlighted the striking divorce of traditional neoclassical trade 
models from economic reality. Wassily Leontief, for example, pointed out that the Unit-
ed States have been exporting labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive products — 
the famous Leontief paradox —, contradicting the pattern of trade suggested by the H-
O model.155 Additionally, empirical surveys found out that intra-industry trade account-
ed for much of the international trade that was taking place, with countries exchanging 
commodities within narrowly defined product categories. These commodities were 
mostly differentiated products produced under increasing return to scale, and their 
manufacture appeared to be carried out under market structures other than the perfect 
competition assumed by the CULC model and the H-O model. 
Unwilling to settle with the striking empirical insufficiencies and contradictions of 
neoclassical international trade theory, during the late 1970s a group of young scholars 
started to realize that they had to look beyond mainstream neoclassical trade models in 
order to find a satisfactory explanation of the actual pattern of international trade, par-
ticularly the extensive trade of differentiating products among industrialized countries 
(Krugman, 1980). Furthermore, they concluded that the neoclassical notion of compara-
tive advantage, which stresses the differences between countries as the single cause for 
international trade, was not suitable for explaining intra-industry trade, since even econ-
omies that are identical in every respect can find it mutually beneficial to trade with each 
other. 
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At the beginnings of the 1980s, this group of young economic scholars published a 
series of papers in which economies of scale led to arbitrary specialization by nations on 
products within monopolistically competitive industries.156 In order to highlight the 
break with traditional neoclassical trade theory — and also perhaps for self-marketing 
purposes —, they proposed to name their new insights the New Trade Theory (NTT), 
merging various theoretic models under this unified label. The authors of these papers 
called themselves the new trade theorists. 
What is the essence of the NTT? According to Krugman, who has been perhaps the 
most outspoken new trade theorist, it is the non-comparative advantage trade 
(Krugman, 1992, p. 424). New trade theorists argue that countries do not necessarily 
specialize and trade solely in order to take advantage of their differences; they also trade 
because of increasing returns, which makes specialization advantageous per se. For the 
new trade theorists, therefore, economies of scale are an independent cause of interna-
tional trade, logically as the same level as comparative advantage.157 The basic ideas of 
the NTT are therefore the emphasis on increasing returns to scale as an important cause 
for international trade, and the need to model international markets as imperfectly com-
petitive. 
The formidable challenge of integrating economies of scale into general equilibrium 
models was accomplished by using models of imperfect competition that had been orig-
inally developed by researchers of industrial organization.158 On the one hand, these 
theoretic models offer a high level of mathematical sophistication, satisfying the neo-
classical obsession with formal mathematical analysis; on the other hand, they are 
relatively easy to handle. 
Nevertheless, these imperfect competitive trade models could not overcome the main 
weakness of the traditional models:  the lack of economic realism and empirical rele-
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vance.159 Curiously, despite of their failed attempt to reconcile economic theory with 
reality, the new trade theorists have been credited for bringing economic analysis a step 
closer to reality, because their models dispense with the two fundamental assumptions 
of the neoclassical trade theory: perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Alt-
hough the problem of empirical relevance persisted, these models of imperfect 
competition offered a conceptual framework for reintroducing increasing returns to 
scale into mainstream international trade theory without having to dismiss the notion of 
general economic equilibrium.  
In terms of its intellectual influence among scholars, the NTT has been a highly suc-
cessful innovation. Its basic insights — in particular, the importance of increasing 
returns to scale as a fundamental cause of international trade, and the need to model 
international markets as imperfectly competitive — have quickly moved from iconoclasm to 
orthodoxy (Krugman, 1992, p. 423). A possible explanation for the rapid gains in popular-
ity of the NTT in academic circles can be found in the obvious shortcomings of the 
traditional neoclassical international trade models, which were very much discredited by 
the time of the arrival of the NTT. That the arrival of the new models of imperfect 
competition was accompanied by serious questions regarding their empirical relevance 
was not seen as an insurmountable handicap in this context, because the traditional 
neoclassical international trade models had even greater problems in terms of empirical 
relevancy.  
The other relevant factor that contributed to the relatively rapid acceptance of the 
NTT among scholars has to be found in the public debate about international trade 
within the United States during the 1980s. From 1945 until the mid 1980s, free trade 
enjoyed broad popular support both in academics and the public in the United States. 
This country emerged from World War II as a staunch crusader for liberalization of 
global trade, notwithstanding occasional lapses from its own stated ideals. For most U.S. 
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companies, neither exports nor competing imports played an important role in overall 
profitability. If a few industries had grievances about foreign competition, the country as 
a whole seemed to prosper along with, and because of, the steady expansion of its inter-
national trade (McCulloch R. , 1993). 
This positive attitude towards free trade changed during the 1980s. With help from a 
strong dollar in the mid-1980s, foreign companies started to challenge U.S. producers in 
a widening range of industries. Trading partners with activist policy regimes enjoyed 
prosperity fueled by export surpluses, while employment and wages sagged in America’s 
own manufacturing sector. The continued growth of U.S. exports was outpaced by the 
growth of imports. The resulting trade deficits were startling in size and seemingly re-
sistant to the usual remedies. Of still greater concern was the perceived nature of foreign 
competition. Where lost market share had once been concentrated in mature industries 
such as apparel and footwear, powerful rivals (some bankrolled by foreign governments) 
began to contest U.S. dominance even in advanced high-technology sectors (Tyson, 
1993). Innovative products, including ones based on U.S. research, seemed as likely to 
come to the U.S. market from foreign as from domestic producers (McCulloch R. , 
1993). 
Growing concerns about a perceived decline in US international competitive position 
and overall economic performance led to increasing public dissatisfaction with the na-
tion’s laissez-faire approach to international trade. As a consequence, popular support 
within the US for free trade policies started to decrease. Some argued that the US was 
losing its competitive edge with respect to the rest of the world because of its liberal 
trade policies. The rising skepticism regarding the merits of free trade created new inter-
est in whatever rationale economic theory can provide for trade-policy activism. 
At the first look, the NTT does not seem to imply an activist or protectionist trade 
policy at all. Although the new models of trade challenges the traditional view that all 
trade represents exploitation of comparative advantage, the NTT does not at first chal-
lenge the proposition that trade is of mutual benefit to the trading nations. Indeed, if 
anything, the introduction of increasing returns and imperfect competition into trade 
theory strengthens the case that there are gains from trade. In addition to benefiting 
from complementary differences in resources and technology, trading countries can 
specialize in the production of different goods, allowing a greater use of economies of 
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scale while maintaining or increasing the diversity of goods available. Furthermore, by 
creating larger, more competitive markets, trade may reduce the distortions that would 
have been associated with imperfect competition in a closed economy. Thus, the initial 
implication of the new trade theory seemed to strengthen the case for free trade, rein-
forcing the traditional view that trade is a positive-sum game that is generally carried on 
to the countries’ mutual benefit.160 
Nevertheless, a theory of international trade that takes increasing returns to scale into 
consideration must also allow for oligopoly, external economies, or both. The NTT 
indeed suggests that in the real world many traded commodities are produced by indus-
tries that are both oligopolistic and subject to external economies. Either necessarily 
implies a failure of the usual conditions for optimality of laissez-faire: if economies of 
scale are internal to firms, there must be an oligopoly in which price exceeds marginal 
cost; if the economies of scale are somehow purely external to firms, and perfect com-
petition is thus preserved, social marginal cost is less than private (Krugman & Smith, 
1994, p. 2). “Once one has abandoned the assumptions of constant returns and perfect competition”, 
Krugman (1993, p. 363) states, “one has also abandoned the Arrow-Debreu world in which mar-
kets necessarily produce a Pareto optimum. Therefore, the NTT not only legitimized imperfect 
competition in positive discussion of trade, but also opened the door to possible arguments for government 
intervention.” Thus instead of the traditional picture that free national and international 
markets lead to a Pareto optimum, the NTT offers a new picture in which markets 
normally lead to suboptimal results. Furthermore, in arguing that trade is driven to an 
important extent by increasing returns rather than comparative advantage, the new trade 
theorists also inevitably introduced some arbitrariness into the pattern of international 
specialization: in the new view, who produces what is the result of history, accident and 
past government policies rather than underlying differences in national resources and 
aptitudes (Krugman, 1992, p. 425). 
It was merely a matter of time, therefore, when some scholars would figure out how 
to make a case for protection out of the new theoretic framework created by the NTT. 
Indeed, the view emphasized by the NTT that international trade is driven to an im-
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portant degree by economies of scale in a context of imperfect competition has suggest-
ed two arguments against free trade, which will be analyzed in the following section. 
4.2.2 Two Neoclassical Arguments against Free Trade 
4.2.2.1 Strategic Trade Policy 
The antecedents of the strategic trade policy argument are to be found in research re-
sults in the field of industrial organization, where scholars studied the competitive 
behavior of firms in oligopolistic industries.161 International trade economists later 
transplanted these insights into a context that seemed relevant to international trade 
theory. James Brander and Barbara Spencer, in particular, suggested in two influential 
papers (1983; 1985) that government policies such as export subsidies and import re-
strictions may deter, under the right circumstances, foreign companies from competing 
for lucrative markets. In this context, government trade policy serves much the same 
role that strategic moves such as investments in excess capacity or in research and de-
velopment serve in many models of oligopolistic competition — hence the term strategic 
trade policy (Krugman, 1987, p. 134). 
The strategic-trade-policy argument is built upon the rather uncontroversial observa-
tion that in industries characterized by increasing returns to scale and imperfect 
competition some companies may consistently earn profits above the natural rate. From 
this undisputed fact, Brander and Spencer have derived the new proposition that a 
country may raise its national income at other countries’ expense if it can somehow 
ensure that the companies earning monopolistic profits are domestic rather than for-
eign. 
The above proposition can be briefly explained with the following example: imagine 
two companies from different countries competing for some lucrative export market. 
Furthermore, suppose that economies of scale are sufficiently large in this particular 
industry that there is only room for one profitable entrant in the world market as a 
whole; that is, if two firms were to enter they would both incur in losses. Then whichev-
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er firm manages to establish itself in the industry will earn monopolistic profits that will 
not be competed away. The respective domestic consumers are ignored or assumed 
away by supposing that there is no domestic demand for the commodity exported, so 
that the monopolistic profits of the successful company can be identified with the na-
tional interest of the home country. In this sort of competitive situation, each company 
would like the other to believe that it will invest or produce massively, thereby inducing 
the other to produce or invest less, or even deter the other of entering the market in the 
first place. The challenge is to find a way to make the threat of such an aggressive com-
petitive behavior credible. Suppose that one company can commit its national 
government to subsidize the firm’s operations. Such a move would most likely convince 
the competing foreign company that the threat of aggressive competitive behavior is 
credible, prompting it to curtail its own investment plans. The result can be to raise the 
firm’s profits by much more than the actual subsidy outlay. As a result, such a strategic 
trade policy is said to raise the aggressive country’s national income at the other coun-
try’s expense.162 
Brander and Spencer focus on possible subsidization of cost-reducing R & D such as, 
for example, the Japanese and French subsidization of robotics in automobile assem-
bly.163 R & D is assumed to be undertaken before the associated output is produced, 
with firms anticipating the effect of R & D on the resolution of output shares. Thus R 
& D serves as a commitment or credible threat, along the lines considered in Spence 
(1977; 1979), Dixit (1980) and Eaton & Lipsey (1980). In contrast to these papers, how-
ever, where an established firm acts first, Brander and Spencer use a theoretic model 
where firms have equal opportunity in setting R & D levels. The efficacy of government 
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163 They also consider the case of export subsidies, concluding that with export subsidies availa-
ble, countries would not choose to subsidize R & D. Nevertheless, because GATT codes 
effectively restrict direct export subsidies, they consider the setting in which only R & D subsi-
dies are available as the most relevant case. See Brander & Spencer (1983, p. 707). 
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policy arises from the assumption that a government can credibly commit itself to R & 
D subsidies before private firms made their R & D investment decisions. 
According to the supporters of the strategic trade policy argument, the principal aim 
of international trade policy appears to be to increase a country’s share in the worldwide 
production of imperfectly competitive — and therefore monopolistic profit earning — 
industries operating in international markets. A similar aim is proclaimed by other ar-
guments for protection, like the monopoly tariff argument (Johnson, 1953-1954), the 
use of export taxes and encouragement of export cartels to exploit the monopoly power 
of domestic firms (Auquier & Caves, 1979), or the use of tariffs to extract rent from 
foreign imperfectly competitive firms (Brander & Spencer, 1981). 
4.2.2.2 External Economies 
The second neoclassical argument for protection originated by the NTT is built 
around the notion of external economies. Alfred Marshall relied heavily on the notion 
of external economies for explaining the phenomenon of industrial districts, i.e., the geo-
graphical concentration of industries that could not be attributed to the existence of 
natural resources (Marshall A. , 1920). Nowadays, these geographical agglomerations of 
industries are often called clusters.164 Famous modern-day examples of clusters are the 
semiconductor industry in California’s Silicon Valley; the financial clusters in New York 
and London; the entertainment industry in Hollywood and Mumbai; and the IT-industry 
in Bangalore, India. 
Marshall mentions several reasons why a cluster of firms may be more productive 
than an individual firm in isolation; for example, the ability of a cluster to support spe-
cialized suppliers; the way that a geographically concentrated industry allows labor 
market pooling; and the way that a geographically concentrated industry helps foster 
knowledge spillovers. All these reasons may continuously reinforce a certain pattern of 
international trade, which initially had merely been the result of a historical accident. 
                                                
 
164 The term cluster appears to have been popularized by Michael Porter in The Competitive Ad-
vantage of Nations (1990). Interestingly, the title of Porter’s book is a hint to his fictitious 
contraposition of comparative and competitive advantage, which is a direct consequence of 
using the neoclassical notion of comparative advantage. See Porter (1990, p. 11). 
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Before the arrival of the NTT, the ideas that external economies were important, and 
that the promotion of industries with considerable external economies might be an im-
portant goal of international trade policy, were remarkably unpopular among 
international trade theorists (Krugman, 1992, p. 435). Since general economic equilibri-
um models used to assume perfect competition and constant returns to scale, the only 
external economies that could be conceived were pure technological spillovers. Empiri-
cally, however, the most plausible source of positive external economies is the inability 
of innovative firms to fully appropriate the knowledge they create. The presence of 
problems of appropriability is unmistakable in industries experiencing rapid technologi-
cal progress, where firms routinely take each other’s products apart to see how they 
work and how they were made. In traditional international trade models with their reli-
ance on perfect competition, however, external economies resulting from incomplete 
appropriability could not be explicitly recognized, because a firm’s investment in 
knowledge creation and innovation that is the source of the spillover could not be fitted 
in. These investments inevitably have a significant fixed-cost component; once a firm 
has improved its product or production technique, the unit cost of that improvement 
falls as a greater amount of commodities is produced. The result of these dynamic 
economies of scale must be a breakdown of perfect competition. As a result, perfectly 
competitive models could not explicitly recognize the most plausible reason for the 
existence of external economies (Krugman, 1987, p. 137). 
Moreover, people working for different companies can certainly learn from each oth-
er, but this rather undisputed fact is not particularly relevant for international trade 
theory, unless this learning process somehow stops at the country border. The best can-
didates for nationally limited external economies are where knowledge spreads largely by 
personal contact and word of mouth, which is a much more restricted set of activities 
than R & D in general. 
The most important international trade policy implication of the NTT is that it re-
vokes these restrictions formerly associated with external economies, legitimizing the 
importance of external economies for international trade. According to the NTT, what 
matters for international competition are broadly defined external economies, including 
market-size effects as well as pure technological spillovers (Krugman, 1992, p. 436). 
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Like the strategic trade policy argument, external economies seem to offer a reasona-
ble justification for a neo-mercantilist view of international trade. According to 
Krugman (1992, p. 436), it seems quite plausible that a country that systematically tries 
to promote industries subject to significant external economies will raise its standard of 
living at the expense of other countries. 
The external economies argument, however, differs in one important aspect from the 
strategic trade policy argument: policies to promote sectors yielding substantial external 
economies do not necessarily need to affect other countries adversely. Whether the 
effect of one country’s targeting of high-externality sectors on other countries is positive 
or negative depends on whether the scope of the externalities is national or internation-
al. The conflict of national interests is limited to the case when knowledge spills over 
within a country but not between countries.165 
4.2.3 A Political Restatement of the Free Trade Case after the NTT 
As already been said, the NTT has been a success story in terms of reception and ac-
ceptance in the academic playing field. The new international trade models, featuring 
imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale, have partially eclipsed the tradi-
tional constant-returns-to-scale and perfect-competitive models of mainstream 
neoclassical international trade theory. This rather significant overhaul of mainstream 
international trade theory, though, has had few implications on the practical recommen-
dations about international trade policy. A majority of professional economists, 
including many new trade theorists, have maintained their recommendation in favor of 
free trade.166 
This lack of consequence in the field of international trade policy has disappointed 
and angered those economists who had hoped the NTT could be turned into a new 
                                                
 
165 Krugman (1987, p. 138) states in a footnote: “Finally, if economies of scale (internal and external) are 
large enough, conflict of interest becomes unavoidable. Suppose there is room for only one Silicon Valley in the 
world, yet the agglomeration will yield valuable external economies to the country that gets it. Then the conflict 
cannot be avoided except through side payments.” 
166 According to Krugman (1993, p. 365) it is perfectly possible to be both a new trade theorist 
and a free trader. 
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framework of international trade capable of offering a solid theoretical support for in-
terventionist trade policies. These economists have launched stringent accusations 
towards the new trade theorists, accusing them of inconsequence and collective coward-
ice.167 So why hasn’t the NTT led to a new international trade policy? New trade 
theorists have come up with different explanations for their collective trade policy reti-
cence. Krugman, for example, recurs at some point to the neoclassical dichotomy 
between positive and normative economics, arguing that the NTT is primarily a positive 
rather than a normative economic theory, and therefore not meant to be policy-oriented 
at all. The majority of the new trade theorists — including himself — were motivated by 
an effort to explain the pattern of trade, and to fill a logical gap in traditional interna-
tional trade theory, rather than by the desire to find a justification for neo-mercantilist 
trade policies (Krugman, 1992, p. 424). 
The above explanation, though, is not particularly convincing. As already pointed out 
earlier in the thesis168, the alleged dichotomy between positive and normative economics 
— a characteristic feature of the neoclassical school of economic thought —, is a con-
venient and often heard excuse for the growing inability of neoclassical theories to offer 
an accurate and consistent description of the real functioning of the economy, and to 
derive concrete economic policies from it. Moreover, it is also an attempt to create a 
false aura of objectivity and impartiality around an economic theory with very concrete 
distributional preferences and consequences. 
In order to offer a more solid explanation for their pro-free-trade position, some new 
trade theorists, including Krugman, have critically examined the two neoclassical argu-
ments against free trade, discovering important weak points. Particularly the strategic 
trade policy argument has been subject to a detailed academic critique. Eaton & Gross-
man (1986) showed that the case for strategic trade policy is sensitive to the assumed 
form of competition; Horstmann & Markusen (1986) demonstrated that the benefits of 
strategic trade policy might be dissipated by entry of new firms and the resulting excess 
capacity; Dixit & Grossman (1986) showed that competition for scarce resources among 
                                                
 
167 See, for example, Kuttner (1991). 
168 See section 1.3. 
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industries complicates greatly the task of devising a welfare-improving policy; and Dixit 
& Kyle (1985) argued that strategic trade policy should be seen as part of a larger game 
in which it would often be better for governments to rule out their possibility. It also 
appears that the assumptions made in the Brander-Spencer model lack robustness: small 
changes in the assumptions can easily undermine or even reverse the results (Krugman, 
1992, p. 433).169 
According to Krugman, the above objections do not prove the strategic trade policy 
argument wrong, but highlight the fact that the case for trade intervention based on this 
argument is highly sensitive to details of market structure that governments are unlikely 
to get right. Furthermore, efforts to quantify the potential gains from monopolistic rent 
snatching suggest small payoffs.170 Free trade may not be the optimal policy, these stud-
ies suggest, but sophisticated interventionist policies will do only a little better 
(Krugman, 1993, p. 363). 
External economies, on the other hand, seem to be a plausible argument against free 
trade as long as they remain an abstract academic concept. When trying to confront the 
external economies argument with the real world, however, one would rapidly encoun-
ter difficult empirical challenges. External economies, for example, are particularly 
difficult to quantify, and one industry seems as likely as any other to generate significant 
external economies. 
As a consequence of the above-mentioned problems, the supporters of strategic trade 
policy and external economies arguments have encountered severe obstacles when try-
ing to make their trade policy proposals operational. So far, they have not even been 
able to clearly identify the highly desired industries (Krugman, 1992, p. 439). If a practi-
cal-minded politician, after being convinced by some economists that national firms in 
certain strategic sectors are entitle to receive subsidies, would ask these economists 
which sectors should be subsidized, he or she may receive the following answers: high 
                                                
 
169 Eaton and Grossman (1986), for example, showed that the implausible assumption of 
Cournot competition was crucial to the result; if firms compete in prices instead of quantities, 
the optimal policy is an export tax. 
170 For surveys of this literature, see Helpman & Krugman (2002) and Krugman & Smith (1994). 
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technology and high investment industries (Brander & Spencer, 1983, p. 717); industries 
where R & D is an especially large part of firm’s cost (Krugman, 1987, p. 137); or indus-
tries with a high value added. These vague and rather ambiguous answers are far from 
being operationally useful.171 
Unable to solve the multiple theoretical and empirical challenges mentioned above, 
the new trade theorists have opted for the following compromise: While conceding that 
the two neoclassical arguments against free trade are valid in principle, they nevertheless 
recommend to maintain a free trade policy because the potential benefits of promoting 
strategic sectors or industries with important external economies appear to be relatively 
small172, and the practical implementation of interventionist trade policies may bear con-
siderable political risks.173 
Interventionist trade policies as the ones suggested by the NTT are indeed very likely 
to generate considerable political problems at the national as well as international level, 
which can revert any theoretical benefit. Regarding the national level, when a proposed 
economic policy change is expected to raise the income of small privileged groups while 
spreading the considerable costs on a large amount of people, the political process of 
formulating and implementing economic policy usually comes to be dominated by con-
siderations regarding distribution rather than efficiency. An effort to promote strategic 
sectors, for example, could be easily taken over by special interests and molded accord-
ing to their economic interests, because they are usually far better informed than those 
who have to bear the costs. As a result, the initial effort to promote strategic sectors may 
end up as an inefficient redistributive program. Although governments never fail to 
promote their economic policies as a patriotic imperative, particularly those with respect 
to international trade, they are not necessarily guided by the general interest of the 
population, but more often by the particular interests of powerful interest groups. 
                                                
 
171 This fact is recognized by Krugman (1987, p. 137). 
172 Without resolving the problem regarding empirical measurability, several researchers have 
nevertheless suggested that the potential gains from deviating from free trade are very small at 
best. See, for example, Cox & Harris (1985) and Feenstra (1988). 
173 See Krugman (1987; 1993). 
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How can the problem of interest-group influence on decision-making be resolved in 
the real world? To ask the political decision-makers to ignore special-interest politics 
while formulating industrial policy is not realistic; to establish a blanket policy of free 
trade, with exceptions granted only under severe scrutiny, may not be the optimal policy 
according to the theory but may be the best policy that the country is likely to get 
(Krugman, 1987, p. 141ff.). 
Moreover, a successful implementation of a strategic trade policy, shifting profits in 
oligopolistic industries towards national companies, presupposes that foreign govern-
ments do not retaliate. The unilateral use of export subsidies or import tariffs in 
oligopolistic industries to gain a competitive edge is, however, very likely to invite retali-
ation from aggrieved trading partners. Such retaliation is even more likely in precisely 
the knowledge-intensive high-technology industries, since these industries are widely 
regarded as important in themselves. Locating them behind one’s own borders is often 
seen as a matter of securing broader political and economic benefits. Intervention by 
foreign governments, regardless of whether profit-shifting-related advantages exist or 
not, is generally seen, therefore, as an attempt to get a larger share of this important pie 
than is warranted by legitimate market forces. 
The expected retaliation may trigger mutually harmful trade wars. In many cases, 
though, a trade war between two interventionist governments will leave both countries 
worse off than if both had adopted a hands-off approach. The way to avoid this nega-
tive result is to establish rules of the game that keep mutually harmful actions to a 
minimum. If such rules are to work in the practice, however, they must be simple 
enough to be clearly defined. Free trade is such a simple rule; it is easy enough to deter-
mine whether a country imposes tariffs or import quotas. 
As a result of the above-mentioned objections to strategic trade policy and the exter-
nal economies argument, neither of them has managed to overthrow the case for free 
trade. Nevertheless, they have created a climate of doubt about the economic merits of 
free trade. As a consequence, the case in favor of free trade has turned more political 
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than economic.174 What the supporters and critics often miss to point out, though, is 
that the adduced theoretical validity of the two neoclassical arguments against free trade 
is actually limited to the general economic equilibrium framework175, and that the uncer-
tainty with regard to the empirical relevance of the two arguments is the unavoidable 
consequence of the fact that they are the product of this defective and intrinsically con-
tradictious theoretic framework. 
4.2.4 A Classical Critique of the New Trade Theory 
Some new trade theorists, most notably Krugman, like to portrait the main insights 
and propositions of the NTT as a novel and revolutionary contribution to international 
trade theory.176 With respect to the role of increasing returns to scale as an important 
cause of international trade, though, they had to recognize somehow reluctantly that 
Ohlin had already highlighted it back in 1933.177 So what is exactly new and revolutionary 
with regard to the New Trade Theory? The short answer is: very little, if anything. 
The new trade theorists can legitimately claim achievement for reintroducing increas-
ing returns to scale into mainstream neoclassical international trade theory. Increasing 
returns to scale, while acknowledged in principle, could not be formally built-in into 
traditional neoclassical trade models until the NTT came along due to the presence of 
the constant-cost assumption. An innovative modeling technique allowed the new trade 
theorists to drop this assumption. Thus, the NTT is essentially a new modeling approach 
                                                
 
174 In one of several papers on the subject, Krugman (1987, p. 132) states that “(...) free trade is not 
passé, but it is an idea that has irretrievably lost its innocence. Its status has shifted from optimum to reasonable 
rule of thumb. There is still a case for free trade as a good policy, and as a useful target in the practical world of 
politics, but it can never again be asserted as the policy that economic theory tells us is always right.” 
175 Krugman recognizes the close relationship between the two neoclassical arguments against 
free trade and the general economic equilibrium paradigm when affirming that “(…) the view that 
free trade is best of all possible policies is part of the general case for laissez-faire in a market economy, and rests 
on the proposition that markets are efficient. If increasing returns and imperfect competition are necessary parts of 
the explanation of international trade, however, we are living in a second-best world where government intervention 
can in principle improve on market outcomes” (Krugman, 1987, p. 134). 
176 See Krugman (2009). 
177 See Krugman (2002). 
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(McCulloch R. , 1993) of international trade within the neoclassical general economic 
equilibrium paradigm. 
The new trade theorists regard the general economic equilibrium paradigm as a syno-
nym for theoretic rigor, despite the fact that increasing returns to scale had been initially 
omitted from mainstream neoclassical models of international trade because they were 
incompatible with the constant-returns-to-scale and perfect-competition assumptions of 
this paradigm. Krugman unambiguously acknowledges this reason for initially excluding 
increasing returns to scale when affirming that “(…) unexhausted economies of scale at the firm 
level necessarily imply imperfect competition, and there were no readily usable models of imperfect compe-
tition to hand. Even more to the point, there were no general equilibrium models of imperfect competition 
readily to hand — and trade theory, perhaps more than any other applied field of economics, is built 
around general equilibrium analysis” (Krugman, 2009, p. 563). 
The incorporation of imperfect competition into general economic equilibrium mod-
els of international trade was achieved by following the neoclassical practice of making 
unrealistic assumptions. The new trade theorists generally acknowledge the unrealistic 
nature of international trade models featuring imperfect competition, as can be seen in 
the following quote from Krugman: 
“The new trade theory, instead, focused on strongly special, even silly-seeming cas-
es. (“Dare to be silly” became one of my principles for research.) There is no good 
reason to believe that the assumptions of the Dixit-Stiglitz model — a continuum 
of goods that enter symmetrically into demand, with the same cost functions, and 
with the elasticity of substitution between any two goods both constant and the 
same for any pair you choose — are remotely true in reality. The assumptions are 
instead chosen, with full self-consciousness, to produce a tractable example that 
contains what older trade theories left out — namely, the possibility for intraindus-
try specialization due to economies of scale” (Krugman, 2009, p. 566). 178 
The new trade theorists could openly recognize the unrealistic nature of the new in-
ternational trade models featuring imperfect competition without seriously jeopardizing 
the validity and general acceptance of these models, because the use of unrealistic as-
sumptions is an extended and validated practice throughout the neoclassical school of 
                                                
 
178 A similar statement can be found in Krugman (1992, p. 426): “During the 1970s theorists in the 
industrial organization area, above all Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), developed a set of consistent yet easy-to-use 
models of imperfect competition. Nobody really viewed these models as plausible descriptions of the real-life process 
of competition in oligopolies.” 
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economic thought. Therefore, they knew that more traditional-minded neoclassical trade 
theorists could not seriously challenge them on this point. After all, if the deployment of 
unrealistic assumptions has been already accepted in principle, it is very easy to end up 
with an anything-goes-approach, since there is no scientific parameter for discriminating 
against specific unrealistic assumptions while accepting others. 
Classical economists, however, can effectively criticize the unrealistic assumptions of 
the NTT, since they are not bound to the practice of making these assumptions to pro-
duce desirable results. Moreover, they should also reject the assertion made in the above 
quote that preceding international trade theories had left out the possibility for intrain-
dustry specialization due to economies of scale by referring to Adam Smith and the 
Wealth of Nations. 
Smith has to be seen as the legitimate intellectual forefather of the NTT — and also 
the New Growth Theory for that matter — in light of his insistence that an economy’s 
productivity depends primarily on the development of the division of labor, which itself 
is limited by the extent of the market, including a country’s export markets. Smith’s 
analysis of the division of labor also includes what has been later labeled as internal and 
external economies of scale.179 
Besides ignoring the fact that considerations regarding large-scale production and 
technological innovations were already at the center of Smith’s analysis on the benefits 
of international trade, the new trade theorists have also misinterpreted Ricardo’s com-
parative advantage insight. Krugman likes to define comparative advantage as “(…) the 
idea that countries trade to take advantage of their differences” (Krugman, 2009, p. 561). This is 
of course the neoclassical notion of comparative advantage, which is the result of the 
misinterpretation of Ricardo’s numerical example. According to Smith and Ricardo, 
there are plenty of sources — both natural and artificial — for comparative advantage, 
including economies of scale and increases returns to scale.180 Consequently, they should 
                                                
 
179 See also Kibritçioglu (2002). 
180 See section 2.5. 
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not be considered as non-comparative-advantage sources of international specializa-
tion.181 
Due to this misunderstanding, the new trade theorists put economies of scale, for-
merly viewed by Ohlin as an important but secondary cause for international trade, on 
an equal footing with respect to comparative advantage. Increasing returns to scale are 
portrayed in the NTT as an independent cause for international trade. Facing the obvi-
ous contradiction of having two unrelated and mutually-exclusive explanations for in-
international trade, the new trade theorists found an ingenious way-out of this dilemma. 
The compromise consists in referring to the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory to 
explain inter-industry trade; the intra-industry trade, the result of specialization within 
industries, however, is now supposed to be driven by increasing returns to scale 
(Krugman, 1992, p. 427). Thus, the NTT fails to integrate economies of scale into a 
broader explanation of comparative advantage, as was already accomplished by classical 
political economists nearly two centuries ago. 
Moreover, the continued reliance of the NTT on the general economic equilibrium 
paradigm has transformed the insight regarding the benefits of large-scale production 
into a potential argument for government intervention and protectionism. This is in 
sharp contrast to the treatment of large-scale production in classical political economy, 
where it is regarded as an important cause for increases in labor productivity, and there-
fore a crucial argument in favor of free trade. 
Classical political economy also provides a solid theoretical framework for seriously 
challenging the validity of the neoclassical notion of strategic trade policy as well as the 
external economies argument. These two neoclassical arguments against free trade hinge 
crucially on the idea that some industries are intrinsically more desirable than others, 
and that a country would devote inadequate resources to these industries without an 
explicit government policy in their favor. The focus of the critique of these two argu-
ments has to be on the use of alternate and questionable benchmarks for assessing the 
desirability of certain industries. 
                                                
 
181 For the opposite view, see Krugman (1993, p. 363). 
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The NTT labels an industry as strategic first and foremost if the companies involved 
are able to achieve monopoly profits. According to classical political economy, though, 
profits above the natural — or average — rate are always an indication for a low level of 
competition within a particular industry, because monopoly profits are supposed to be 
competed away by established competitors or new participants in the marketplace. The 
government should thus encourage competition rather than granting protection when-
ever an industry is achieving monopoly profits, because the resulting lower commodity 
prices — not high firm profits — are in the best interest of the consumers. 
Furthermore, all industries are theoretically feasible of achieving high profit rates or 
important external economies, so neither of these benchmarks should be taken as a 
valid indicator for the desirability of a particular industry. Moreover, external economies 
generated by incomplete appropriability of the results of R & D undoubtedly constitute 
a competitive threat for an individual firm, because it prevents the firm from capturing 
the monopoly profits from innovations, but it should not be seen as a significant threat 
for the economy as a whole. National as well as foreign consumers rather profit from 
incomplete private appropriability of the results of R & D, because they can buy innova-
tive products without having to pay the premium price. 
Furthermore, it seems a questionable practice to use public funds to subsidize R & D 
efforts of private companies, if — as usual — the resulting innovations remain the ex-
clusive intellectual property of the private company. In this case, the consumer has to 
pay twice in order to benefit from the public-funded innovations: first in the form of 
taxes in order to finance the subsidy, and second in the form of premium prices when 
buying the innovative products. This does not imply of course that governments should 
abstain from investing in R & D, but merely that the subsidized research project should 
be of public interest, and the research results should be made generally available. 
A valid formulation of the strategic trade policy argument can be found in the Wealth 
of Nations, when Smith refers to the necessity of granting protection to national indus-
tries which are important for the defense of the country. Although he does not use the 
term “strategic” to denominate these industries, Smith’s analysis perfectly fits to the 
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military origin of this term. In Smith’s time the defense of Britain depended very much 
upon the number of its sailors and ships. For that reason, Smith endorsed the Act of 
Navigation.182 It is important to highlight that in this case the assessment of the strategic 
nature of certain industries is based on considerations of national defense, and not on 
an economic analysis. Smith is well aware that this justified exception from free trade 
comes at the price of diminishing the growth of opulence (WN, IV.ii.30, p. 464). 
In summary, a classical economist should reject the claim made by some new trade 
theorists that the present-day case for free trade rests primarily on political — not eco-
nomic — considerations. This claim may be accurate with respect to the neoclassical 
international trade theory, but certainly not with respect to the classical school of eco-
nomic thought. Classical international trade theory continues to offer a systematic and 
solid economic analysis regarding the benefits of free trade. 
4.3 The Infant-Industry Argument 
No nation was ever ruined by trade, 
even seemingly the most disadvantageous. 
Benjamin Franklin 
4.3.1 The Renaissance of an Old Argument for Protection 
The infant industry argument — i.e. the claim for granting protection to new indus-
tries that are not initially capable of competing with foreign competitors, but with the 
accumulation of production experience could grow to compete successfully in world 
markets —, is perhaps the oldest and longest-lived specific argument for protection. 
Statements in favor of infant industry protection already arise in the mercantilist period, 
where several writers claimed it was necessary for the promotion of domestic employ-
ment and industry.183 
                                                
 
182 Smith states: “As defense, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, 
perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England” (WN, IV.ii.30, pp. 464-465). 
183 For examples of early enunciations of the infant industry argument, see Viner (1937, pp. 71-
72) and Irwin (1998, pp. 116-118). 
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In recent years, the infant industry argument has experienced a certain renaissance, 
particularly among those scholars dedicated to the field of development economics. In 
the present context of accelerated economic globalization some economists have pro-
claimed the ever-greater relevancy of infant-industry protection for developing countries 
at earlier stages of industrialization.184 
The recent revival of this ancient argument for protection seems to be fueled by the 
NTT’s reintroduction of increasing returns to scale into neoclassical international trade 
theory. Before the NTT, increasing returns to scale already played a prominent role in 
the formulation of the infant-industry argument. However, it was confined to the cases 
in which a backward country needed to build up its industrial base to a level that could 
compete with more developed economies. The NTT suggests that developed countries 
need to protect some of their infant industries too. 
Despite of the alleged incremental need for infant industry protection by developing 
countries in particular, some scholars complain that the current international trade rules 
have banned or severely restricted the use of this instrument for industrial develop-
ment.185 Therefore, they propose a revision of these international trade rules, which they 
consider to be unfair and biased against the developing countries. They also claim for a 
new international trade system, in which the differential situations of countries at vari-
ous stages of economic development are taken into account. Under this new 
international trade system developing countries should be allowed to protect their infant 
industries. 
In the light of the restatement of the classical case for free, let us analyze the historical 
origin and logical structure of the infant industry argument in order to assess if develop-
ing countries really need to protect infant industries for achieving economic 
development. 
                                                
 
184 See, for example, Shafaeddin (2000) and Chang (2002). 
185 See, for example, Chang (2002). 
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4.3.2 List’s Case for Infant-Industry Protection 
The contemporary case for infant industry protection is largely based on the writings 
of nineteenth century German journalist Friedrich List, particularly on his magnum 
opus The National System of Political Economy.186 This book has attained a similar status 
within protectionist circles as the Wealth of Nations among free traders. In The National 
System, List recommends infant-industry protection as a catch-up strategy for Germany 
and the United States with respect to Britain, the birthplace of the industrial revolution 
and most advanced country of the time. 
Despite the relevance of List and his infant industry argument for the history of eco-
nomic thought, Shafaeddin (2000) complains that he is often misinterpreted or 
completely ignored by contemporary economists and historians of economic thought. 
The contemporary literature often regards “(...) the debate on infant industry protection as one 
against free trade, or even against international trade; perceives infant industry protection as synonymous 
with import substitution; conceives import substitution as a permanent feature or strategy versus export 
orientation strategy (…); restricts the infant industry argument to the stage of production for the domes-
tic market; and envisages that protection should be applied across-the-board to the manufacturing sector 
as a whole, rather than on a selective basis” (Shafaeddin (2000, p. 3). According to Shafaedin, 
though, List advocated merely for temporary, selective and not excessive protection, and 
even supported free trade among countries with the same level of economic develop-
ment. Given the sharp contrast between these opposing receptions of List, it seems 
necessary to consult his original writings for clarification. 
List states in the National System that all nations have to pass through five develop-
ment stages in their long journey towards economic progress: (1) the savage stage; (2) 
the pastoral stage; (3) the agricultural stage; (4) the agricultural and manufacturing stage; 
and (5) the agricultural-manufacturing-commercial stage. In order to progress, countries 
ought to industrialize, i.e. transit from stage (3) to stages (4) and (5). List believes that 
                                                
 
186 List’s first book, Outlines of American Political Economy, was a collection of articles which had 
been published in American journals and newspapers, whereas his second book, The Natural 
System of Political Economy, was written in haste for the purpose of participating in a prize compe-
tition in France, and its ideas are not always well exposed. See Henderson (1983). 
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such a transition cannot take place automatically through the natural course of things, 
because countries at stage (3) or (4) cannot compete successfully in manufactures with 
countries at higher stages of industrialization and economic development. If they want 
to reach the agricultural-manufacturing-commercial stage (5), these catching-up coun-
tries need to protect their infant industries from foreign competition in order to develop 
their national productive powers.187 
Based on numerous and extensive historical examples, List draws the conclusion that 
the best commercial policy for a specific country is always dependent on its particular 
stage of economic development: 
“Finally, history teaches us how nations which have been endowed by Nature with 
all resources which are requisite for the attainment of the highest grade of wealth 
and power, may and must (...) modify their (commercial) systems according to the 
measure of their own progress: in the first stage, adopting free trade with more ad-
vanced nations as a means of raising themselves from a state of barbarism, and of 
making advances in agriculture; in the second stage, promoting the growth of 
manufactures, fisheries, navigation, and foreign trade by means of commercial re-
strictions; and in the last stage, after reaching the highest degree of wealth and 
power, by gradually reverting to the principle of free trade and of unrestricted 
competition in the home as well as in foreign markets, that so their agriculturists, 
manufacturers, and merchants may be preserved from indolence, and stimulated to 
retain the supremacy which they have acquired. In the first stage, we see Spain, 
Portugal, and the Kingdom of Naples; in the second, Germany and the United 
States of North America; France apparently stands close upon the boundary line of 
the last stage; but Great Britain alone at the present time has actually reached it” 
(List, 1909, p. 93). 
In List’s opinion, a developing country at an earlier stage of economic development 
characterized by a backward agriculture should not protect its industries. On the contra-
ry, it should pursue free trade, both for the material gains and for the educational gains 
from contact with the more advanced countries. It is only after the country has attained 
a certain level of general economic development, including a thoroughly developed agri-
culture, that it should start giving protection to the main branches of its incipient 
manufacturing industry, which would promote the increase of the mental and material 
capital, the technical abilities and the spirit of enterprise of the nation. After arriving to 
the final stage of the development ladder, the former underdeveloped country should 
                                                
 
187 See List (1909, pp. 143-144). 
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embrace again the free-trade principle.188 But even then, List introduces an important 
political prerequisite: “If (...) we assume a universal union or confederation of all nations as the 
guarantee for an everlasting peace, the principle of international free trade seems to be perfectly justified” 
(List, 1909, p. 100). 
In chapter XII of The National System List introduces his Theory of the Powers of Produc-
tion. After making a distinction between wealth and the causes of wealth, he affirms that 
“the power of producing wealth is therefore infinitely more important than wealth itself; it insures not 
only the possession and the increase of what has been gained, but also the replacement of what has been 
lost” (List, 1909, p. 108). Therefore, the prosperity of a nation is not (…) greater in the 
proportion in which it has amassed more wealth (i.e. values of exchange), but in the proportion in which 
it has more developed its powers of production (List, 1909, p. 117). 
The sources of productive power are quite diverse and include, according to List 
(1909, p. 113), the Christian religion, monogamy, abolition of slavery and of vassalage, 
hereditability of the throne, invention of printing, of the press, of the postal system, of 
money, weights and measures, of the calendar, of watches, of police, the introduction of 
the principle of freehold property, of means of transport, among others. 
List believes that a country cannot cultivate these sources of powers of production 
within its national borders without a strong manufacturing sector, and that this sector 
cannot prosper if the country commerce freely with more developed economies. The 
objective of developing the national powers of production perfectly justifies the initial 
costs of infant industry protection.189 He is convinced that these initial costs will be 
compensated by future benefits from establishing domestic manufactures.190 
                                                
 
188 See List (1909, pp. 144-145). 
189 List states: “The foreign trade of a nation must not be estimated in the way in which individual merchants 
judge it, solely and only according to the theory of values (i.e. by regarding merely the gain at any particular mo-
ment of some material advantage); the nation is bound to keep steadily in view all these conditions on which its 
present and future existence, prosperity, and power depend” (List, 1909, p. 117).  
190 List states: “The nation must sacrifice and give up a measure of material property in order to gain culture, 
skill, and powers of united production; it must sacrifice some present advantages in order to insure to itself future 
ones. It is true that protective duties at first increase the price of manufactured goods; but it is just as true (...) that 
in the course of time, by the nation being enabled to build up a completely developed manufacturing power of its 
own, those goods are produced more cheaply at home than the price at which they can be imported from foreign 
parts. If, therefore, a sacrifice of value is caused by protective duties, it is made good by the gain of a power of 
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Notwithstanding the potential benefits, List makes several qualifications for the im-
plementation of infant-industry protection. Besides limiting the use of infant-industry 
protection to a certain stage of economic development, he also believes that protection 
should be temporary, i.e. confined to the infant stage of an industry, and that it should 
be gradually removed as the industry matures. Moreover, List considers that the use of 
protective measures should be confined to the manufacturing sector191; agriculture and 
raw materials should never be protected.192 
List’s contemporary supporters usually bring up the above-mentioned qualifications, 
particularly the selective and temporal nature of his claim for protection, in order to 
defend him from being portrayed as a far-fetched supporter of protectionism.193 If the 
domestic industry could never survive without protection, List would have regarded 
protection as unwisely granted. 
What these supporters often miss to mention is that List is willing to wait a long peri-
od of time before allowing protection to expire, calling it “ridiculous to allow a nation merely 
a few years for the task of bringing to perfection one great branch of national industry” (List, 1909, p. 
256). In the practical world, however, granting protection for a prolonged period of 
time factually equals to unlimited protection. Even so, Graham (1923, p. 202) accuses 
him of making the error of conceding too much to his opponents on this point. Besides 
this, List’s supporters also downplay the fact that he does not advance any specific crite-
                                                                                                                                     
 
production, which not only secures to the nation an infinitely greater amount of material goods, but also independ-
ence in case of war (...). A nation capable of developing a manufacturing power, if it makes use of the system of 
protection, thus acts quite the same spirit as that landed proprietor did who by the sacrifice of some material 
wealth allowed some of his children to learn a productive trade” (1909, pp. 117-118). 
191 In List’s words: “(...) the system of protection can be justified solely and only for the purpose of the industri-
al development of the nation” (1909, p. 152). 
192 List considers that “(...) free trade in agricultural products and raw materials is useful to all nations at all 
stages of their industrial development” (1909, p. 259). Because the production of agricultural products 
and raw materials needs no protection, imposing restrictions on the exchange of these commod-
ities “(...) must be disadvantageous under all circumstances to both nations — to that which imposes, as well as 
to that which suffers from such restrictions” (idem, p. 151). 
193 According to Shafaeddin (2000, p. 1), List recommends “(...) selective, rather than across-the-board, 
protection of infant industries and (...) was against neither international trade nor export expansion. In fact, he 
emphasizes the importance of trade and envisages free trade as an ultimate aim of all nations; he regards protec-
tion as an instrument for achieving development, massive export expansion and ultimately free trade.” 
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rion for making an accurate selection of those industries eligible for protection, which 
cast further doubts about the selective nature of his case for infant industry protection. 
On the other hand, List’s contemporary supporters barely mention that he explicitly 
introduces some remarkable limitations to his case for infant industry protection, which 
are particularly relevant for current developing countries. List explicitly states, for exam-
ple, that not all countries are well suited for infant industry protection. Because he is 
somehow convinced that manufactures can only flourish in temperate climates, he be-
lieves that tropical countries must never attempt to acquire manufactures through 
artificial means.194 
In addition to limiting the infant industry argument to countries located in the tem-
perate zone, List introduces additional geographical and socioeconomic prerequisites for 
granting infant industry protection: 
“Measures of protection are justifiable only for the purpose of furthering and pro-
tecting the internal manufacturing power, and only in the case of nations which 
through an extensive and compact territory, large population, possession of natural 
resources, far advanced agriculture, a high degree of civilisation and political devel-
opment, are qualified to maintain an equal rank with the principal agricultural 
manufacturing commercial nations, with the greatest naval and military powers” 
(List, 1909, p. 247). 
List’s supporters hardly mention the above exceptions — for obvious reasons. If 
List’s recommendations were to be followed to the letter, the immense majority of to-
day’s developing countries would be actually banned from using infant industry 
protection. That was indeed List’s intention, because his case for infant industry protec-
tion was conceived as a tailor-made economic theory for the incipient industrialists’ 
circles of the United States and his native country Germany. 
                                                
 
194 In his prior book, The Natural System of Political Economy, List (1838, pp. 75-76) states: “A 
country of the torrid zone would make a very fatal mistake, should it try to become a manufacturing country. 
Having received no invitation to that vocation from nature, it will progress more rapidly in riches and civilization 
if it continues to exchange its agricultural productions for the manufactured products of the temperate zone. It is 
true that tropical countries sink thus into DEPENDENCE upon those of the temperate zone, but that de-
pendence will not be without compensation, if competition arises among the nations of temperate climates in their 
manufacturing industry in their trade with the former (...) This competition will not only ensure a full supply of 
manufactures at low prices, but will prevent any one nation from taking advantage by its superiority over the 
weaker nation of the torrid zone (capital letters added).” 
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The few propositions mentioned in the above paragraphs constitute the theoretical 
fundament on which the infant industry argument ultimately rests. Looking at these few 
paragraphs, one may argue that it is inappropriate to summarize the infant industry ar-
gument in such a succinct way, taking into account the more or less bulky books 
previously written in support of it.  However, the greater part of these books is dedicat-
ed to recount numerous historical examples and case studies, which are usually 
presented in support of the otherwise squalid theoretical argumentation. 
Despite — or even because of — its vague theoretical formulation, the infant indus-
try argument has managed to survive criticism, and continues to occupy an uneasy place 
in the international trade theory. Eminent neoclassical economists have even considered 
it to be a legitimate exception to the case for free trade.195 These economists, though, 
have supported the argument based on a superficial case-study approach, and usually do 
not offer any deeper analysis of the underlying theory.196 Apparently, the intellectual 
authority of these academics has prevented others from independently reviewing the 
theoretical and practical merits of the infant industry argument. 
Moreover, neoclassical economists have arrived to opposite assessments regarding the 
theoretic acceptance of the infant industry argument by classical political economists. 
While some representatives of the neoclassical school of economic thought, for example 
Marshall197, have accused the classical political economists of being too dogmatically 
opposed to the infant industry argument — and therefore implicitly recognizing their 
rejection of the argument—; others, like Baldwin (1969) and Bhagwati (1988, p. 91), 
have affirmed that the practice of protecting new industries has a perfectly legitimate 
role within the classical free trade theory. Obviously, both sides cannot be right in their 
                                                
 
195 Irwin (1998) explicitly mentions Marshall and Taussig (1905) among those who have given 
some credit to the infant industry argument. 
196 Irwin states: “What economists including Mill had failed to do was to address the underlying economic 
structure of the infant industry argument in terms of specific market failures, specify the gains that accrue to a 
nation from naturalizing a certain industry, and then describe how these gains could compensate for the loss in-
curred while protecting the industry” (Irwin, 1998, p. 134). 
197 For a summary of Marshall’s view on free trade, see Deane (1990). 
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assessment. Therefore, the next section is dedicated to work out the accurate reception 
of the infant industry argument by classical political economy. 
4.3.3 List and the Classical Political Economy 
The assessment about the “perfectly legitimate role” of infant industry protection 
within the classical international trade theory appears to rest rather exclusively on J. S. 
Mill’s endorsement of the argument in the following passage of his Principles of Political 
Economy with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy: 
“The only case in which, on mere principles of political economy, protecting duties 
can be defensible, is when they are imposed temporarily (especially in a young and 
rising nation) in hopes of naturalizing a foreign industry, in itself perfectly suitable 
to the circumstances of the country. The superiority of one country over another 
in a branch of production, often arises only from having begun it sooner. There 
may be no inherent advantage on one part, or disadvantage on the other, but only 
a present superiority of acquired skill and experience. A country which has this skill 
and experience yet to acquire, may in other respects be better adapted to the pro-
duction than those which were earlier in the field: and besides, it is a just remark of 
Mr. Rae, that nothing has a greater tendency to promote improvements in any 
branch of production, than its trial under a new set of conditions. But it cannot be 
expected that individuals should, at their own risk, or rather to their certain loss, 
introduce a new manufacture, and bear the burthen of carrying it on until the pro-
ducers have been educated up to the level of those with whom the processes are 
traditional. A protecting duty, continued for a reasonable time, might sometimes 
be the least inconvenient mode in which the nation can tax itself for the support of 
such an experiment. But it is essential that the protection should be confined to 
cases in which there is good ground of assurance that the industry which it fosters 
will after a time be able to dispense with it; nor should the domestic producers ever 
be allowed to expect that it will be continued to them beyond the time necessary 
for a fair trial of what they are capable of accomplishing” (JSM, 1909, V.x.11). 
This isolated passage of J. S. Mill — an author which Karl Marx harshly criticized for 
his shallow syncretism198 — is clearly insufficient for claiming a general acceptance of 
the argument by the classical school of economic thought. The great consternation that 
J. S. Mill’s positive sanctioning of the infant-industry argument caused among political 
economists and free-trade activists of the time might be a clear indication that it was not 
                                                
 
198 See Marx (1962, p. 21). In the German original of Das Kapital, Marx writes “(...) Geistloser 
Synkretismus, wie ihn John Stuart Mill am besten repräsentiert.” 
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part of classical economic theory until then.199 Later, J. S. Mill repeatedly complained in 
his correspondence about the way his argument was being distorted by protectionists to 
justify high tariffs in the United States, Canada and Australia in the 1860s. He eventually 
recanted his view that import protection was an appropriate means of promoting infant 
industries, although he never abandoned his belief that such industries could exist and 
that this in principle constituted a genuine exception to free trade (Irwin, 1998, p. 
129).200 
As a matter of fact, none of the three most renowned representatives of classical po-
litical economy — Smith, Ricardo and Marx — have ever given any credit to the infant 
industry argument. And Marx, being the only one among them who had the opportunity 
to read List’s book, had nothing but scorn with respect to the magnum opus of his fel-
low citizen.201 
No one is perhaps better suited for proclaiming the incompatibility of the infant in-
dustry argument with classical political economy than List himself. He certainly would 
have been very surprised to hear that his case for infant industry protection is perfectly 
supported by classical political economy. It is rather unconceivable that any serious re-
searcher, after making even the most superficial review of The National System of Political 
Economy, could ever conclude that List’s analysis is rooted or backed by classical political 
economy. Right from the introduction of the National System, it is obvious that List con-
ceives his case for infant industry protection as a frontal attack to the insights of the 
                                                
 
199 Richard Cobden, the most prominent free trade activist in mid-nineteenth-century Britain, 
reportedly lamented on his deathbed: “I believe that the harm which Mill has done to the world by the 
passage in his book on Political Economy in which he favors the principle of protection in young communities has 
outweighed all the good which may have been caused by his other writings.” Quoted from Irwin (1998, p. 
128). 
200 John Stuart Mill writes: “Though I still think that the introduction of a foreign industry is often worth a 
sacrifice, and that a temporary protecting duty, if it were sure to remain temporary, would probably be the best 
shape in which that sacrifice can be made, I am inclined to believe that it is safer to make it by an annual grant 
from the public treasury, which is not nearly so likely to be continued indefinitely, to prop up an industry which 
has not so thriven as to be able to dispense with it” (JSM, XVI, p. 1516). And in another letter: “I am now 
much shaken in the opinion, which has so often been quoted for purposes which it did not warrant; and I am 
disposed to think that when it is advisable, as it may sometimes be, to subsidise a new industry in its commence-
ment, this had better be done by a direct annual grant, which is far less likely to be continued after the conditions 
which alone justified it have ceased to exist” (JSM, XVI, p. 1520). 
201 A detailed exposition of Marx’s critique towards List will be given in the next section. 
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classical school of economic thought. Moreover, the main reason why he chose to fun-
dament his trade policy recommendations largely on a historical rather than on a 
theoretical analysis is because he thought that the theoretical insights of classical political 
economy would lead to a rejection of his case. Thus, the supposed sanctioning of the 
infant industry argument by classical political economists would certainly prove List’s 
methodological approach worthless. 
List indicates two aspects that separate his doctrines from those of Smith and his fol-
lowers (Irwin, 1998, p. 124). First, after introducing a sharp distinction between Smith’s 
cosmopolitical economy and his national political economy202, he accuses Smith of ignoring 
the distinct and separate economic interest of particular nations in favor of a cosmopoliti-
cal view. Second, List accuses Smith and his school of taking a static view that value only 
current wealth to the exclusion of other factors that could be used to produce wealth. 
List believes that more attention should be devoted to production, because “production 
renders consumption possible” (List, 1909, p. 188) and, therefore, “the power of producing wealth 
is (...) infinitely more important than wealth itself; it ensures not only the possession and the increase of 
what has been gained, but also the replacement of what has been lost” (List, 1909, p. 108). 
List is absolutely right in considering his case for infant industry protection basically 
incompatible with classical political economy. His mischaracterization of classical inter-
national trade theory in the National System, though, should not be taken as basis for 
drawing the red line between the two. List’s charges against Smith are actually of such 
an extravagancy, that they do not bear even the most superficial scrutiny. For example, 
the first prove mentioned by List for Smith’s cosmopolitical approach is that he entitles 
his famous book “The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” (sic!). Besides the fact 
that the precise title of Smith’s book is actually longer, List deduces from the word “na-
tions” that Smith was thinking about the wealth “of all nations of the whole human race” (List, 
1909, p. 97). This rather embarrassing argument is indeed an indication for the scientific 
merit of List’s analysis of classical international trade theory. 
                                                
 
202 According to List (1909, p. 97), cosmopolitical economy is the “(...) science which teaches how the 
entire human race may attain prosperity”, whereas political economy is the “(…) science which limits its teaching 
to the inquiry how a given nation (under the existing conditions of the world) prosperity, civilisation, and power, 
by means of agriculture, industry, and commerce.” 
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List’s second charge regarding the development of the national productive powers, 
which he deems contrary to the approach of the classical school of economic thought, is 
artificially fabricated and not at all at variance with the insights of classical political 
economy. As the reader might remember, Smith already emphasized the positive effect 
of free trade on the development of the productive powers of labor in the respective 
countries. 
A few pages later, List finally indicates the real point of disagreement between him 
and Smith: the idea that the well-being of the individual is dependent altogether from 
the well-being of the whole human race. Smith’s cosmopolitical view — i.e. his convic-
tion that the economic interests of people living in different countries are ultimately 
bound together — is the result of his theoretical insights regarding the mutually benefi-
cial nature of trade — not his point of departure, as List wrongly suggests. 
4.3.4 A Classical Critique of the Infant Industry Argument 
The following critical review of the infant-industry argument is built on the insights 
of the classical case for free trade in chapter 2. Furthermore, it rests partially on Marx’s 
List Critique. Being a young German intellectual interested in economic affairs in the mid 
1840s, the publication of List’s book naturally caught his attention. In March 1845, 
Marx began to write a critical essay on The National System of Political Economy. Unfortu-
nately, he left his List Critique unfinished. The draft version of the article appears to have 
remained unknown long after his death, until a Russian translation was published in a 
Soviet historical journal in 1971.203 Although being merely an incomplete draft, it is per-
                                                
 
203 See “Karl Marks o knige F. Lista 'Natsional'naia sistema politicheskoi ekonomii”, Voprosy 
istorii KPSS, no. 12 (1971), pp. 3-27. The original German version appeared as K. Marx, “Über 
Friedrich Lists Buch Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie”, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Ar-
beiterbewegung, no. 3 (1972). It was reprinted as an appendix in Friedrich List, Das nationale 
System der politischen Ökonomie, ed. Günter Fabiunke (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1982), pp. 441-
477. The English translation, Karl Marx, “Draft of an Article on Friedrich List’s Book Das nationale 
System der politischen Ökonomie”, is in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 4 
(New York: International Publishers, 1975), pp. 265-293. It will be cited here as the “List Cri-
tique”. 
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fectly possible to identify Marx’s main lines of critique towards List.204 It can therefore 
be regarded as a valuable source for a classical critique of List’s infant-industry argu-
ment. 
In the List Critique, Marx unmasks his fellow compatriot as the leading spokesperson 
for the aspirations and economic interests of the incipient German capitalists. Not sur-
prisingly, Marx is merciless in his assessment of the nature and scope of the economic 
interests represented by List: 
“The German idealising philistine who wants to become wealthy must, of course, 
first create for himself a new theory of wealth, one which makes wealth worthy of 
his striving for it. The bourgeois in France and England see the approach of the 
storm which will destroy in practice the real life of what has hitherto been called 
wealth, but the German bourgeois, who has not yet arrived at this inferior wealth, 
tries to give a new, “spiritualistic” interpretation of it. He creates for himself an 
“idealising” political economy, which has nothing in common with profane French 
and English political economy, in order to justify to himself and the world that he, 
too, wants to become wealthy. The German bourgeois begins his creation of 
wealth with the creation of a highflown hypocritically idealising political economy” 
(List Critique, p. 267). 
According to Marx, List’s audacious attempt to modify the principles of political 
economy developed by British and French economists is merely the interested view-
point of the capitalists in a backward country. All the highfalutin talk about national 
political economy and productive forces of the nation is nothing other than a fraud and 
disguise for the German capitalist’s cynical materialism. Their spiritual talk about the 
German fatherland and the necessary sacrifice for the common good are nothing but 
ideological masquerades deliberately set up to mislead and, therefore, a mere cover-up 
for the drive for money, for wealth, because money and wealth are the real fatherland of 
the industrialist. Being capitalists in a backward country at the time, the German indus-
trialists seek State protection from the more advanced and powerful English and French 
capitalists. 
Marx pointed out that List’s theory was designated, among other purposes, to con-
vince the ruling class that granting protection to certain industries was of national 
                                                
 
204 Marx harsh criticism and unmask hostility towards List may surprise some scholars familiar 
with the work of many self-proclaimed Marxists. These so-called Marxists usually support List’s 
argument and oppose free trade. 
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interest. Since the German capitalists of that time, unlike their English and French 
counterparts, did not have state power at their disposal and therefore could not arbi-
trarily guide the economic policies of the government according to their economic 
interests, they had to resort to requests and present their demands as a concession to the 
State, whereas in reality they demanded concessions from the State.205 List’s empty ideal-
istic phraseology about the national economy impedes him to identify the real barriers 
standing in the way of his pious wishes — the high-ranking nobility, the bureaucracy 
and the feudal institutions ruling his home country at that time. These bastions of the 
ancient regime, and not the British and French capitalists, were the true impediments of 
the process of industrialization in Germany. 
Marx rightly regards List’s simultaneous support of free trade within a united Germa-
ny and his defense of external tariffs as contradictory: 
“Thus, the German philistine wants the laws of competition, of exchange value, of 
huckstering, to lose their power at the frontier barriers of his country! He is willing 
to recognise the power of bourgeois society only in so far as it is in accord with his 
interests, the interests of his class! He does not want to fall victim to a power to 
which he wants to sacrifice others, and to which he sacrifices himself inside his 
own country! Outside the country he wants to show himself and be treated as a 
different being from what he is within the country and how he himself behaves 
within the country! He wants to leave the cause in existence and to abolish one of 
its effects!” (List Critique, p. 280) 
The German capitalists claim government protection from the very same laws of 
competition operating outside the country that they praise inside the country with re-
gard to proletarians and fellow German capitalists. They want freedom to exploit the 
proletariat at home without having to compete in such exploitation with foreign capital-
                                                
 
205 Marx states: “The bourgeois wants protective tariffs from the state in order to lay his hands on state power 
and wealth. But since [in Germany] unlike in England and France, he does not have state power at his disposal 
and therefore cannot arbitrarily guide it as he likes, but has to resort to requests, it is necessary for him in relation 
to the state, the activity (mode of action) of which he wants to control for his own benefit, to depict his demand 
from it as a concession that he makes to the state, whereas [in reality] he demands concessions from the state. 
Therefore, through the medium of Herr List, he [the German Bourgeois] proves to the state that his theory differs 
from all others in that he allows the state to interfere in and control industry, in that he has the highest opinion of 
the economic wisdom of the state, and only asks it to give full scope for its wisdom, on condition, of course, that 
this wisdom is limited to providing “strong” protective tariffs. His demand that the state should act in accordance 
with his interests is depicted by him as recognition of the state, recognition that the state has the right to interfere 
in the sphere of civil society” (List Critique, p. 274). 
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ists. Their motives are thus completely materialistic and selfish. The protectionist poli-
cies recommended by List are designed to grant the German capitalists the exclusive 
right to exploit their fellow citizens, indeed exploit them even more than they were ex-
ploited from abroad, because protective tariffs require sacrifices from the consumers 
(Szporluk, 1988, pp. 35-36). 
Although List does recognize the material sacrifices that infant industry protection in-
flicts to the national consumer, he considers them merely as an initial loss which would 
be offset by greater economic benefits in the long run. A greater level of independence 
and security; a better division of labor with its impetus to developing skills and accumu-
lating capital; an optimal commodity composition of trade, which consists in exporting 
manufactured commodities and importing raw materials and agricultural products — 
these are the alleged benefits of creating a strong and competitive manufacturing base at 
home. 
Thus, List’ case for infant industry protection rests on the premise that less developed 
countries are allegedly not able to build up a strong domestic manufacturing sector 
without protection, because they cannot compete in manufacturing with the most ad-
vanced countries. List apparently believes that under an international free trade regime 
the most advanced countries would somehow monopolize the bulk of the world’s in-
dustrial production, while the less developed countries would be reduced to the role of 
agricultural producers and providers of raw materials. The majority of economists have 
too readily accepted this premise without carefully reviewing the actual meaning of the 
term manufacturing, on which the logical consistency of this premise ultimately rests. 
Manufacturing (from Latin manu factura, which means “making by hands”) is the use 
of tools and labor to make things for use or sale. In its earliest form manufacturing was 
usually carried out by a single skilled artisan with assistants, who learned their masters’ 
trade through long periods of apprenticeship. Curiously, at the beginning most manu-
facturing occurred in rural areas, where household-based manufacturing served as a 
supplemental subsistence strategy to agriculture. Later, entrepreneurs started to group a 
number of manufacturing households into a single enterprise through the so-called put-
ting-out system. 
The putting-out system was a method of subcontracting work, also known as the 
workshop system. In that system, a central agent gave work to subcontractors who com-
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pleted the work in their own facility, usually their own home. It was later replaced by 
inside contracting, which was the practice of hiring contractors who work inside the 
proprietor’s facility. Finally, inside contracting was replaced by the factory system, where 
every worker was an employee of the manufacturer directly. Nowadays the term manufac-
turing may refer principally to this latest and most advanced form — the large-scale 
industrial production in a factory —, but manufacturing can also imply in principle all 
the other forms mentioned above, covering a vast range of economic activity, from 
handicraft to high-tech industries. 
Industrial production can be described as the mechanical making of standardized 
products from standardized inputs under identical production conditions. Its goal is a 
large-scale output of commodities with nearly identical quality attributes. The ascension 
period of the industrial method of production as the dominant form of manufacturing is 
known as the Industrial Revolution. The logical opposite for industrial methods of produc-
tion has always been handicraft production, i.e. the individual making of non-identical 
products under non-identical production conditions. 
Although humankind has created different forms of manufacturing for organizing the 
productive forces of labor, each and every specific form of manufacturing has always 
described a particular way or method of producing commodities. Therefore, it is logical-
ly inconsistent and misleading to contrast industrial production to a certain branch of 
the economy like agriculture or mining, because these last two activities refer to the 
production of specific commodities, and not to a particular method of production. It is 
perfectly possible to encounter industrial methods of production in the extraction of 
raw materials and food production as well — agro-industrial complexes, for example. 
Indeed, in economically advanced countries it is rather common to encounter industrial 
methods of production in every branch of the economy, including economic activities 
that are usually not associated with the term “industry” like gastronomy (franchise res-
taurants) and travelling (all-inclusive travel packages). 
When proponents of the infant-industry argument emphasize the intrinsic importance 
of manufacturing, are they referring to the production of certain commodities (which?) 
or just prizing the benefits of the industrial method of production in general? If they 
mean the later, then they have to accept the fact that industrial methods of production 
can be applied in principle to the making of almost every kind of commodity. 
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After bringing some light to the term manufacturing, it should be clear that the basic 
argument of those who favor infant industry protection — i.e. that under an interna-
tional free trade regime it would be impossible for less developed countries to 
successfully compete with the most advanced economies and build up a strong domestic 
manufacturing base — cannot be accurate. Anyone who believes that this is indeed a 
probable outcome does not understand the classical rule of specialization nor compara-
tive advantage — i.e. Ricardo’s original meaning of the insight and not the neoclassical 
caricature of it. Initially, less developed countries might indeed not be able to host the 
most technologically advanced production facilities, but they will specialize in the pro-
duction of other commodities according to their comparative advantage, and will also 
increasingly deploy superior industrial methods of production to fabricate them. 
Therefore, List’s basic contraposition of agriculture versus manufacturing, although 
perfectly understandable in the period when the National System was written, is not accu-
rate anymore since nowadays agricultural products are produced by industrial methods 
of production as well. A more promising contraposition in terms of the infant industry 
argument seems to be the one which differentiate between different kinds of industrial 
sectors, for example processing vs. extracting industries, high-tech vs. low-tech indus-
tries. This approach essentially states that the pattern of specialization matters (i.e. some 
industrial sectors are intrinsically more valuable than others), that free trade would result 
in a harmful pattern of specialization for developing countries, and therefore, that the 
government has to guarantee that the national economy specializes in the right kind of 
industrial sectors. 
The sectors esteemed worthy of support have to be chosen according to dynamic fac-
tors. Countries should naturalize industrial sectors with prospects of long-term growth 
in output, profits and wages (Wade, 1990, p. 355). Amsden cites the case of Taiwan, 
where the government picked industries based on six criteria; large linkage effects; high 
market potential; high technology intensity; high value-added; low energy intensity; and 
low pollution (Amsden, 2004, p. 137). 
The problem with these plausible-sounding criteria for targeting industrial sectors lies 
in the details. Take for example the concept of linkages effects. Hirschman (1958, p. 
100) distinguishes two varieties: 1) The input-provision, derived demand, or backward 
linkage effects, i.e., every non-primary economic activity, will induce attempts to supply 
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through domestic production the inputs needed in that activity; and 2) the output-
utilization or forward linkage effects, i.e., every activity that does not by its nature cater 
exclusively to final demands, will induce attempts to utilize its outputs as inputs in some 
new activities. According to Hirschman, the linkage effects of a given product line can 
be defined as “investment-generating forces that are set in motion, through input-
output relations, when productive facilities that supply inputs to that line or utilize its 
outputs are inadequate or nonexistent. Backward linkages lead to new investment in 
input-supplying facilities and forward linkages to investment in output-using facilities” 
(Hirschman, 1981, p. 65). 
Besides the complications that accrue when trying to measure the linkage effects of 
particular sectors (Jones L. P., 1976), it seems that they are already accounted for in the 
classical concept of division of labor. The sectors with a high level of division of labor 
are also the ones with the greatest interrelations and linkages with other sectors. How-
ever, whereas the classical concept incorporates the benefits of the national and well as 
international division of labor, the concept of linkage effects seems to regard the eco-
nomic interrelations between national producers as intrinsically more desirable than the 
international ones. 
Moreover, five of the six criteria mentioned by Amsden refer to issues that corre-
spond to the method of production, and not to specific commodity attributes. One can 
infer from this that what really matters is not so much the kind of commodities chosen 
for specialization but how they are produced, i.e. what methods of production are de-
ployed for producing them. Some commodities are highly regarded because they require 
the most advanced methods of production; they simply cannot be produced without 
them. Other commodities, like potatoes or sugar, can be produced under the most ru-
dimentary conditions as well. The method of production, along with the national and 
international competitive conditions, will determine the level of profits, wages and the 
growth rate of certain economic activities. Ceteris paribus, the most sophisticated and 
efficient methods of production will yield the highest income for the factors of produc-
tion involved. 
Besides the difficulties in selecting the right industrial sectors, Smith reminds us to 
take into account the probable effects in other sectors of the economy as well. By di-
verting resources from other branches of industry into a particular channel, the targeted 
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industry may indeed flourish and, after a certain period of time, match or even undercut 
the unitary real costs of producing a particular commodity in other countries.206 Smith 
rightfully considers this output to be possible yet far from certain, because no one can 
anticipate the actions of foreign competitors and governments. But even if the most 
optimistic outcome is taken for certain and the proclaimed objectives are accomplished, 
it would not follow that the real income had been increased by such a procedure. 
Imports have to be paid ultimately with exports. Thus, if the government decides to 
protect the commodities produced by an infant industry, it is necessarily withdrawing 
capital and human resources from other domestic industries. This means that fostering 
the national production of certain commodities always comes at the expense of the do-
mestic production of other commodities. The classical analysis regarding opportunity 
costs still applies. Any government-guided channeling of resources towards infant in-
dustries necessarily implies an initial withdraw of resources that had been already 
employed in other branches of the economy. As Smith points out, the immediate effect 
of protective measures — tariffs or subsidies — is a reduction of wealth. Since the ac-
cumulation of capital is dependent on the amount of wealth available, the wealth of a 
country is likely to augment faster without the initial loss. 
Putting the theoretical analysis aside, let us turn the attention now to the prolific his-
torical evidence in favor of infant industry protection. It is a well-documented fact that 
both early industrialized and newly industrialized countries — with the exception per-
haps of Hong Kong — have used some sort of infant industry protection (Shafaeddin, 
1998). Is this overwhelming historical evidence not a sufficient proof for the alleged 
requirement of infant industry protection? 
Classical free traders would counter that today’s industrialized countries have been 
able to develop economically despite — not because — their extensive record of protec-
tionist measures. But if they have done so, isn’t it possible to conclude that international 
trade policy — whether free trade or protection — is actually irrelevant for achieving 
economic development? Classical economists would emphatically reject this conclusion. 
Their conviction has always been that free international trade may speed up the process 
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Chapter 4: Some Arguments against Free Trade Revisited  
-177- 
of industrial development, not that protection impedes industrialization. They firmly 
believe that countries can increase the real income of their citizens more rapidly by fol-
lowing a free trade policy than by implementing the most sophisticated system of 
protection. 
Some free traders may be tempted to counter the numerous historical examples of the 
supporters of infant industry protection by presenting some historical examples in sup-
port of the case for free trade. Through historical evidence, though, one may prove a 
certain level of correlation between two events, but one has to offer a logically con-
sistent theory for establishing a causal relation between them. It is simply impossible to 
empirically prove the proposition that a country would have achieved a higher rate of 
economic growth rate under free trade than protection — or vice versa — by relying on 
historical research alone, because one cannot reproduce the experiment under the same 
set of conditions. Historical examples may be found in support or against a specific 
trade policy, but none will be truly convincing for either side of the debate. A satisfacto-
ry answer can only be found by carefully contrasting the theoretic case for free trade 
with the case for infant industry protection. In my opinion, the case for free trade con-
ceived by the classical political economists is by far more convincing and logically 
consistent than the argument for protecting infant industries. 
List’s contemporary supporters, particularly those who are fervent sympathizers of 
the German Historical School, would probably criticize the above affirmation as the 
standard assessment of a theoretical economist who professes an intrinsic aversion 
against history and therefore automatically disqualifies objective historical facts as inva-
lid proves. Many neoclassical economists may indeed profess such an intrinsic aversion 
towards the study of history, but their methodological approach has not been the guid-
ing approach of this doctoral thesis. Fortunately, Karl Marx, who can hardly be regarded 
as an ahistorical neoclassical economist, also rejects List’s profuse historical evidence, 
unmasking the treatment of history in The National System of Political Economy in the fol-
lowing terms: 
“Being a true German philistine, Herr List, instead of studying real history, looks 
for the secret, bad aims of individuals, and, owing to his cunning, he is very well 
able to discover them (puzzle them out). He makes great discoveries, such as that 
Adam Smith wanted to deceive the world by his theory, and that the whole world 
let itself be deceived by him until the great Herr List woke it from its dream, rather 
in the way that a certain Düsseldorf Counsellor of justice made out that Roman 
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history had been invented by medieval monks in order to justify the domination of 
Rome” (List Critique, p. 266). 
Current supporters of the infant industry argument, for example Chang (2002), often 
reproduce List’s attitude of suspecting and looking for undisclosed aims, but instead of 
specific individuals, he accuses developed countries and the international organizations 
controlled by them of following a hidden agenda. According to Chang, the real purpose 
behind the developed countries’ support of free trade is to kick away the ladder they have 
used to reach their present level of economic development. The truth is, though, that 
the governments of developed countries are rather shutting the developing countries 
out from the current process of economic globalization by protectionist policies like the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. 
In resume, the critical review of List’s case for infant industry protection reveals sig-
nificant logical gaps in its main propositions. Specifically, List fails to demonstrate how 
free trade would impede the process of industrialization in less developed countries. 
Moreover, neither him nor his followers offer solid criteria for selecting the industrial 
sectors which qualify for infant industry protection. This important omission leaves the 
door wide open for the possible misuse of the infant industry argument for backing-up 
vulgar protectionist interests. Furthermore, it seems quite ironic that nowadays List’s 
case for infant industry protection is presented as the optimal trade policy for develop-
ing countries, since he explicitly ruled out the use of infant industry protection for 
promoting industrialization in small countries located in torrid climate zones — precise-
ly the typical characteristics of the majority of today’s developing countries. 
Developing countries do not have to rely on infant industry protection in order to 
developed their national productive forces and achieve economic growth. On the con-
trary, a free trade policy, if implemented properly, is perfectly capable of promoting the 
adoption of industrial methods of production and spurring economic growth through-
out the developing countries, as the next chapter will show. 
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5 Implementing Free Trade In Developing Countries 
To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored 
in Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia 
should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of the publick, but 
what is much more unconquerable, the private interests of many individu-
als, irresistibly oppose it. 
Adam Smith 
5.1 Free Trade and Economic Development  
The question of whether the classical case for free trade is suitable for the economic 
reality of developing countries has already drawn a considerable amount of controversy 
in the economic literature.207 Myint (1958, p. 317) resumes the twists of this controversy 
as followed: 
“The critics start with the intention of showing that the “nineteenth-century pat-
tern” of international trade, whereby the underdeveloped countries export raw 
materials and import manufactured goods, has been unfavourable to the economic 
development of these countries. But instead of trying to show this directly, they 
concentrate their attacks on the “classical theory”, which they believe to be re-
sponsible for the unfavourable pattern of trade. The orthodox economists then 
come to the defense of the classical theory by reiterating the principle of compara-
tive costs which they claim to be applicable both to the developed and the 
underdeveloped countries. After this, the controversy shifts from the primary 
question whether or not the nineteenth-century pattern of international trade, as a 
historical reality, has been unfavourable to the underdeveloped countries to the 
different question whether or not the theoretical model assumed in the compara-
tive-costs analysis is applicable to these countries.” 
This longstanding academic debate is irremediably vitiated by the misinterpretation of 
Ricardo’s comparative advantage. As a result, both sides of the debate have inevitably 
taken an erroneous path. The arguments of the critics regarding the applicability of the 
traditional interpretation of comparative advantage to the developing countries are es-
sentially right. The problem, however, is that they are criticizing a theoretic model of 
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in Viner (1953). 
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international trade that has very little in common — if anything at all — with Ricardo’s 
original insights, and thus should not be considered as part of the classical theory of 
international trade in the first place. Correspondingly, the neoclassical economists have 
not been defending the applicability of a classical concept to the economic reality of de-
veloping countries, but propagating a misinterpreted version of Ricardo’s numerical 
example. 
The misinterpretation of Ricardo’s numerical example — along with the omission of 
the other crucial propositions — has lead to the formulation of a rifted, mutilated, con-
tradictious and unrealistic case for free trade, paving the way for theoretic assaults on its 
core pillars. With the accurate restatement of comparative advantage, though, it is pos-
sible to appreciate the plain elegance and logical consistency of the classical case for free 
trade, as well as the essentially complementary nature of the theoretic insights of Smith 
and Ricardo with respect to international trade. Moreover, the necessary restatement of 
the classical case for free trade shows that it is based on a theoretic system of closely 
interlinked propositions and insights, and thus should not be reduced to a single propo-
sition, as has often been the erroneous practice in recent years.208 
Irrespective of the specific answer to the historical question of whether or not the 
nineteenth-century of international trade has been favorable to the developing countries, 
it is important to acknowledge that the classical theory of international trade does not 
recommend any particular pattern of trade for developing countries in general. It does 
not affirm, for example, that all developing countries should specialize in agriculture 
whereas the advanced countries should specialize in the production of manufactures, as 
many critics wrongly suggest. What the classical theory of international trade does is to 
offer an accurate explanation of past and current patterns of international trade. Fur-
thermore, it demonstrates that the trade patterns resulting from a world trading system 
based on the principle of free trade would be necessarily beneficial for every country 
involved, irrespective of its particular level of economic development. 
The support for free trade by classical political economists is based on the insight that 
it would increase the amount of wealth available in a country, which is a necessary pre-
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condition for achieving and sustaining a high level of economic development. One of 
the central features of the classical theory of international trade is precisely the emphasis 
given to the close connection and mutual interaction between international trade and 
domestic economic development, in particular the importance of foreign exchange for 
developing the productive forces of labor. By widening the extent of the market and the 
scope of the division of labor, international trade creates favorable conditions for tech-
nical innovations in the methods of production, enabling the exporting firms to reap off 
the benefits of increasing returns to scale by the deployment of sophisticated machinery. 
In classical political economy the theory of international trade is in fact so closely inter-
woven with the theory of domestic economic development that one may called it the 
classical trade-cum-development approach, extending the term originally coined by Myint 
(1977) to describe only the Smithean approach to Ricardo as well.209 
Until now, this doctoral thesis has been emphasizing rather exclusively the expected 
positive effects of free trade on the growth of real income per head. The central mes-
sage and preliminary conclusion of the prior chapters has been that free trade is indeed 
the most favorable trade policy for increasing the wealth and bettering the general living 
conditions of the population of any country, independently of its actual level of eco-
nomic development. It should be seen as a dynamic force in the quest for economic 
development. That being said, it is important to realize that this assertion does not imply 
that trade liberalization has only positive effects on the real income of every single indi-
vidual at any moment in time. Since free trade encourages the productive forces of 
labor, the resulting increase in labor productivity is not always achieved by producing a 
greater amount of commodities and services with the same amount of labor; if that were 
the case, the implementation of free trade would be a benign process for all parties in-
volved, since no one looses. In the real world, however, increases in labor productivity 
are often the result of producing a greater amount of commodities and services with less 
amount of labor. Moreover, some national producers might get hurt by the increased 
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Chapter 5: Implementing Free Trade In Developing Countries 
-182- 
level of national as well as international competition, and might eventually get out of 
business. 
These individual losses cannot be downplayed nor balanced up by referring to the 
positive effects of free trade like the lower nominal prices of the imported commodities, 
which amount to an increase in real income for the national consumers. It is certainly 
true that every producer is also a consumer, and that all consumers benefit from the 
resulting lower commodity prices. For those individuals who may lose their jobs or 
businesses, though, this undisputed fact offers very little consolation, since the expected 
income loss will certainly exceed any real income gains as consumers, as well as the indi-
vidual burden of any particular protectionist policy in favor of their industry. Thus, one 
cannot affirm that free trade is in the best economic interest of every single individual at 
any moment in time, although it might be highly beneficial for the society as a whole. 
A failure to recognize and address the above-mentioned downside may cause consid-
erable economic hardship and distress to particular groups, diminishing the political 
support for further trade liberalizations. It is therefore not sufficient to merely highlight 
the crucial role of free trade in achieving economic development, but also to indicate the 
most reasonable way for its implementation. Therefore, the following section deals with 
some important recommendations of the classical school of economic thought regard-
ing the implementation of free trade. While these recommendations are valid and 
relevant for developed as well as developing countries, they are even more so for the 
later. 
5.2 Some Classical Recommendations for Implementing Free Trade 
5.2.1 Abstain from Signing Preferential Trade Agreements 
The most outstanding feature of present-day international trade politics is the prolif-
eration of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) throughout the world.210 Virtually all 
                                                
 
210 I follow here Bhagwati’s recommendation of using the term preferential trade agreements instead 
of free trade agreements to highlight the fact that these trade agreements are preferential (i.e., dis-
criminatory) and therefore essentially different from nondiscriminatory free trade. Bhagwati’s 
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countries are now members of at least one PTA. There are total of over 350 PTAs re-
ported to the WTO. Even if only active PTAs are counted, the estimated total is still 
large. The vast majority of these PTAs are free trade agreements (FTAs); only a few of 
them contain an added common external tariff that converts them into customs unions 
(CUs), like the European Union and Mercosur. 
The proliferation of PTAs in recent years has to do with the fact that many politicians 
mistakenly believe that by signing PTAs they are pursuing a free trade agenda and ad-
vancing the cause of free trade (Bhagwati J. , 2008, p. 11). They apparently think that a 
free trader should support all kinds of trade liberalization, and that any reduction of 
trade barriers is as good as any other. These politicians seldom realize that free trade 
areas and customs unions are always a mix of free trade and protection. When a free 
trade area is formed and trade barriers are eliminated among members, while the exter-
nal barriers to nonmembers are left unchanged, the handicap suffered by non-members 
with respect to rival companies producing in the member countries increases. Thus free 
trade areas are two-faced: they increase free trade among members but also increase 
protection against nonmembers (Bhagwati J. , 2008, pp. 16-17). 
More importantly, PTAs directly contradict the principle of nondiscrimination in 
trade, which is an essential pillar for building a fair and efficient world trading system. 
The principle of nondiscrimination is legally codified in the most favored nation (MFN) 
clause, under which any member of a trade treaty would automatically receive the same 
lowest tariff that any other signatory of the treaty would enjoy.211 The MFN principle is 
one of the cornerstones of the GATT treaty and later the WTO.  
The primacy of MFN in the GATT’s rules meant that any exceptions to MFN were 
explicitly provided for. Unfortunately, the relatively stringent requirements, originally 
                                                                                                                                     
 
since, as he rightly points out, PTAs are not always regional in any meaningful way. See Bhagwa-
ti (2008, p. xi). 
211 This is the unconditional MFN. There is also the conditional MFN, under which tariff reduc-
tions made to one member of the treaty had to be offered to another member but did not 
automatically extend to that other member unless it made some reciprocal tariff reductions as 
well. The GATT embodied the unconditional MFN as its central organizing principle, with 
some explicit exceptions such as Article 24, which permitted the formation of free trade areas 
and CUs. 
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built into Article XXIV of the GATT treaty as preconditions that had to be satisfied 
before exceptions to MFN could be invoked, have been progressively reduced to near 
irrelevance.212 The most disturbing disregard of Article XXIV requirements has taken 
place for the developing countries. During the 1970s the developing countries sought 
and were granted what came to be known as special and differential treatment (SDT). 
Under the so-called Enabling Clause the developing countries can escape altogether from 
the discipline of Article XXIV, as long as the PTA is amongst less-developed contract-
ing parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and non-tariff measures on 
products imported from one another. 
The main disadvantage of preferential trade agreements is already mentioned in the 
Wealth of Nations: 
“When a nation binds itself by treaty either to permit the entry of certain goods 
from one foreign country which it prohibits from all others, or to exempt the 
goods of one country from duties to which it subjects those [324] of all others, the 
country, or at least the merchants and manufacturers of the country, whose com-
merce is so favoured, must necessarily derive great advantage from the treaty. 
Those merchants and manufacturers enjoy a sort of monopoly in the country 
which is so indulgent to them. That country becomes a market both more exten-
sive and more advantageous for their goods: more extensive, because the goods of 
other nations being either excluded or subjected to heavier duties, it takes off a 
greater quantity of theirs: more advantageous, because the merchants of the fa-
voured country, enjoying a sort of monopoly there, will often sell their goods for 
better price than if exposed to the free competition of all other nations” (WN, 
IV.vi.1, p. 545). 
Such treaties, however, though they may be advantageous to the merchants and 
manufacturers of the favoured, are necessarily disadvantageous to those of the fa-
vouring country. A monopoly is thus granted against them to a foreign nation; and 
they must frequently buy the foreign goods they have occasion for, dearer than if 
the free competition of other nations was admitted. That part of its own produce 
with which, such a nation purchases foreign goods, must consequently be sold 
cheaper, because when two things are exchanged for one another, the cheapness of 
the one is a necessary consequence, or rather is the same thing with the dearness of 
the other. The exchangeable value of its annual produce, therefore, is likely to be 
diminished by every such treaty. This diminution, however, [325] can scarce 
amount to any positive loss, but only to a lessening of the gain which it might oth-
erwise make. Though it sells its goods cheaper than it otherwise might do, it will 
not probably sell them for less than they cost; nor, as in the case of bounties, for a 
price which will not replace the capital employed in bringing them to market, to-
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gether with the ordinary profits of stock. The trade could not go on long if it did. 
Even the favouring country, therefore, still gain by the trade, though less than if 
there was a free competition (WN, IV.vi.2, p. 545).  
In the above quote Smith refers to the fact that by pursuing trade liberalization 
through PTAs the favoring country obtains its imports relatively more expensive com-
pared to a non-preferential trade liberalization, which secures that a country will always 
obtain its imports from the most efficient supplier. Thus, by giving preferences to par-
ticular foreign exporters, the favoring country incurs in a terms-of-trade loss. It still 
gains from trade, but less compared to genuine free trade. 
Besides this main disadvantage of PTAs with respect to non-preferential trade liberal-
ization, the developing countries jeopardize some crucial advantages directly associated 
with the MFN principle. First, the MFN principle secures developing countries the same 
preferences that developed countries often grant to each other, and that developing 
countries would probably be not powerful enough to obtain in bilateral trade negotia-
tions. Second, having only one set of tariffs for all countries simplifies the rules and 
makes them more transparent, eliminating the administrative nightmare of having to 
establish arbitrary rules of origin to determine which country a product must be at-
tributed to for customs purposes. Moreover, these rules of origin often vary across 
different FTAs by the same country, and across different commodities within each 
FTA. The complications and costs associated with the handling of different rules of 
origin are particularly onerous for small companies and poorer countries. All these dis-
advantages makes PTAs a particularly unattractive trade liberalization option for 
developing countries relative to the MFN principle. 
For the developed countries the biggest motivation to favor PTAs over the multilat-
eral route for freeing trade has been to use PTAs for advancing trade-unrelated agendas 
— for example intellectual property protection (IPP) — beyond what the multilateral 
negotiations had already yielded.213 Lobbies in the United States have been particularly 
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ing them into trade treaties and institutions typically mislead by claiming that their agendas are “trade-related”. 
Thus, intellectual property protection has to do with collecting royalties, not with trade. (…) By inserting the 
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software lobbies managed to get the U.S. trade representative at the Uruguay Round to get the issue into the newly 
Chapter 5: Implementing Free Trade In Developing Countries 
-186- 
successful in pressuring the U.S. administrations and Congress to impose trade-
unrelated areas in one-on-one negotiations with weaker countries. Such concessions 
have been a precondition for FTA approval (Bhagwati J. , 2008, p. 46). 
It is noteworthy that the PTAs among developing countries are almost never charac-
terized by the inclusion of such trade-unrelated issues. They concentrate exclusively on 
trade liberalization. It is only when the hegemonic powers — principally the United 
States but increasingly the European Union as well — are involved that one finds the 
inclusion of such extraneous matters. Trade-unrelated agendas have no demonstrable 
advantage and, in fact, clear disadvantages for the developing countries. Although they 
are of central concern for powerful lobby groups within the developed countries, these 
trade-unrelated issues are often presented as if they were addressing the needs of the 
developing countries, even if they are not the main producers of intellectual property. 
Developing countries are forced to accept onerous trade-unrelated demands as the per-
manent price for preferences whose effectiveness steadily erodes as they are extended to 
others (Bhagwati J. , 2008, pp. 71-72). 
A growing amount of theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that the prolifera-
tion of PTAs has a malign effect on the progress of multilateral trade negotiations.214 
PTAs provide an incentive for large trading partners like the U.S. and the European 
Union not to reduce MFN tariffs, because the value of its preferential tariffs decreases 
with any reduction of the MFN tariffs. Thus, the PTAs should be regarded as stumbling 
blocks rather than building blocks toward multilateral nondiscriminatory trade liberaliza-
tion, according to the terminology introduced by Bhagwati (1991). 
                                                                                                                                     
 
formed WTO in 1995. Thanks to this trickery, and use of U.S. political muscle, the WTO became a tripod 
with three legs: two legitimate ones (the GATT on goods trade and the GATS on service trade) and one illegiti-
mate one (TRIPs).” 
214 See Krishna (1998). For an overview of the major developments in the theory of PTAs after 
1945, see the Appendix in Bhagwati (2008). For the empirical evidence regarding the U.S., see 
Limão (2006). 
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The negative effects of the proliferation of PTAs can be partially contained or revert-
ed by reducing the MFN tariffs to negligible levels.215 However, as Bhagwati — one of 
the most prominent supporters of this course of action —, recognizes, this is a rather 
partial solution, since it only addresses the damage done by PTAs to the world trading 
system through tariff preferences; it does not address the issue of trade-unrelated agen-
das, which are particularly onerous for developing countries.216 The next section sug-
suggests a more radical course of action. 
5.2.2 Implementing Free Trade Unilaterally 
Every country, irrespective of its particular level of economic development, should 
pursue unilateral trade liberalization. This simple and plain solution suggested by the 
economic science — at least by the classical school of economic thought —, is yet very 
difficult to implement in the political arena, since it has to overcome two formidable 
obstacles: the vested economic interests of powerful groups and the prejudices of the 
majority of people. Many wrongly consider free trade as a concession that one govern-
ment makes towards other governments, with the sole purpose of obtaining a similar 
concession from them. Consequently, reciprocity is considered a necessary precondition 
for implementing free trade at home, because otherwise it would be a harmful trade 
policy for the national interests. As classical international trade theory shows, though, 
free trade is in the very best interest of every nation, irrespective of other governments’ 
actions, and should thus be implemented unilaterally. 
Unilateral trade liberalization is the opposite of what Jagdish Bhagwati (1991) has 
called aggressive unilateralism, the controversial new trade tactic adopted by the U.S. gov-
ernment in 1985. Before that year, the U.S. postwar approach to trade liberalization had 
been to encourage multilateral negotiations in which the participating countries ex-
change reciprocal commitments to lower trade barriers under the auspices of the 
                                                
 
215 Bhagwati (2008, p. 97) states: “Preferences are relative to the MFN tariff. So if we cannot do much about 
PTAs directly to remove the preference, we can virtually eliminate PTAs by reducing the MFN tariff itself to 
zero.” 
216 See Bhagwati (2008, p. 98). 
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GATT. Under the new trade tactic, though, the U.S. government aggressively demands 
from its trading partners to reduce real or imagined barriers to U.S. exports and direct 
investment, and to enforce the protection of intellectual property rights of U.S. corpora-
tions. This U.S. trade tactic is unilateral in two respects. First, the U.S. government 
frequently decides unilaterally if a foreign trade practice is unfair. Second, it typically 
requires that its trading partners should unilaterally liberalize without any reciprocal 
actions from the United States (Bayard & Elliott, 1994, p. 1). 
The recommendation of implementing free trade on a unilateral basis, though, should 
not be interpreted as an invitation for the developing countries to ignore longstanding 
trade restrictions and protectionist barriers put in place by the developed countries. This 
novel version of protectionism — the traditional version of protectionism was mostly 
put in place by less developed countries towards the most advanced country of the time 
— is indeed very harmful for both sides, effectively curtailing the economic develop-
ment efforts of many developing countries. Reciprocity is indeed important and 
necessary, but it should not be viewed as a pre-condition for implementing free trade at 
home. Perhaps the developing countries may accomplish their strategic objective of 
removing the protectionist barriers of the developed countries more rapidly by imple-
menting free trade on a unilateral basis and, simultaneously, strengthening their lobbying 
efforts among those groups and economic sectors in the developed countries which 
favor free trade. 
5.2.3 Refrain from Automatic Retaliation 
The question of whether a country should implement free trade on a unilateral basis 
is completely different from the question of whether a government should retaliate for 
trade restrictions recently imposed by other trading partners. New restrictions on inter-
national trade never fail to hurt both parties — the country that put them in place as 
well as the host country of the companies that produce the targeted commodities. “Re-
venge in this case”, as Smith rightly points out, “naturally dictates retaliation, and that we should 
impose the like duties and prohibitions upon the importation of some or all of their manufactures. Na-
tions, accordingly, seldom fail to retaliate in this manner” (WN, IV.ii.38, p. 467). 
In the following paragraph, though, Smith questions the economic logic behind these 
retaliations: 
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 “There may be good policy in retaliations of this kind, when there is a probability 
that they will procure the repeal of the high duties or prohibitions complained of. 
The recovery of a great foreign market will generally more than compensate the 
transitory inconveniency of paying dearer during a short time for some sorts of 
goods. To judge whether such retaliations are likely to produce such an effect, does 
not, perhaps, belong so much to the science of a legislator, whose deliberations 
ought to be governed by general principles which are always the same, as to the 
skill of that insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman or politician, 
whose councils are directed by the momentary fluctuations of affairs. When there 
is no probability that any such repeal can be procured, it seems a bad method of 
compensating the injury done to certain classes of our people, to do another injury 
ourselves, not only to those classes, but to almost all the other classes of them” 
(WN, IV.ii.39, p. 468). 
Smith is therefore against automatic retaliations, because a retaliatory tariff does not 
benefit the national producers affected by foreign trade restrictions and prohibitions. In 
fact, these national producers are hurt double by this kind of retaliation, since they — 
along the rest of the country — have to buy dearer the foreign commodities targeted by 
the retaliatory tariffs. 
Retaliatory tariffs are only justified if they lead to the repeal of trade restrictions and 
prohibitions imposed by foreign governments. However, to judge whether the use of 
retaliatory tariffs as a bargaining counter in trade negotiations will bear the desired result 
is beyond the confines of the economic science. If retaliatory tariffs are unlikely to bring 
about the repeal of these trade restrictions and prohibitions, they are not an appropriate 
response. Granting direct support to the affected national producers in form of tempo-
rary subsidies or tax exemptions seems to be a more effective measure for alleviating the 
economic hardships occasioned by foreign trade restrictions and prohibitions. 
5.2.4 A Gradual Implementation of Free Trade 
Both Smith and Ricardo were very much aware and concerned about the potential 
distress caused by any sudden change in the general conditions of international trade as 
a result of a hasty implementation or restoration of free trade. In their times, these sud-
den changes in international trade were often caused by the recurrent outbreak of war 
and the subsequent restoration of peace. Smith was particularly concerned about the 
effects on those branches of the economy that employ many people, as the following 
paragraph shows: 
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“The case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation, how far, or in 
what manner it is proper to restore the free importation of foreign goods, after it 
has been for some time interrupted, is, when particular manufactures, by means of 
high duties or prohibitions upon all foreign goods which can come into competi-
tion with them, have been so far extended as to employ a great multitude of hands. 
Humanity may in this case require that the freedom of trade should be restored 
only by slow gradations, and with a good deal of reserve and circumspection. Were 
those high duties and prohibitions taken away all at once, cheaper foreign goods of 
the same kind might be poured so fast into the home market, as to deprive all at 
once many thousands of our people of their ordinary employment and means of 
subsistence. The disorder that this would occasion might no doubt be very consid-
erable” (WN, IV.ii.40, pp. 468-469). 
A few paragraphs later, Smith expressed similar concerns regarding the negative im-
pact on the economic interests of factory owners with a high amount of fixed capital 
invested: 
 “The undertaker of a great manufacture who, by the home markets being sudden-
ly laid open to the competition of foreigners, should be obliged to abandon his 
trade, would no doubt suffer very considerably. That part of his capital which had 
usually been employed in purchasing materials and in paying his workmen, might, 
without much difficulty, perhaps, find another employment. But that part of it 
which was fixed in workhouses, and in the instruments of trade, could scarce be 
disposed of without considerable loss. The equitable regard, therefore, to his inter-
est requires that changes of this kind should never be introduced suddenly but 
slowly, gradually, and after a very long warning” (WN, IV.ii.44, p. 471).217 
In order to minimize the negative impacts of any sudden change in the general condi-
tions of international trade on these groups, both Smith and Ricardo recommended a 
slow and gradual implementation of free trade. This clearly underscores the assertion 
that both classical political economists were pragmatic free traders — not free-trade 
ideologues. They were able to see the potential downsides of a hasty restoration or im-
plementation of free trade, and advocated for proper actions to address them. 
Nevertheless, a gradual implementation of free trade may not be sufficient for safe-
guarding the economic interests of the most vulnerable groups. Additional measures 
should be considered, as indicated in the next section. 
                                                
 
217 Ricardo (Vol. I, chapter XIX, pp. 263-272) expressed similar concerns. 
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5.2.5 Public Investments in Human Capability-Expansion 
Until now, this doctoral thesis has been focused on highlighting the beneficial effect 
of free trade on the growth of real income per head, in correspondence with the analysis 
of Smith and other classical political economists. This approach implicitly sets the 
achievement of the highest possible real income as the paramount goal of economic 
policy. A similar approach can be found in the origins of development economics, the 
branch of the economic science that is dedicated to study the process of economic de-
velopment. When development economics emerged as a distinct field of study after the 
Second World War, its main focus was also on real income growth. While this was also a 
central issue in Smith and other classical political economists, one should remember that 
they always considered income as one of several distinctive means to important ends, 
which are very different from earning the highest possible income. The classical political 
economists recognized that individuals have reasons to value many things other than 
income and wealth, which relate to the real opportunities to lead the kind of life they 
would value living. They considered the freedom to lead valuable lives as an intrinsically 
important goal for every individual (Drèze & Sen, 1995, p. 10). 
In accordance with the above view, Drèze and Sen propose to conceive the process 
of economic development in terms of the expansion of the real freedoms that the citi-
zens enjoy to pursue the objectives they have reason to value, and in this sense the 
expansion of human capability can be seen as the central feature of the process of de-
velopment. The term capability refers to the alternative combination of doings and 
beings from which a person can choose. Thus, the notion of capability is essentially one 
of freedom — the range of options a person has in deciding what kind of a life to lead. 
According to this view, poverty lies not merely in the impoverished state in which a 
person actually lives, but also in the lack of real opportunity — given by social con-
straints as well as personal circumstances — to choose other types of living. Poverty is, 
thus, ultimately a matter of capability deprivation (Drèze & Sen, 1995, pp. 10-11). 
The expansion of human capabilities can clearly be enhanced by growth of income 
per head, but the impact of general economic growth on human capabilities can be ex-
tremely variable, depending, for example, on whether it is a participatory or non-
participatory process of economic growth (Drèze & Sen, 1989), and whether the eco-
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nomic gains from growth are channeled into remedying the capability deprivations of 
the most needed. Therefore, economic policies should be judged, ultimately, by their 
impact on the enhancement of the capabilities that the citizens enjoy. This differs sharp-
ly from the more standard practice of judging economic policies by their contribution to 
the growth of real incomes — seen as a merit in itself. To dispute this erroneous prac-
tice, though, should not be seen as an invitation to ignore the important instrumental 
role of economic growth in enhancing human capabilities; it is a matter of being clear 
about ends and means (Drèze & Sen, 1995, p. 12). 
If the central challenge of economic development is understood in terms of the need 
to expand human capabilities and social opportunities, then trade liberalization must 
necessarily be seen as occupying only one part of a larger stage. This means that a free 
trade policy should always be accompanied by public policies that expand the provision 
of public education218, job training, health care and infrastructure. 
At this point of the analysis one can appreciate the importance of making a sharp dis-
tinction between the classical and neoclassical case for free trade, and liberating the 
former from the unnecessary and harmful association with the notions of laissez-faire 
and general economic equilibrium. Both notions promote a picture of confrontation and 
mutual exclusion between the market and State, and try to minimize the role played by 
the State in the economy. In reality, though, the relationship between the market and the 
State in the opening up of economic opportunities and the social conditions that facili-
tate the use of those opportunities is first and foremost a complementary one.219 As 
Drèze and Sen rightly point out:  
“On the one hand, the opportunities offered by a well-functioning market may be 
difficult to use when a person is handicapped by, say, illiteracy or ill-health. On the 
other hand, a person with some education and fine health may still be unable to 
                                                
 
218 For the crucial connection between education and economic progress, see Schultz (1962, 
1963, 1982). 
219 According the Drèze and Sen, the failures of India with regard to economic development, for 
example, can be scarcely seen simply as the result of an overactive government. What can be 
justifiably seen as overactivity in some fields has been inseparably accompanied by thoroughgoing 
underactivity in others. It is not a simple question of more or less government. Rather, it is a ques-
tion of the type of governance to have, and of seeing the role of public policies in promoting as 
well as repressing social opportunities. See Drèze & Sen (1995, p. 8). 
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use his or her abilities because of the limitation of economic opportunities, related 
to the absence of markets, or overzealous bureaucratic control, or the lack of ac-
cess to finance, or some other restraint that limits economic initiatives. Social 
opportunities are, thus, influenced by a variety of factors — among other things, 
the state of educational and health services (and public policies that deal with 
them), the nature and availability of finance (and policies that affect them), the 
presence or absence of markets (and policies that promote or restrict them), and 
the form and reach of bureaucratic control in general (including the barriers to en-
terprise imposed by such control). (…) In focusing on social opportunities, we 
propose a perspective that is substantially broader that the narrow view that con-
centrates simply on promoting markets and competition, as well as the similarly 
narrow “contrary” view that just wants to debunk liberalization” (Drèze & Sen, 
1995, pp. 6-7). 
One can even argue that a gradual process of trade liberalization increases the need 
for a social safety net. Under free competition people are confronted with an economic 
environment characterized by a high level of dynamism and frequent restructuring. 
Some national industries will rise, while others may decline or completely disappear. 
This restructuring process may imply relocation of employment or temporary unem-
ployment, decline or abandonment of certain towns or regions, loss of some industry-
specific skills and other changes in the nature of society.220 If jobs are lost, employment 
and other social policies should be in place in order to retrain people, inform them of 
employment opportunities and assist them during the transition period. 
Free trade so conceived and properly implemented as recommended by classical po-
litical economy will never fail to result in higher economic growth rates and rising living 
standards for the population in the long run. The final section will deal with some gen-
eral recommendations regarding the best way to respond to the risks associated with the 
increasing level of interdependence between national economies. 
5.3 Reducing the Risks of Interdependence through Integration 
It is a rather undisputed fact that the widespread adoption of a free trade policy 
would spur the flourishing international trade even further, leading to an ever-increasing 
level of interdependence between national economies throughout the world. Notwith-
                                                
 
220 Some argue that these personal and social costs have to be in some way subtracted from the 
gains from trade (Prasch, 1996). 
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standing the important benefits — the gains from trade — of this growing economic 
interdependence, it would also increase the level of exposure and vulnerability of do-
mestic economies to external economic disturbances. 
The increased vulnerability to external shocks poses a considerable risk for the eco-
nomic stability of small countries in particular — the typical size for the majority of 
developing countries —, since a greater percentage of their total productive capacity is 
usually oriented towards export markets. Any severe economic or financial turmoil in 
one of its largest trade partners would certainly affect crucial sectors of the national 
economy. The part of the productive capacity that cannot be rapidly reoriented from 
export to domestic markets would become temporary idle. 
Some may argue that the risks associated with an ever-increasing level of economic 
interdependence between national economies should be considered as the necessary 
price to pay for the enhanced economic opportunities of international specialization. 
Others may counter that the economic and social costs of recent external shocks have 
been too high to ignore or tolerate. Both points of view are valid, and, fortunately, each 
of them can be honored without detriment of the other, since they are not mutually 
exclusive. By creating the proper international institutional framework it is rather feasi-
ble to tackle the risks of growing economic interdependence without curtailing the 
benefits of international specialization and economic globalization. 
The practical evidence suggests that external risks can be greatly reduced by pursuing 
economic integration at the regional level. Regional integration projects, when envisaged 
as open regionalism, not only encourage trade within member states but also with the 
rest of the world, while helping smaller countries in particular to dampen the negative 
impact of external economic disturbances. In order to accomplish these goals, regional 
integration efforts should not be conceived as projects of resistance to global market 
forces by which state actors re-impose boundaries at a supranational level, but as multi-
national institutional arrangements aimed at reducing the risks associated with 
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commercial and financial interdependence.221 Thus, a viable future for regionalism222 lies 
in building common institutions and pursuing deeper forms of economic, political and 
social integration at the regional level, while abstaining from granting preferential trade 
agreements among participating countries. 
In summary, free trade should not be conceived and implemented merely as an unfet-
tered exchange of commodities and services across political borders throughout the 
world. It should also include the unfettered movement of the two broad categories of 
factors of production — capital and labor. Therefore, the current process of economic 
globalization should be accompanied and supported by projects of economic, political 
and social integration at the regional level. The realization of such a broadly defined free 
trade principle should be the strategic goal of international economic policy for the 
twenty-first century. 
 
                                                
 
221 The relationship of regionalism to globalization is modeled in the literature either as open 
regionalism aimed at integration with the global market or as a project of resistance to global 
market forces. See Nesadurai (2002). 
222 The term regionalism is defined here as a states-led project to coordinate policies in a given 
region. It is, thus, contrasted with regionalization, which is defined as a process of regional inte-
gration driven primarily by markets, or more specifically, by the actions of private 
corporate/economic actors. See Wyatt-Walter (1997). 
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Conclusions 
If all economists were laid end to end, they would not reach 
a conclusion. 
George Bernard Shaw 
Free trade would be a powerful lever for spreading economic growth and develop-
ment around the world if it would be embraced and implemented by many 
governments. It is in fact the most suitable international trade policy for developed as 
well as developing economies. 
The success of a free trade policy depends to a great extend, though, on how it is 
conceived, explained and implemented in the real world, which is predetermined by the 
underlying economic paradigm that sustains it. As this doctoral thesis has shown, there 
is not a single monolithic case for free trade in international trade theory but two fun-
damentally different, competing and mutually exclusive cases: the case for free trade 
made by classical political economy, and the currently mainstream case for free trade of 
the neoclassical school of economic thought. 
The core contribution of this dissertation is the restatement of the classical case for 
free trade. This restatement is based on the accurate interpretation of Ricardo’s compar-
ative advantage insight. In contrast to what is actually written in contemporary 
economic textbooks, Ricardo’s numerical example of chapter 7 of the Principles does not 
offer a new rule or law for international specialization. What he originally intended to 
prove with the four magic numbers were two novel and interrelated propositions: 1) 
that his labor theory of value does not determine the relative value of commodities in 
international exchanges when the factors of production — labor and capital — are im-
mobile between countries; and 2) the associated corollary that a country would import a 
certain amount of a commodity although it could produce it with less amount of labor 
than the exporting country. 
These two new propositions are not laws or principles that lead to free trade. Never-
theless, they constitute important insights for the free trade case. The proposition 
regarding the non-appliance of the labor theory of value in international trade offers a 
plain explanation for why higher real labor costs in poorer countries do not command 
higher prices for their commodities in international markets. The corollary of this prop-
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osition regarding comparative advantage refutes the previous notion that commodities 
would be produced in the locations with the lowest real costs of production. This fur-
ther strengthens the insight that every country, no matter how rich or poor, has the 
chance to participate under favorable terms in the free international exchange of com-
modities and services. 
The accurate interpretation of the numerical example in the Principles reconciles Ri-
cardo’s propositions with Smith’s theory of international trade, and restitutes Smith’s 
insight regarding the benefits of the division of labor and specialization to its original 
place as the core argument in favor of free trade. Both classical political economists also 
agreed on the propositions that free trade would increase the amounts of commodities 
available for consumption to the utmost, that the gains from international trade are 
mutual, and that these gains consist mainly of an increase in labor productivity in the 
respective countries. 
Smith and Ricardo used the same rule of specialization, which can be applied to the 
specialization between individuals, regions and countries. It has been labeled here as the 
classical rule of specialization. Applied to international exchanges the classical rule of 
specialization states it pays to import commodities from abroad whenever they can be 
obtained in exchange for exports at a smaller real cost than their production at home 
would entail. The economic gains from this international exchange can be measured by 
calculating the difference between the real costs of the exported commodities that have 
been sent in exchange for the imports, and the expected real costs of producing the 
imported commodities at home. 
For the application of the classical rule of specialization there has to be persistent real 
cost differences between countries in producing the amounts of commodities traded. 
These persistent real cost differences among countries are the result of different natural 
conditions — such as soil, climate and geographic location — and artificial advantages 
— like education, production skills, economies of scale and historical development. 
These factors are usually labeled in the economic literature as sources of comparative 
advantage. 
The observed pattern of international trade is the result of several sources of compar-
ative advantage working simultaneously. Therefore, any modeling approach that 
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highlights a single factor and excludes all others by assumption would offer an incom-
plete explanation for the current pattern of international trade. 
The restatement of the classical case for free trade shows that it does not rely on un-
realistic assumptions like, for example, constant return to scale or perfect competition. 
These assumptions were introduced later on by the neoclassical theory of international 
trade and its associated trade models. 
Furthermore, the accurate interpretation of Smith’s international trade theory dis-
misses the current association of the free trade case with the laissez-faire doctrine. 
Although Smith rejected most government interventions into the free exchange of 
commodities across political borders, he did not preclude government intervention in 
other areas of the economy. Smith rejects most trade interventions because they are not 
made on behalf of the general interest of the society, but on behalf of private interests 
of powerful groups. These trade interventions impose considerable costs to the con-
sumers, and will most likely fail to achieve the proclaimed objectives. 
Instead of assuming an automatic compatibility between selfish private interests and 
the interests of the society as a whole, Smith holds to a more nuanced position that 
competition within the framework of natural liberty ensures a broad but imperfect har-
mony of the private interests of individuals and the general interest of the society, with 
the government creating an institutional framework that would regulate the economic 
activities of the private economic agents where a conflict of interest may subsist. Under 
this conception, government interference with the free operation of self-interest is not 
only allowed but also necessary in order to secure the economic progress of the country.  
Under the influence of the mainstream neoclassical paradigm, the case for free trade 
has lost its once formidable intellectual appeal. Neoclassical economists have degraded 
the issue of free trade to a mere appendix of the modern version of the laissez-faire 
doctrine: the general economic equilibrium paradigm. 
One of the weakest points of the general economic equilibrium paradigm consists of 
its failure to provide a satisfactory and straightforward explanation for increases in 
productivity and economic growth. This intrinsic weakness makes it the least suitable 
theoretic framework for an appealing case for free trade, which should be built upon the 
beneficial effects of international trade on the productive forces of labor and the eco-
nomic growth of a country.  
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The general economic equilibrium paradigm incorporates unrealistic assumptions to 
the free trade case like constant return to scale and perfect competition, which are not 
part of the original case for free trade formulated by classical political economy. In addi-
tion to this, neoclassical economists have formulated theoretic trade models that mystify 
core classical insights like the one regarding comparative advantage. 
The so-called Ricardian model of modern economic textbooks, for example, departs in 
key aspects — main purpose, logical construction, assumptions and implications — 
from Ricardo’s numerical example in chapter 7 of the Principles. Ricardo’s original nu-
merical example does not assume constant labor costs, zero transportation costs and 
perfect internal mobility of the factors of production. Neither does it imply complete 
specialization, as the Ricardian model does. More importantly, the Ricardian model omits 
any reference to the main proposition of the numerical example in the Principles regard-
ing the labor theory of value. Given these differences, one should not consider the 
Ricardian model of contemporary economic textbooks as part of Ricardo’s theory of 
international trade. 
Besides the questionable merit of linking free trade to the general economic equilibri-
um paradigm, the neoclassical trade models have not introduced a single original idea to 
the theory of international trade. Smith clearly anticipated Heckscher’s idea regarding 
the importance of the differences in the relative factor supplies and relative factor prices 
for the determination of comparative advantage and the pattern of international trade. 
But instead of assuming the quantities and the productivity of resources to be static and 
exogenously given — as the Heckscher-Ohlin approach does —, Smith views the long-
er-run changes in factor supplies and their productivity as the outcome of the two major 
forces of domestic economic development: capital accumulation and the division of 
labor. 
The neoclassical case for free trade offers plenty of weak spots for potential challeng-
es from scholars that oppose the idea of free trade. Not surprisingly, it has been recently 
challenged by new arguments — strategic trade policy and external economies — as 
well as an old argument — infant industries — for protection. These arguments for 
protection can be refuted by the restatement of the classical case for free trade. 
The classical case for free trade also provides valuable insights for a successful im-
plementation of free trade, which are particularly relevant for developing countries. It 
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urges governments to abstain from signing PTAs. Instead, they should implement free 
trade unilaterally, and abstain from automatic retaliations to foreign trade restrictions. 
Those governments who have embraced the free trade principle should pressure others 
for reciprocity. The increased level of vulnerability to external economic disturbances 
can be counterbalanced by a higher degree of economic, social and political integration 
at the regional level. 
Finally, free trade should always be implemented gradually, in order to take care of 
those groups who will be affected in the short run by this economic policy change. It 
should always be accompanied by public policies that expand the provision of public 
education, job training, health care and infrastructure.  
Economic globalization is a discretionary process — not an inevitable one. Human 
wisdom and insight can and should direct the general direction of this process. There 
are indeed more desirable alternatives to the present version of economic globalization, 
but none of them imply the return to protectionism and national self-sufficiency. A 
greater degree of national self-reliance would necessarily imply less economic wealth 
available to the population of a particular country. The material wealth available in a 
society is always the fund on which local and national governments rely to finance the 
valuable services it should provide to its residents — education, health care, modern 
infrastructure, justice and protection, to name the most important ones. Less material 
wealth available necessarily means a diminished ability to provide these vital social ser-
vices. Moreover, free international trade makes an important contribution to securing 
peace among nations. Therefore, the case for free trade is not in any way diminished by 
taking non-materialistic goals into consideration. 
Although formulated over two hundred years ago, the classical case for free trade has 
not lost its original intellectual appeal and practical relevance. On the contrary, it still 
offers valuable insights for building an international economic order which benefits the 
overwhelming majority of the world’s population currently living in developing coun-
tries. For that it needs to be restituted to its original place as the mainstream explanation 
for the virtues of free international trade.  
 
 Recommendations 
-201- 
Recommendations 
If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; 
but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end 
in certainties. 
Francis Bacon 
This doctoral thesis has evidenced the intrinsic strength and appeal of classical politi-
cal economy in dealing with current economic problems related to international trade. 
The theoretical elegance yet relative simplicity of the classical case for free trade first 
formulated by Adam Smith and later corrected and complemented by David Ricardo is 
striking, particularly if one compares it to the currently mainstream neoclassical case for 
free trade. 
Therefore, I strongly recommend a revival of the academic interest in the classical 
school of economic thought and its associated concepts and analytical perspectives. 
Classical political economy should not be seen anymore as a mere forerunner of the 
mainstream neoclassical paradigm, but as a viable alternative to it. 
Moreover, this doctoral thesis has also put into evidence the paramount role of value 
and distribution theories in the formulation of international trade theories. It is accurate 
to affirm that value and distribution theories are at the very core of any theoretical sys-
tem about the functioning of the economy. Thus, I would like to recommend the 
repositioning of Ricardo’s labor theory of value as a legitimate alternative to the main-
stream general economic equilibrium paradigm. 
The above recommendations would certainly reorient a significant part of present-day 
economic research from the current fixation with arid mathematical puzzles created by 
the general economic equilibrium paradigm to the search for viable remedies to the 
obtrusive socioeconomic problems of our times. This change of focus would probably 
cure many contemporary economists from their noticeable policy-reticence, and absolve 
the economic science from the current critique that it does not make any significant 
contributions to the solution of real-life economic problems. 
In terms of methodological approach, the restatement of the classical case for free 
trade has been accomplished by going back to the primary sources, instead of relying on 
 Recommendations 
-202- 
secondary literature and received opinions. Although often a time-consuming and de-
manding process, this research approach never fails to pay off. 
It is a rather vivid indication for the unsatisfactory state of present-day economic in-
struction at universities that nowadays it is perfectly possible to graduate in economics 
without having ever to consult seminal economic literature like Smith’s Wealth of Nations 
or Ricardo’s Principles. Instead of encouraging today’s undergraduate students to read 
and interpret the primary sources, the present economic textbooks train them in math-
ematical models like the so-called Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models, which barely 
resemble and often contradict the original ideas and propositions of the economists 
after which they have been labeled. 
Given the many contradictions and incompatibilities of the Ricardian model with Ri-
cardo’s authentic theory of international trade, the authors of these economic textbooks 
might perhaps consider the possibility of replacing the former with the original numeri-
cal example of the Principles. The proposed change would not only increase the 
theoretical accuracy of these textbooks with respect to the primary source, but would 
also be advantageous from a didactical perspective, since Ricardo’s original demonstra-
tion of the comparative-advantage proposition is clearly superior in terms of simplicity 
and reliance on realistic assumptions. As a second option, the textbook authors could at 
least rename the Ricardian trade model to, for example, Constant Unitary Labor Costs 
Model (CULC), in order to disassociate it from Ricardo’s theory of international trade. 
The current process of economic globalization is the most significant development of 
our lifetime. For this process to yield the expected benefits for the majority of the 
worlds’ population, it has not only to be conceived and implemented differently, but 
also explained in a way that everybody — not only professional economists — can un-
derstand. Those who are committed to this valuable task of instruction may find in the 
classical school of economic thought a suitable theoretic framework to begin with. 
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